From Sarmiento to Martí and Hostos: Extricating the Nation from Coloniality

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During the past two decades, studies of culture, politics, history, and literature have converged in what could be described as a dizzying rush to understand the relationship of ethnicity, mestizaje and nationality to enduring Latin American structures of coloniality (Anzaldúa 1987; Menchú 1992; Wade 1993; Rappaport 1994; Hale 1996; Mignolo 2000; De la Cadena 2002; Castro-Klarén and Chasteen 2003; Miller 2004; Moraña 2005; and Quijano 2006). Earlier, during the nineteenth century, these same problems were addressed from divergent ideological perspectives, albeit from within the liberal paradigm. In this paper I would like to discuss three foundational paradigms for interpreting national cultures as expounded in a trio of Hispanic American essayists whose ideas dominated the second half of the nineteenth century. The first one put forth by Domingo Faustino Sarmiento (Argentina: 1811-1888) posits as fact a colonialist grid that supposes the superiority of one culture over others. The second postulated by José Martí (Cuba: 1853-1895) rejects the first in favour of what could be understood as an early postcolonial model based on equality, at once envisioning heterogeneous components coalescing for a mutually beneficial existence, while negating, at times, their differences. The third elucidated by Eugenio María de Hostos (Puerto Rico: 1839-1903) is rooted in the same enlightened precepts that inform the second, but radicalizes it, recommending miscegenation with the ultimate goal of a homogeneous population. This article will show how the latter two overcome the original paradigm as they establish a liberating discourse relevant to Latin America.

Toward the formation of a posthumous intellectual community

The birth of the modern Latin American essay represents another benchmark in the continuing debate pitting the concepts of ‘Civilization’ and ‘Barbarism’ against each other. The initial hypothesis offered by Aristotle’s poets had been ingrained into Western consciousness with a latter-day appropriation of the culturally informed maxim: ‘it is proper for the Greeks to govern the barbarians (bk. I, ch. 2, pp. 2-3). After the Middle Ages, the civilized baton passed from the Greeks to the Spanish as they built a transoceanic empire. As agents of ‘Civilization’, the Spanish, whose justifications were mocked by the Dominican priest Bartolomé de Las Casas, were obliged to make ‘the barbarians – read Amerindians – live in a civilized and humane manner’ (2000, 28). This continuing rupture of humanity into two camps is taken up three-hundred years later by Domingo Faustino Sarmiento who defends it, and by José Martí and Eugenio Maria de Hostos who look for subtle and not so subtle ways to get beyond it.

Why consider these three essayists together some might ask? The obvious an-
swers is that they are among the most studied Latin American nonfiction authors of their century, each of whom came to be synonymous with his respective nation by establishing a new hybrid form of writer, Sarmiento the writer-politician, Hostos the writer-sociologist, and Martí the poet-diplomat. All felt the need to enter the civilization-barbarism debate yet were of a new breed, bringing an economic focus to the social projects they endorsed and pursued into their writing. And despite never actually meeting, each knew of the others and referred to them in his writing, Sarmiento to Martí, Martí to Sarmiento and Hostos, and Hostos to Sarmiento and Martí.

Sarmiento was aware of Martí, may have even respected him slightly, enough to ask the Franco-Argentine author Paul Groussac to translate his essay on the Statue of Liberty into French (1895-1909, 46:173-176). Yet Sarmiento may have also made this gesture not for Martí so much but for the United States, the country he most respected, for when the Cuban criticized the ‘monster’, Sarmiento reacted strongly, saying he must ‘get regenerated, educated’, letting the giant nation of the north flow through his veins. Sarmiento flat out asks the younger essayist to be less ‘Latin’ and more ‘Yankee’ (1895-1909, 46:167). With such advice there was little room for common ideological ground between the two thinkers. Beyond this ephemeral polemic, Sarmiento barely notices ‘the correspondent Martí’ who published frequently in the Argentine press. Regarding Hostos, there is silence.

