Citizenship ‘from Above’? The Case of Chile, 1964-2010

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Abstract: During the last fifty years, citizenship in Chile has been re-interpreted and reformulated in different ways. By combining top-down and bottom-up approaches towards citizenship, this article argues that the reformulation of citizenship in Chile has been brought about through both state-initiated projects and civil society responses, which have interacted over time. State projects have been based on ideological doctrines in order to resolve problems emanating from ‘below’, while civil society responses have come in reaction to the ways in which the state has sought to implement its projects. Even though this historical process has produced periods of rapid expansion and radical restriction of citizenship, in the end it has produced a stable but asymmetric model of citizenship in Chile. Keywords: citizenship, Latin America, Chile, democracy, Concertación.

The election of Sebastián Piñera as president of Chile in January 2010 marked the end of twenty years of non-stop centre-Left government by the Concertación-coalition. Even though few Chileans seemed to expect the newly elected conservative government to embark on a fundamentally different course from its predecessors (Navia 2010a), it nevertheless signified the end of a unique phase in Chilean history. Undoubtedly, the Concertación-era will enter the history books as a period of unprecedented economic growth and stability. It will also remain known as a phase in Chilean history in which citizenship was re-interpreted and re-formulated after a long period of political turmoil and authoritarian rule.

This article explores the development of citizenship in Chile from the mid-1960s to the present. It argues that traditional approaches towards citizenship in the context of Latin America overemphasize either its top-down implementation or bottom-up contestation. Instead, it proposes an alternative by using the structure-agent approach to an analysis of citizenship, emphasizing the interaction between the state (acting as a structure) and civil society (the agent). The mutual constitution of these two highlights the ways in which state actions have generated civil society identities and interests, and vice versa, in the context of citizenship formation. Additionally, by emphasizing the dynamic nature of the process, this perspective allows us to trace the historical origins of citizenship in Chile today.

For several reasons, the case of Chile is particularly enlightening for the study of the interaction between state and citizenry in the mutual constitution of citizenship. To begin with, compared to what has been characteristic to the rest of Latin America, the country has known a relatively high level of institutional stability as well as cohesive elites (Eisenstadt 2002, Góngora 1986). This has allowed for the implementation of well-articulated elite projects of social, economic, and political modernization (Silva 2008). Second, Chile’s political elites have been particularly engaged in political ideologies and doctrines. This has translated into a tendency to base their political projects on intellectual worldviews (which were often imported and adapted from foreign sources) (Silva 2008). This is not to say that Chilean political projects did not serve the interests of particular sectors of society, but rather that they did so with reference to, and inspired by, ideological concepts and doc-
trines. As a result, the reframing of citizenship formations by political elites can be traced back to their intellectual origins.

Even though these projects initially provoked relatively little civil society responses (comparatively speaking), from the 1960s on there was a profound change. In the context of expanding citizenship demands combined with a faltering socio-economic strategy, political elites and the citizenry produced particularly intense dialectics, which to a large extent centred on the nature and quality of citizenship (Jocelyn-Holt 1998, van der Ree 2007). This resulted in four ideologically very different projects: a communitarian reform project under the Christian Democrat government of Eduardo Frei (1964-1970), a Socialist but democratic experiment under Salvador Allende (1970-1973), an authoritarian neo-liberal scheme under the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990), and, finally, a democratic market-oriented model under the governments of the Concertación coalition (1990-2010). For all their ideological differences, these projects have in common a concern with the redefinition of citizenship in the country as well as tension between top-down aspirations and bottom-up responses. Eventually, the balance has tipped towards an asymmetric mix of all four projects.

**Citizenship from above and below**

Citizenship is usually understood in terms of arrangements that give shape to the relations between the civil society and the state (Bendix 1996, xii). As Yashar (1999, 80), drawing from Jenson and Philips (1996), puts it, these ‘citizen regimes’ not only reflect ‘bundles of rights and responsibilities that citizenship can offer’ but also refer to the ‘accompanying modes of interest intermediation’. As a consequence, the notion of citizenship is not restricted to relatively fixed sets of social orders, but includes, in a very significant way, elements of renegotiation and re-definition. Citizenship should therefore not be understood in terms of social order, but rather in terms of social practice that is embedded in discursive negotiations between civil society and the state (Purvis and Hunt 1999).