Martí most certainly feared alienating the man he once called ‘the Great Sarmiento’ (1963-1973, 7:368), someone who could be instrumental in the struggle for Cuban independence. His unvarnished sentiment is revealed in his often-cited essay ‘Our America’ where he offers a thinly veiled criticism of Sarmiento whose ‘easy pen’ was put to paper ‘to accuse his native republic of being incapable and irreparable’ (1963-1973, 6:16). Let us not forget what Martí most certainly had in mind: Sarmiento’s presidency (1868-1874) was given form by wars with mostly indigenous Paraguay, with rural caudillos like López Jordán, and with the Amerindian chieftain Calfucurá (Sorensen 1998, 132). All of these ethnic elements would have been viewed as barbarism by Sarmiento and as natural components of the nation by Martí and Hostos.

For his part, Hostos offers a short biographical tribute to Sarmiento (1939, 7:31-39). In it he supposes that thinkers and sociologists will always respect the *Facundo* because it is ‘one of the most interesting intellectual creations’ (1939, 7:33). Yet he also states that Sarmiento is the perennial propagandist, a calling that besides [good] qualities also brings defects (1939, 7:32). While enumerating the things that Sarmiento said and did Hostos obliquely slides in his disapproval when he writes that his subject was ‘well-intentioned’, implying he made some errors (1939, 7:31). He praises the erudite politician while criticizing him: ‘What Sarmiento felt for [his] society, was more elevated, more reflexive, more rational and more dignified, but not reflexive and dignified enough’ (1939, 7:37). As with Martí, Hostos had to tread lightly in any condemnation of Argentina’s head of state to preclude alienating any aid that might eventually support the liberation of Puerto Rico and Cuba. This tact was made very clear in his essay ‘The Last Hecatomb’ (1873), published in the Argentine press toward the end of Sarmiento’s presidency. In it he implores the chief of state to recognize the Cuban patriots fighting for independence trumpeting the idea that it would be in Argentina’s ‘economic interests’ and would send a warning to Spain to boot (1939, 9:263-264). Whatever
negativity Hostos expresses toward Sarmiento in the biography, in ‘El Perú’ (1939, 7:40-60), as we will see, he seems to have greater difficulty than Martí in freeing himself from the ideology of civilization and barbarism, even though in the end, he offers the most radical solution.

Finally Martí and Hostos certainly knew of each other, but generally did not seek mutual solidarity. The former describes the latter as ‘the most profound orator’ (1963-1973, 22:172), a ‘beautiful Puerto Rican intelligence’ (1963-1973, 8:55) to whom not enough attention is paid (1963-1973, 2:259). In a short note, he holds up his revolutionary colleague as a high moral authority on the subject of democracy (1963-1973, 8:53-54). For his part, Hostos generally maintains silence on the subject of the former, but upon his death in 1895, proclaims that his ideas were not his own but were of the Revolution. These same ideas, however, when expressed by Martí, took on a new lustre (1939, 9:484). While none of the three mentions the others more than a half-dozen times, the response of the two Antilleans to the parameters established by the Argentinian is palpable, polemical and represents an early awareness of a condition that has come to be known as coloniality.

Over the years their thought has been compared, Sarmiento and Martí (Mead 1976; Fernández Retamar 1982, 107-114; Sacoto 1998, 43-50; Porras 2001), and Martí and Hostos (Ferrer Canales 1990, 19-45; Arpini and Giorgis 1991; Rojas Osorio 2002; Gaztambide-Geigel 2004), but to this author’s knowledge, not much attention has been dedicated to Hostos and Sarmiento nor have the three been scrutinized together to examine one single theme: race ideology as it relates to the liberal construction of national formations. The discussion must start with Sarmiento who was influential, in Marina Kaplan’s words, ‘on successive generations of Latin American writers’ (1994, 314). He achieved his period of maximum creative genius right about when Martí and Hostos were coming into the world, publishing his canonical Facundo: Civilización y barbarie in 1845. Later, as the two Caribbean pensadores were blooming into powerful intellects, embarking upon their lifelong quests to liberate Cuba and Puerto Rico from Spanish domination, they were forced to negotiate a complicated web of colonialism, liberalism, Latin Americanism, Pan-Americanism and the coloniality the interrelationship these agencies generated as they came together in business, diplomacy, journalism, literature and nascent sociology. By that time, Sarmiento was not only a distinguished essayist but a formidable Argentine politician, serving as the nation’s president. While they needed Sarmiento’s help in their respective liberation campaigns, his view of civilization and barbarism went against the grain of their progressive thought despite the fact that all three shared a mutual faith in liberal doctrine. To appreciate the multifaceted intellectual enquiry that the combined work of these three pensadores convenes, three constituent components must be contemplated as part of the nation; these are the possibility and nature of national cohesiveness, the social resilience of Amerindians, of blacks, and of mestizos and, how these social groups hold influence over the national body.