The literature on citizenship can be separated roughly into two different camps: one that emphasizes the role of the state, and another that focuses on the role of civil society. The first starts out with T. H. Marshall’s (1950) conceptualization of citizenship as an expanding state project, spilling over from the civil into the political, and finally the social realm. For the context of Latin America, however, alternative realms have been proposed for the granting of citizenship. Some have suggested special citizen arrangements for indigenous minorities (Grey Postero 2006) while others have criticized the individualist bias Marshall’s understanding of citizenship carries, proposing a more communal understanding of citizenship in the Latin American context (Yashar 2005). Nevertheless, a more critical current challenges the optimism that underlies Marshall’s approach. As Taylor (1998) argued, the attention on Marshall’s conceptualization of political rights excludes many forms of political participation. In fact, in Latin America the state not only restricts citizenship in many ways, but has even reversed the granting of citizenship since the 1980s (Salman 2004, Cameron 2007). The main cause of this reversion is usually identified with the rise of neo-liberal economic policies and the subsequent withdrawal of the state (Weyland 2004, Foweraker 2001, Oxhorn 2004)
The second camp, which originally focused on the ways in which labour unions and other organizations fought for the achievement of citizen’s rights, has emphasized the role of civil society. This has included sectors such as women, blacks, the elderly, home-owners, ethnic minorities, and homosexuals (Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar 1998). More recently, it has put central the ways in which Latin American civil society groups, particularly indigenous movements, choose not to petition for citizenship, but rather contest it (Dagnino 2003). As Yashar argues, the ways in which the Latin American state historically produced regimes that regulated ‘who has political membership, which rights they possess, and how interest mediation with the state is structured’ (2005, 6) has also produced patterns of exclusion and structural disempowerment which have given rise to the contestation of both the state and the concept of citizenship.

The above provides a basic framework for understanding the dynamics of the formation and development of citizenship formations. From the perspective of the state, citizenship can be both granted and revoked in different realms of citizen’s rights. From the perspective of civil society, citizenship can be both petitioned and contested. As has been pointed out in the previous section, it is the purpose of this article to show that none of these four stories can provide a satisfactory understanding of the dynamics of citizenship formation. Rather, it proposes a circular understanding, roughly based on Giddens’ notion of structuration (1984), known today as the structure-agent approach. From this perspective, the state acts as a structure which imposes a certain formation of citizenship (either expansive or restrictive) that produces certain social identities and meanings for different sectors of the population. However, agents (civil society) are not completely determined by these new social identities, and can play out different kinds of responsive strategies: passivity, petitioning for more citizen rights, or contestation of citizenship. These responses, in turn, give meaning to new state-level initiatives in the formation of citizenship, and so the circle continues. This perspective allows us to analyse the ways in which the state and civil society mutually constitute each other in the struggle over citizenship without reducing its dynamic to a structuralist or reductionist process. Additionally, it adds a historical dimension to the whole, as previous cycles of engagement between state and civil society produce the interests, identities and meanings that will guide the next cycle. Thus, we can trace the historical process of the formation of current citizen regimes to its earlier roots.

Towards a communitarian citizenship, 1964-1970

The Christian Democrat’s programme, labelled ‘Revolution in Liberty’, was not the first attempt to widen social and political citizenship in Chile. During the two previous decades, for instance, women were granted suffrage, and voters in the countryside were protected from the traditional coercion by the landowning classes. This had produced a significant growth of popular awareness of extended citizen’s rights, both political and social (Jocelyn-Holt 1997). However, the Christian Democrat project was a break with these gradual moves because of its wide range and depth. Additionally, it took place in the context of the breakdown of the import-substitution programme that had been set in motion in the 1940s. As many analysts at the time argued, a sustainable re-structuring of the economy could only
be successful if it went hand in hand with an extension of social and political citizenship (Ahumada 1958, Pinto 1958). It was the Christian Democrats’ attempt to achieve this goal that ended up placing the extension of citizenship in the context of civil disorder.

The Christian Democrats felt they were ideologically well-prepared to take up the challenge. Having evolved out of the Conservative Party in the late 1930s, they had developed a particular ideology that focused on the ways in which class harmony could be constructed in the context of modernity. Based on the writings of Jacques Maritain, they fused Christian-based understandings of human dignity and value with the functionings of the secular state into a form of communitarian citizenship. Central in this understanding of citizenship was the notion of ‘intermediary groups’ (family, church, the corporation, labour unions) in which all citizens would be incorporated. These groups would subsequently function as representative organs of their members towards the state. In this way, the individual would be strengthened vis-à-vis the state, and class differences would be minimised (as, for instance, workers would be both the members of companies and of labour unions) (González 1989). The re-foundation of citizenship on the basis of communitarianism would create, the Christian Democrats argued, a ‘true democracy’ which would allow all citizens access to all decision-making levels through their representation in ‘intermediate groups’ (Cardemil 1997, 156). Thus, by integrating all individual members of the population in politically recognized intermediate groups, both social and political citizenship could be expanded without engendering political conflict.

Obviously, the Christian Democrats were not concerned with citizenship issues exclusively. Important sectors of the party (including party leader and President Eduardo Frei Montalva) took expansion of citizenship as an instrumental sine qua non for economic modernization as well as a political weapon against the rise of the Left. From this perspective, the ending of latifundia and the inclusion of the marginal urban masses would be an essential step towards the formation of a country that would be able to combine rapid economic growth with institutional and political stability. As Frei put it two years into his presidency, the country first needed:

…highly accelerated economic growth, without which the country’s problems have no solution, and second,…social development, without which the people have no destiny (Frei Montalva 1966).

Be it for ideological reasons or for pragmatic considerations, the PDC set out to expand citizenship rapidly and fundamentally. Two sectors would be particularly affected: the urban marginals and the agricultural sector.

In the urban marginal sectors, a massive self-help programme called promoción popular (popular promotion) was initiated, which sought to alleviate the lives of the pobladores in the many shanty-towns. This included distributing tools and technical assistance as well as setting up a myriad of intermediate organizations (such as mothers’ centres, neighbourhood committees) that were intended to emancipate the population collectively, even granting them some political clout in several cases (González 1989). In the countryside, large-scale agrarian reform reorganized most of the rural workers in cooperatives, freeing them from the traditional
latifundia and simultaneously providing them with political and social citizenship in the form of collective representation (Moulian and Guerra 2000).

Despite the PDC’s ideological enthusiasm, the implementation of their programme was far from lacking electoral considerations. Both the marginal urban pobladores and the rural workers had been excluded from political participation, and were therefore a welcome contribution to the parties’ constituencies. This set in motion an intense competition with the Left, which subsequently sought to expand its urban labour support to the poblaciones as well as in the countryside. In this process of ideological outbidding, both sectors increasingly used revolutionary discourse in order to garner support. As a consequence, the Left voted against many reforms it would have hailed some years earlier (Valenzuela 2003). Meanwhile, it started to develop its own understandings of citizenship, which outran the Christian Democrat programme by miles.

Thus, by the end of the 1960s, the reformulation of citizenship had become the target of intense inter-party competition, which provoked an ideological and electoral ‘arms race’ between them. Additionally, large sectors of the urban working classes remained disenchanted with the achievements of the Christian Democrat government. This offered significant sections of the population new roles and logics for action, leading to wide-spread strikes, demonstrations, and illegal land take-overs, as well as some first inklings of political terrorism. The state, under leadership of Eduardo Frei’s government, immediately took a restrictive and repressive stand, and brought the citizenship expansion programme to a halt (Cardemil 1997, 256). However, the discontinuation of both agrarian reform and the promoción popular, together with the violent repression of demonstrations, was not enough to restore order. Expansion of citizen’s rights had now become closely tied to, if not synonymous with, political and social unrest based on ‘the right of having rights’ (Dagnino 2003).

Socialist citizenship in democracy? The UP government, 1970-1973

Under the government of the Popular Unity (Unidad Popular, UP) government of Salvador Allende, the linkage between the expansion of citizenship and civil unrest acquired the additional association of the total breakdown of society. The failure of Christian Democrat reformism had produced significant scepticism among important sectors of the Left about the viability of a peaceful transition to socialism. Nevertheless, the left-wing UP government that came to power in 1970 remained united – at least initially – by its electoral programme. This programme was a highly original amalgamation of Marxist and liberal thought, proposing a reformulation of citizenship on the basis of both. Arguing in the same vein as the Christian Democrats before them that liberal democracy offered little more than a hollow and formalistic citizenship, it proposed a ‘true democracy’ on the basis of the ‘participation of the whole population in the vital decisions for the course of the country’ (Allende, quoted in Cardemil 1997, 332).

The UP’s ‘true democracy’ was based on two central ideas, which were brought together under the banner of poder popular (popular power). On the one hand, it would expand political citizenship by directly involving the working class in political decision-making, both national and regional. To this end, a unicameral popu-
lar assembly was to be installed, replacing the bicameral system, giving the workers representation in all political decision-making. More radically, the UP proposed to extend the Christian Democrat idea of collective citizenship to the realm of policy-making. Worker’s unions and other collectives (such as neighbourhood committees) would be integrated into all administrative bodies and bear direct political responsibility, thus allowing for full political citizenship—that is, for the working class.

On the other hand, citizenship was to be extended to the socio-economic realm, by passing on most of the productive sectors into the worker’s hands. This would take place in two steps. First, a substantial part of the productive sector was to be nationalized into what was called the ‘social area’ of the economy. While these nationalizations excluded most of the small enterprises, they comprised the bulk of national industry in terms of employment (De Vylder 1976). This way, it was argued, the state would be able to guarantee a whole range of social rights to the workers, including work, welfare, home-ownership, education, etc. Second, this extension of social citizenship was to be crowned with allowing the workers direct participation in the administration of the nationalized companies. This would also be done in the countryside, where an intensification of the agrarian reforms would lead to the foundation of Cuban-style cooperative agricultural societies (Falcoff 1991, 101).