The national unity problem: between civilization and nature

As a liberal, Sarmiento was immensely concerned with inserting Argentina into the international economic system of his time. Buenos Aires, situated on a large river
with direct access to Europe, was gradually developing a cosmopolitan character that set it apart from the rest of the nation rooted in Spanish/gaucho and indigenous cultures. This schism is apparent in the controversial *Facundo*, a text that opposes European-style urban ‘civilization’ to New World rural ‘barbarism’, despite betraying, as Ramos (1989, 30-31) has indicated, a palpable respect for certain rustic forms of life. Sarmiento was passionate in his speculation on national unity because without the stability it implied, liberal economics could not take hold.

When Sarmiento compares Buenos Aires to Córdoba, he finds the first to be worldly and the second, traditional, the one a breading ground for capitalism, the other the last bastion for Spanish feudalism. Sarmiento was evidently onto something since much later, during the twentieth century, the University of Córdoba was, in the words of Nicola Miller, ‘the most conservative of Argentine academic institutions, still dominated by the ecclesiastical orthodoxies of scholasticism’ (1999, 56). Thus Sarmiento’s Córdoba not only represents Argentina’s failure to throw its lot with the European capitalists, it also symbolizes the ‘weakening of national linkages’ (1895-1909, 7:108). Later on, when Sarmiento has abandoned *Facundo*’s romantic enlightenment and embraced the Darwinian and Spencerian evolutionary thought of *Conflictos y armonías de las razas en América* (see Sørensen 1998, 145), he wants to know what the nation is, fearing that it lacks ‘amalgamation’, its structures needing to be ‘tightened up’, yet lacking the ‘cement’ to mould them all together (1895-1909, 37:27). Sarmiento was deeply troubled by the hordes of migrants of European descent fleeing Buenos Aires for the countryside where they would then produce a mixed-race people (1895-1909, 7:234). There, they would be less open to modern Western civilization and more prone to accept rural and/or oligarchic social models. In his condemnation of those ill disposed toward global-leaning liberalism, Sarmiento attached himself to a group of elites whose ‘economic interests [fell] within the international capitalist system’ (Hale 1986, 367). The famous writer-politician was a liberal who supported this paradigm, although he did not understand a primary feature of it that can be described as ‘neocolonial’, implying, as Hale (1986, 367) points out, ‘that independence was formal and superficial and that dependence was the deeper and more significant experience of the region’.

This then is the liberal-neocolonial paradox that Sarmiento represents. In constructing it, he was arguing for one group’s liberty, that which Mignolo calls ‘modernity’. Yet he was also arguing to curtail the equality of other groups (gauchos, blacks, Amerindians), setting up a bifurcated condition Mignolo has dubbed coloniality (2000, 51). This skewed intellectual system – ‘liberal ideas […] applied in countries which were highly stratified, socially and racially’ (Hale 1986, 368) – was oppressive to non-European forms of culture, building modernity ‘on the backs of the rural class’ (Rama 1984, 74). For this reason Mignolo has affirmed that ‘modernity and coloniality are two sides of the same coin’ (2000, 50). Nevertheless, the ‘system’ came to represent, as Hale has put it, a set of ‘generalized assumptions in the period after 1870’ (1986, 378), that is to say, in the period in which Martí and Hostos took up their pens to fight for Antillean independence.