While the UP’s popular power programme pushed the Christian Democrat’s notion of collective citizenship farther into the realms of political and social citizenship, it stopped short of promoting a full-scale state-run socialist utopia. The maintenance of certain essential aspects of liberal democracy was at the heart of the UP project. This included the electoral system, the judiciary, a range of liberal rights such as the freedom of speech, and the free market for those sectors of the economy that did not fall under the ‘social area’. Even if during the UP government radical sections of the coalition increasingly started pressuring these democratic elements of the programme in an attempt to push through social and political reform, in essence the democratic plural system remained intact (Arrate 1985: 76).

The implementation of the UP’s citizenship model took place in the context of extreme controversy and contestation. As a consequence, several of its key elements never materialized. The idea for a unicameral popular assembly was postponed in the light of Congressional opposition and never re-emerged. Similarly, the ‘social area’ of the economy was never formally institutionalized, even though a wave of nationalizations took place by the end of 1971, bringing some 125 companies under state tutelage and worker’s control. The most successful element of the UP’s programme in this respect was agricultural reform (which had been initiated by the Frei government), which took place in relative autonomy, and was able to organize a large part of the country’s countryside in agricultural cooperatives with worker’s participation (Falcoff 1991).

The project of the Unidad Popular did not confine itself to change through institutional pathways only. It also involved a high level of mass mobilization and political agitation. Partially, these responses were inspired by the opposition, which sought to block the UP’s most far-fetched proposals. For another part, though, new roles were created for the radical sectors inside and outside the UP, which feared a repetition of the Christian Democrat reformist failure. To these radical groups, citizenship claims were seen as a legitimate pathway for the abolition of ‘bourgeois’
democracy altogether. Their actions, also running under the banner of ‘popular power’, consisted of massive demonstrations, land seizures, occupations, and strikes, pressuring the government to keep its word on the granting of social and political rights. Thus, the interesting situation emerged that citizenship claims were articulated not because of political and social exclusion (as for instance Biekhart, 2005, argues for the general Latin American context), but rather as a result of inconclusive and relative inclusion.

As a result, the extension of social and political citizenship was increasingly placed in the context of not just civil unrest, but even the breakdown of the institutional order. Under pressure of massive reclamation of social, political, and economic rights, intense opposition from the Christian Democrats and the Right, and, after 1971, a collapsing economy, the Allende government was forced to make choices. It could either push forward its socialist programme at the cost of democratic plurality, or reverse its reform programme in an attempt to restore order (as Frei had done before). However, Allende proved unable or unwilling to make either choice. In the end, this crisis could not be resolved within the existing institutional framework, producing a context of institutional breakdown that allowed for a military intervention (O’Donnell 1977; van der Ree 2007, 173-180).

Authoritarian market citizenship, 1973-1990

In most studies on the development of citizenship in contemporary Chile the period of the military regime is usually perceived in two ways: as a period in which citizenship was largely withdrawn, and as a turning point in which collective citizenship was replaced with individualism and market orientation (Oxhorn 2004, Yashar 2005). Both these movements obtained relative legitimacy and meaning within the context of the strong association between the expansion of citizenship and institutional breakdown.

Even though the military government suspended practically all political rights after the military coup in 1973, it was not unconcerned with citizenship. This was reflected in the ways in which, after the initial years of extreme repression and restructuring, the regime was at pains to formally institutionalize a new model of citizenship. It did so by installing a new constitution that included, amongst others, a time-table for the return of a ‘restricted democracy’. Nevertheless, the experiences of the UP government, as well as Christian Democrat government before it, had instilled upon the military (as well as on their conservative civilian supporters) the conviction that only a radical break would be able to save the country from chaos, socialism, and the complete annihilation of the Right as a social-economic class (Roxborough et al. 1977, 106).

The citizenship formation that was developed by the military regime was based on three pillars. The first was the authority of the military and the ‘depolitization of society’, with the associated suspension (and later restriction) of political rights (O’Donnell 1977). The second was the formation of a conservative social and legal order which would function as a foundational legitimization of the regime – even after a return to democracy. The third was a neo-liberal economy, which transformed traditional collective understandings of citizenship into individualist market-oriented societal roles.
The first pillar of military authority and the ‘depolitization of society’ was highly restrictive in terms of citizenship. When the military came to power in 1973, they had no proper vision of how to restructure citizenship, and focused instead on the withdrawal of political rights (Pollack 1999). From this perspective, claims to rights were strictly tied to the acknowledgement of military authority, the legacy of the nineteenth century ‘Portalian state’ and an adherence to conservative and Catholic values (Huneeus 2007, 139-152).

The second pillar of the regime’s approach of citizenship came in the form of the gremialista movement, a civilian movement that formed an important ideological source for the regime. This movement, headed by the conservative ideologue Jaime Guzmán, had been particularly successful in the opposition against Allende. After the coup, it became a vital support basis for the military regime, and took a large responsibility in drafting the regime’s 1974 ‘Declaration of Principles’ and the 1980 constitution.

The ideology of the gremialistas was, once again, based on a collective understanding of citizenship. However, in the gremialista conceptualization, the ‘intermediary groups’ were not supposed to represent their members vis-à-vis the state. Instead, they were expected to focus exclusively on their primary function. Thus, the Church should not engage in politics or social critiques, but focus on religious teaching, while the University should restrict its activities to academic practices. In this way, individuals would be embedded in a wide range of private circles that would fulfil most of their needs. This would allow the state to fulfil only a subsidiary role, only taking care of the rights and services that the intermediate groups could not fulfil (Cristi 2000, 167). Thus, the gremialistas argued, the Christian Democrats’ promoción popular and the UP’s poder popular would make way for poder social, or social power, consisting of the ability of the ‘intermediate groups’ to fulfil the needs of their members (Military Government 1974).

The third foundational pillar of citizenship under the military regime came from the so-called ‘Chicago Boys’, US-trained economists that were put in charge of the restructuring of the economy in 1975. Based on the teachings of (among others) Milton Friedman, their neo-liberal policies involved a radical withdrawal of the state from public life, and the introduction of market mechanisms in its place. As a consequence, they argued, political citizenship should be abolished, as the market would now come to fulfil the needs of the population. The functions of political and social citizenship would be provided through consumption, job markets, and other market mechanisms. Citizenship would come from consumption, and the state would remain subsidiary to the market (Lavin 1987). Only civil rights and, in the case of extreme poverty, social support were to be granted by the state, as a means of providing a level playing field (Huneeus 2007).

In the context of a longer-term restoration of order by the military and its ideological legitimization by the gremialistas, the market transformations of the Chicago Boys turned out to produce a slow but significant transformation of citizenship orientation in the country. Supporters of the regime hailed the transition from state to market ‘citizenship’ (Lavin 1978), while the opposition denounced the negative socio-political impact of this process (Tironi 1988). By the late 1980s, however, the restriction of citizenship still reflected more of the response to the fear of chaos and civil unrest that it had become associated with than to the new
sets of roles and meanings that the new neo-liberal social-political order was providing the population with. This was possibly best illustrated by the 1988 referendum, where the Pinochetista camp (campaigning for ten more years of authoritarian rule) used images of chaos and Soviet-style repression in order to deter the population from voting for a transition to democracy. The fact that Pinochet still received some 43 per cent of the vote (in an admittedly unequal ballot) suggests how powerful this juxtaposition between citizenship and political breakdown still was, some fifteen years after the fall of the Allende government.

Growth with equity under the Concertación? 1990-2010

During the twenty years of Concertación rule, citizenship was again redefined, largely in response to the previous adjustments. This took place in two phases. In the first phase, specific aspects of social citizenship were transferred back to the responsibility of the state, while political citizenship was restored to the level of formal democratic rights. Bottom-up citizenship claims were, however, neither articulated nor stimulated, and individualistic market logics increasingly permeated Chile’s social fabric. In the second phase, however, modest attempts were made by the Concertación to give the state a more central role in the provision of social citizenship, as well as to stimulate political citizenship by encouraging civil society participation.

When in 1990 the Concertación coalition came to power consisting of Christian Democrat, Socialist, and several smaller parties, it converged on the so-called ‘Growth with Equity’ ticket, emphasizing the mutual dependence of economic growth and social justice. Reminiscent of arguments made by Christian Democrat economists of the 1950s, it was argued that only economic expansion can produce the fiscal revenues to finance social inclusion, while only a society without substantial social exclusion would be able to sustain economic growth in the longer run. Thus, the Concertación emphasized pragmatic market economics, fiscal austerity, as well as poverty reduction, all in the context of the country’s newfound democracy.

Despite a low level of civil society participation during the transition towards democracy, the installation of the first new democratic government of the Concertación coalition in 1990 (headed by Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin) engendered high expectations regarding the redefinition of citizenship. Many, particularly among the Left, hoped and aspired for a return to high levels of political and social citizenship. However, rather than seizing the moment in order to move from ‘formal’ democracy to ‘true’ democracy, as the Christian Democrats and Socialists of the 1960s and early 1970s had advocated, the Aylwin government was happy to settle with the former.