If Sarmiento’s mission was to forge more expansive links between Argentina and greater Europe, José Martí’s, beyond severing Spain’s political ties with Cuba, was to develop stronger links between it and the American republics. Thus if Sar-
miento was transatlantic, actually declaring his presidential candidacy in Paris (Hale 1986, 371), Martí, at least before he became embittered, was Latin Americanist.³ Put differently, if the former’s notion of Argentina was Eurocentric, the latter’s plans for Cuba were hemispheric (with a fearful eye on the United States). Martí’s identification with his country was so intense that Cintio Vitier once remarked that it would be extremely difficult to separate the nation from the man (1981, 11). In fact, love of patria, the people, is a thick sentiment that pervades much of his writing and sets him miles apart from Sarmiento who treated the Argentine masses as if they were, as suggested by one critic, ‘an object’ (Miller 1999, 113).

At the age of eighteen, in The Political Prison in Cuba (1871), Martí already perceives a quandary with the concept of ‘national integrity’ put forward by the Spanish politicians who persisted in their rule over the island (Martí 1963-1973, 1:48 and thereafter). The slogan of ‘national integrity’ is hypocritical for him because it holds no sincere interest in including the totality of elements that make up the nation. It is a sugar-coated expression which justifies the domination of the American (the Cuban, in this case) by the European. Martí blurts out sarcastically that the ‘Volunteers are the national integrity’ (1963-1973, 1:62), this group being an urban military corps controlled by Madrid (see Carr 1966, 308), imposing ‘wholeness’ by force. Sadly, the ‘national integrity’ they offer is nothing more than a ‘dream’ that ‘moves and exalts and enraptures’ in Spain, while it ‘dishonours, whips and assassinates’ in Cuba (1963-1973, 1:65). Optimistically, the youthful Martí looks for a bright spot on the horizon, maintaining hope that the regime in Madrid has a sense of honour which will cause it to give up fusing two realities into one dominated by the stronger (1963-1973, 1:70).

This type of imposed synthesis where modernity attempts to hide its coloniality can be deconstructed by standing Sarmiento’s theory of civilization and barbarism on its head.⁴ By bringing the Argentine essayist into the discursive frame, the political becomes social, Caribbean resistance now taking the form of a conflict that Martí marks out between European and indigenous elements. In ‘Our America’ he decries the paradigmatic use of ‘civilization and barbarism’, declaring it a cover-up for a battle between ‘false erudition and nature’ (1963-1973, 6:17). By laying bare the lie that ‘civilization’ is an enlightened goal, Martí creates a Krausist opening to base good government on the ‘natural’ elements that can be used to reconstruct the nation from the ground up. This idea comes in part from the philosophy of Karl Christian Frederich Krause (1781-1832) whose most eloquent expression in Spain came in the works of Francisco Giner de los Ríos who puts it this way: ‘a natural manner defeats and banishes affectation’ (1919-1936, 3:225). While Giner would not have imagined the turns that Krausism took in the New World, he would have been pleased with Martí’s campaign against artificiality.⁵ ‘Erudition’, in a word, was erroneous for the Cuban when based on Eurocentric political tracts such as Sarmiento’s, or transatlantic ones drafted by Spanish politicians that had very little to do with a Caribbean reality given form by limited land, the extermination of the Amerindian, and, of course, having been what one intellectual historian describes as ‘the hardcore area of slavery in the Americas’ (Lewis 1983, 24), the slave system so severe that in many cases suicide was preferable to it (Knight 1974, 218).

Hostos discusses the same problems as Martí but dodged the Sarmiento question by changing the terminology when their views diverged, using it when they
came closer (at least in a structural sense). With respect to the former case, the city, specifically Havana, he warns in *La peregrinación de Bayoàn*, is where the ‘strong destroy the weak’ (1939, 8:68); it is the site of ‘the usual depraved customs, the same vices, the same appearances of progress: luxury, ostentatiousness and opulence, but also the same ulcers, the same gangrene, the same virus’ (1939, 8:61). Conversely, the *jíbaros*, the mountain men, are the ‘philosophers of nature’: they represent humanity, for only reptiles can be found in the city (1939, 8:144). Regarding nature, Hostos, follows the same general Krausist lines given form in Martí, foregrounding what Rama might describe as ‘dissonance in the lettered city’ (1984, 78; his emphasis). Such dissonance is to be expected. Rama describes these late nineteenth-century metropolitan areas as a ‘massive materialist society that was letting go of its timeworn spiritual values’ (1984, 112). With Hostos, Sarmiento’s burg is turned inside out, nature is praised, and artificiality rejected.