The choice to follow a very moderate course in the expansion of citizenship came from three main sources. First of all, governability was put central in the reestablishment of democracy (Boeninger 1998). On the one hand, this reflected the fear of civil unrest that had now become so intrinsically tied to the notion of extended political citizenship (Silva 1999). On the other, it came from the careful way in which the Concertación had negotiated the transition towards democracy, both with its own constituencies as well as with the opposition (Moreno 2006, 84-
Additionally, the Concertación, being born out of political wedlock between Socialists and Christian Democrats, had developed towards an increasingly technocratic style of governance, in which pragmatic solution-making and consensus were prioritized above political dialectics and popular participation (Silva 1991).

Second, the Concertación faced considerable opposition from the Right, both in parliament and among business elites. Several so-called ‘authoritarian enclaves’ (which had been introduced by the gremialistas into the constitution of 1980) ensured that the new democratic governments would have to maintain the existing neo-liberal structures, and would need the support of the Right for any important reforms (Moulian 1997, 335-6).

Third, the Concertación argued that social and political rights should not be allowed to jeopardize economic growth. Being well aware of the military regime’s success in garnering support on the basis of its economic performance, the Aylwin government did not want to risk losing economic momentum. Thus, it shied away from activating civil society agencies that might eventually push for populist measures and weaken growth, as had been the case in neighbouring Argentina in the mid-1980s (Taylor 1998).

In the context of these restraints, the Concertación chose to limit the expansion of citizenship to very specific areas. Political citizenship was restored in the form of electoral democracy, but never regained any emphasis on collective rights or ‘intermediate groups’. Even though the Aylwin government did make some effort to improve the position of labour unions, they have nevertheless remained notoriously weak ever since (De la Maza 1999). Furthermore, social citizenship remained restricted to poverty reduction, while the government emphasized the importance of the free market in the fulfilment of the population’s needs.

The Chilean model of citizenship that emerged in the early 1990s was thus characterized by formal democratic rights, an elitist political culture that allowed for practically no political participation, and social rights in the form of poverty reduction policies for the poorest sectors of society. Furthermore, even while poverty dropped impressively during the 1990s, inequality in Chile increased, making it one of the most unequal countries of South America. In many ways, therefore, Chilean citizenship followed the general Latin American trend of citizenship under neo-liberalism: individualistic in stead of collectivist, with an strong emphasis on consumerism in stead of citizens’ rights, and a fragmented and disarticulated civil society that was unable to strengthen the rights of the population (Dagnino 2003, de la Maza 2010, Oxhorn 2004).

However, in contrast to the dominant view that, in the context of neo-liberalism, citizenship can only be conquered by confrontational strategies of civil society movements, the Chilean state slowly began to move towards the extension of its citizens’ rights. This move, which started modestly in the second part of the 1990s, initially took place in the context of a set of reforms that were initiated by the government of Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-2000) and was accelerated by his successors Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006) and Michelle Bachelet (2006-today), under the banner of la Modernización del Estado (modernization of the state).

Under the government of Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, the modernization of the state had been centred on increasing efficiency. Even though this did not imply a concrete expansion of citizens’ rights, it affected the relations of the state and the
citizenry in several ways. First of all, it reinforced civil rights through a profound reform of the justice system, which had been opaque and had proven to be less than completely independent from political influences during the dictatorship. Additionally, civil services were streamlined and accountability increased. Second, the state’s regulatory powers were increased, empowering it in its relations with the free market. This was increasingly imperative as in the 1990s successive waves of privatizations transferred significant sectors of public services, such as infrastructure and energy, to the market. Finally, state reform was implemented with the argument that, in order to perform effectively in a social area such as poverty reduction, an efficient, rational, and accountable state apparatus should be in place. In this sense, even if the modernization of the state was not directly targeted to the extension of citizen rights, it certainly was expected to improve the Chilean state’s ability to ‘deliver the goods’. As Frei put it,

There are many people who argue that public services such as water and electricity should be kept in state hands. However, the state has limited resources, and one has to choose. We have privatized those sectors, but with regulations. Now the state budget in Chile represents only about twenty-one per cent of the economy. Nevertheless, we have been able to spend more than sixty per cent of our budget on social policies. We have been able to reduce poverty from forty per cent to twenty per cent. This could be done because we have made good use of our resources (interview with Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle on 22 April 2002).

At the level of appearances, Frei’s approach, like that of Aylwin before him, remained eminently top-down in its relations to the citizenry. This was not surprising, as in the 1990s Chilean civil society became so disarticulated that it became characterized as ‘apathy’ (Riquelme 1999, 276) and as a ‘social void’ (de la Maza 1999, 400). Many have pointed to the heritage of the dictatorship and the transition to democracy for this phenomenon: a fear of active citizenship because of its association with civil disorder and institutional breakdown (Silva 2004, 65), traumas from the dictatorship (Bickford and Noé 1998, 15), and the imposition of the neoliberal market economy (Moulian 1997, 81-124). Nevertheless, the passiveness of Chilean civil society did not imply that the project of the Concertación was exclusively top-down. In fact, beneath the vertical structures of the Concertación’s ‘hypergovernability’ (de la Cuadra 2006), in the late 1990s a tacit system of informal bottom-up input emerged, which would substantially affect the development of citizenship in Chile after 2000.

Instead of simply isolating it, the Concertación’s technocratic nature allowed it to develop a high sensitivity to the country’s civil society. This took place in two ways. Firstly, the parties that made up part of the coalition made extensive use of sociological think-tanks analysing trends in social and political thinking and behaviour. This allowed them to critically follow civil society responses to government policies from a distance, and develop new strategies on that basis (Puryear 1994, 150-159). Secondly, many civil society groups were incorporated, if not to say co-opted, by the Concertación, with the double advantage of neutralising their potential opposition and assimilating their social networks into the polity structure (de la Maza 1999, 402). In this way, the governments of the Concertación were able to develop ‘sensory organs’ that allowed them to respond to civil society demands
before they were actually articulated in the form of political pressure.

The signals that the Concertación received did not automatically lead to consensual outcomes. In fact, in the period 1998-2002 they produced a protracted and intense debate between the so-called autocomplacientes (self-satisfied) and the autoflagelantes (self-chastisers) within the coalition. This debate, which was widely covered in the national media and aroused a great deal of attention, roughly centred on the question of social, and to a lesser degree, political citizenship. The autoflagelantes pleaded for a reduction of socio-economic inequality and insecurity through the creation of an extensive social welfare system. The autoflagelantes countered that, without the fiscal income necessary to create such a system, it would only prove to be counterproductive, as it would impair economic growth and stability (Navia 2004, 235-245).

The impact of this debate on the Concertación has been twofold. On the one hand, it allowed the regulation and management of dissent within the coalition. Even while the tone of the discussions became intense from time to time, dissenters maintained unanimously loyalty to the coalition, and remained cooperative in the policy-making process (van der Ree 2007, 278-285). Thus, their critiques could be incorporated in the Concertación’s thinking without fear of ruptures. On the other hand, the debate allowed the governing parties to rethink their policies and explore new pathways. This led to an increasing and substantial legitimacy for the idea of expanding social citizenship beyond the existing borders of poverty reduction.

In this ideological context the Concertación put forward Ricardo Lagos as its candidate for the 2000 elections. Lagos, who became first Socialist Chilean president since Allende, substantially followed up on the recommendations of the critical sectors of the coalition, and initiated several programmes expanding both political and social citizenship. Political citizenship was expanded in the form of the abrogation of many of the so-called ‘authoritarian enclaves’ that had been curbing the country’s democratic structures since 1990. Additionally, Lagos opened spaces for participation in political decision-making. In total, 120 policy areas were opened up, allowing for over 1200 fields in which participation would become possible. However, this new move towards political rights was limited at best: most of the participatory areas were restricted to consultation or information. Only about 19 per cent of them allowed for true influence in the design or implementation of policies (Espinoza 2004). Furthermore, the project focused almost exclusively on existing civil society organizations, and not, as many proponents of the strengthening of civil society had hoped for, on civil society as a whole (de la Maza 2005). Despite this limited scope, which left much of the country’s top-down political culture intact, the project was an important move in the country’s state-civil society relations. For the first time after nearly thirty years, a move was made towards citizens’ participation, even if it was mostly ‘participation on invitation’.

In the area of social citizenship, Lagos made a significant move from focalized programmes (for instance for specific poverty categories) towards generic policies affecting the citizenry at large. This mainly took form in the implementation of the so-called Plan-AUGE, which provided free health care for all Chilean for the ten most deadly diseases (today it covers over 40). Additionally, the Chile Solidario plan expanded poverty reduction policies into guaranteed rights of state support for all poor (Arenas y Guzmán 2003). Even while the scope of these measures re-
mained limited, they were crucial for the expansion of citizenship in Chile. On the one hand, they explicitly formulated state support in terms of citizens’ rights instead of state supported policy. On the other, they marked an incremental shift in social policy making towards what De la Maza (2010, 117) labels ‘neo-universalism’. Together, they combined into a move towards the extension of universal social rights.