With respect to the latter case, when Hostos takes a more pro-Sarmientine track, he turns his attention away from the Antilles and toward South America describing Peru’s three geographic regions ethnographically with an eye on economic progress. Here Hostos delimits the national problem with a terminology that almost perfectly coincides with Sarmiento’s, despite Peru’s ethnic distance from the Southern Cone:

The civilized population lives on the coast: it is composed of the white Creole race, of the *Cholo*, a mixture of indigenous and European ethnicities, and of the African with his various nuances: the white race predominates. The half-civilized population, or better stated, the civilization decivilized by colonization, inhabits the high tableland of the Andes: it is populated almost exclusively by the indigenous race, distributed in its two great families, the Aymara and the Quechua. The half-savage population inhabits the uncultured steps of the jungle region (1939, 7:51).

Hostos’s Andes take on a social structure not so dissimilar from Sarmiento’s Argentina, yet with a striking variation: among the coastal ‘civilized’, the writer-sociologist includes mestizos and blacks. There is, therefore, the possibility of anyone’s becoming civilized; it is simply a matter of education. This is borne out by his attributing the condition of ‘half-civilized’ not to race, but to the Spanish conquest of Tahuantinsuyo. By elucidating the relentless persistence of coloniality even in a sovereign nation is to thus confront it directly, a necessary pass before cultural and national harmony can be ameliorated. Yet this hindrance to development is not limited to the Peruvian nation, for when Hostos later resolves the seeming urban-rural contradiction in his *Treatise on Morality*, he concludes that barbarism lies just under the surface of each and every society (1939, 16:98). This idea brings us full circle to Mignolo’s proposition ‘that modernity and coloniality are two sides of the same coin’ (2000, 50). To adequately ferret out the structures of coloniality, racial, ethnic, and cultural categories must first be obtained from subconscious criteria in order to break them down; thus the next three sections will be concerned with theoretical approaches to Amerindians, blacks and mestizos.
From undigested sustenance to a new Rome: Amerindians

With most Latin American countries, the cornerstone of fact-based national formulations can be found in the Amerindian. During Sarmiento’s time a historical phenomenon generically known as ‘Indian Wars’ served to dig up that cornerstone in some countries and fill in the gap first with mestizos and then with European immigration. Sarmiento looks in horror at the countries that had very developed non-uprootable indigenous populations at the time of the Spanish invasion, and hence are still defined by those people’s presence: ‘What does the future hold for Mexico, Peru and Bolivia and other Latin American States, the ones in whose innards still live the savage races or indigenous barbarians, like undigested sustenance?’ (1895-1909, 11:38). Indigenous peoples in the belly of the national body represent a problem because they ‘are incapable, even when forced, to dedicate themselves to hard and sustained work’ (1895-1909, 7:26). This ‘difficulty’ is the crux of the matter for Sarmiento, because if the Amerindian will not work for the white man’s moneymaking system, then the nation cannot be inserted into the nineteenth-century global network of industrial capitalism.