The government of Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010) has pushed this line of expanding citizenship in Chile even further, again particularly at the level of social citizenship and, to a lesser degree, political citizenship. In an attempt to address all the socially vulnerable, the Chile Solidario plan was transformed into the so-called ‘Social Protection System’ in 2006, with a protection plan for children and single mothers. Additionally, a labour plan was introduced in the same year, regulating labour rights, in particular the ‘subcontracted’ sectors. Finally, a pension reform plan was implemented in 2009 guaranteeing minimum pensions for all Chilean citizens (de la Maza 2010, 117).

In terms of political citizenship, Bachelet made citizen participation in politics central during the first months of her presidency. However, rather than focusing on the institutional embedding of participatory mechanisms, as Lagos had done, Bachelet emphasized the direct participation of the population in the formulation of government policies. As she put it in 2006:

I want to establish a dialogue based on openness and participation; a great pact between the citizenry and the government…. A new way of seeing and doing politics, a more inclusive form of politics, more participative, more open, more transparent. Politics for, by, and with the citizens (speech by Michelle Bachelet on 11 March 2006).

This attempt to open up citizenship in Chilean politics towards some level of popular mobilization not only produced significant amounts of fear among the Right, who saw it as an invitation to Allende’s ‘popular power’ (De la Maza 2007, 3), but it also coincided with a massive strike by high-school and university students that lasted for several months. The government responded by integrating representatives of the students into an ad hoc advisory committee, which eventually proposed several reforms of the educational system. Thus, the idea of civil participation was translated into a form of ‘participation by invitation’ on the basis of incidental grass-roots mobilization (De la Maza 2010, 192).

Bachelet’s extension of political proved to be limited. Even though it was not unsuccessful in the case of the high-school protests, the social unrest and the associated image of a lack of state authority made the experience extremely costly in terms of public and political support. As a consequence, Bachelet restricted the project to the participation of civil society representatives in advisory boards for pension reform, child policies and education. In none of these cases, however, did citizen participation go beyond expert consultation, and relations with the state always remained vertical (Aguilera 2007).

Thus, while in the 1990s the extension of social and political citizenship had remained largely restricted to the logic of the fear of civil disorder and ungovernability associated with an articulated civil society and a market orientation towards social well-being, after 2000 the governments of the Concertación moved steadily
towards deepening citizenship. This was significantly successful at the level of the formation of social citizenship regimes. The re-activation of civil society as the driving factor of political decision-making, however, has only seen marginal successes. In the context of a of formal democracy, a successful liberal economic order, and a relatively caring state, the old dream of a ‘true democracy’, so tainted by its association with civil unrest and chaos, has never regained its appeal.

Conclusions

Studying citizenship formation from the perspective of structure-agent relations brings to the fore the complex ways in which state initiatives and civil society responses have interacted in the dynamic formation of citizenship regimes. Additionally, it illuminates the ways in which historical events and experiences continue to impact on the constitution of citizenship today. The formation of citizenship in Chile since the 1960s has developed through the interaction of state-initiated programmes and bottom-up responses, which in turn shaped the contexts for further state citizenship proposals. In the process, citizenship was expanded, retracted, claimed and contested in dynamic ways, which were often contradictory but simultaneously saw elements of continuity. While the experience of the Frei government showed a high level of legitimacy for the expansion of social as well as political citizenship, increasing political unrest and the breakdown of the democratic system in 1973 contributed heavily to the de-legitimization of the latter. The association of political citizenship with social unrest subsequently served as a legitimizing logic for the imposition and maintenance of an authoritarian order, with an additional move to reframe citizenship in free market terms. After the restoration of democracy in 1990, the first two governments of the Concertación maintained governability and legitimacy by putting economic logics first and limiting the expansion of citizenship to formal democratic political rights combined with poverty reduction programmes. Slowly, however, the issue of citizenship re-emerged, leading to a double movement under the governments of Lagos and Bachelet: the emergence of social welfare structures, and the introduction of political participation schemes. The success of the first compared to the half-hearted nature of the second, however, is indicative of the low level of legitimacy that political citizenship continues to have. In this sense, the current citizenship regime in Chile reflects elements of all four projects. From the Christian Democrat project of the 1960s, the notion that social citizenship and economic development should be considered to be two sides of the same coin has resurfaced as a central theme under the Concertación. The experiences of the breakdown of democracy under the Unidad Popular and the following military dictatorship, however, have produced a zero-sum dichotomy between economic development and political citizenship, in which political rights are viewed as a direct threat to stability and growth. Even though the Concertación increasingly flirted with the idea of expanding political rights towards participatory models, its pragmatism and emphasis on governability disallowed a significant expansion of political citizenship, leaving open a model in which free-market logics are combined with social citizenship in a unique way.

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