When José Martí looks at some of those same nations (specifically Mexico and Guatemala) he sees great bygone civilizations and he becomes sensitive to the conditions in which their descendants live. Referring to the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Martí echoes Bartolomé de las Casas when he censors ‘the Spanish victors who exaggerated or invented the defects of the defeated race, so that the cruelty with which they treated them would seem just and convincing to the world’ (1963-1973, 18:382). The tyrannies of the past have repercussions in the present because after the conquest no entire city or temple was left standing, not Tula, the Toltec capital, nor Tetzcoco, the centre of the Chichimec empire (1963-1973, 18:385). Those people, ‘Cyclopian and titanic, mercantile, believers, fighters, agrarian and artistic’ (1963-1973, 19:443) were deprived of their greatness. Because pre-Colombian literature was inaccessible in Martí’s time,10 he turned to the Nahua-Spanish colonial chronicler Fernando de Alva Ixtlixochitl (1578-1650) and tries to reconstruct Tetzcoco and Tenochtitlán (1963-1973, 18:381), to put back what has been taken away. He also goes to the ruins in Guatemala and Mexico hoping to make them come alive. He notes that when the indigenous walk by the monuments they pay tribute to these great empires of yore by removing their hats (1963-1973, 18:384).

Keeping the past in mind, Martí tries to restructure the present restoring what has been removed, alleviating it of colonialism’s heritage. In ‘Our America’, he proclaims that ‘governors, in Indian republics, learn Indian’ (1963-1973, 6:21). New ways of seeing must be established to incorporate the contemporary Amerindian into the new republics. He tells children to stop being embarrassed of their mother because she wears an indigenous apron (1963-1973, 6:16) and offers a curricular challenge to universities to give the Incas preference over the Greeks (1963-1973, 6:18). Yet Martí’s readings, his amateur anthropological study, and his theorizing on Native Americans were to define ‘Our America’, Mignolo cautions, rather than to ‘dialogue with indigenous populations of his time’ (2000, 140). This absence of intercultural discourse sets up a snag on the long rope leading out of coloniality but it does not diminish Martí as a theorist since, in his quest to tether
that rope to a more enlightened solution than had previously been possible, he suc-
cceeds in climbing up a step away from the colonial mentality.\textsuperscript{11}

The solution he proposes squarely contradicts Sarmiento’s assessment of what
was known as the ‘Indian Question’ during that time. Commenting on the inhabit-
ants of Verapaz, the site of Las Casas’s famous Utopian experiment and home of
the ‘fierce indigenous peoples of Olapa’, a community later broken apart by civil
war during the 1980s, Martí praises their ‘intelligence’ and their capacity for
‘work’, despite their ‘rough habits’ (1963-1973, 7:165). He thus sidesteps the
common tendency among the Creoles to praise the magnificent indigenous civiliza-
tions of the past but reject their descendants in the present. Martí directly embraces
these peoples in their past and present incarnations and offers solutions. By educat-
ing them and cultivating their work ethic, their towns can gain prominence as they
work the land helping Guatemala achieve financial independence and thus helping
the country avoid ‘anxiously turning to foreign lands in search of labour and intel-
ligence’ (1963-1973, 7:166). Much as with his articles associated with the first
Pan-American Conference (2003, 1399-1418, for example), in these writings Martí
preaches Latin American fiscal independence, a form of regional liberalism, in-
compatible with the Anglo-Saxon variety preached by Sarmiento. Yet to get there,
the white mindset must be completely revamped. The ‘Ladinos must be inculcated
with sympathy and a feeling of connection to the indigenous peoples’ who should
inspire not apprehension but warmth in the white man’s heart (1963-1973, 7:165).
Thus with a stark attitude adjustment in the Ladino mind, the descendants of the
Maya, now ready and accepted as workers, can be integrated into a hemispheric
system of commerce.

The first roadblock to coevalness in Martí’s thinking, which is to say, to seeing
the Maya at a point on the human-evolution scale that, although sui generis and
thus not assessable by means of a Western metric, is not retarded. I use the term
‘coevalness’ here, as Fabian does: to attempt to see two civilizations as if they
were in the same temporal moment as opposed to the ‘denial of coevalness’ which
juxtaposes the modernity of one against the primitiveness of the other (1983, 31).
Such an achievement, if possible in the face of Western ethnocentricity, would
create the possibility of a heterogeneous civilization comprised of many disparate
cultures. The problem, as Mignolo suggests, is that Martí does not poll the indige-
nous to see what they want regarding education and economics. Such a conversa-
tion would help to bridge the modern-colonial gap and approach a range of vision
based on coevality. There is no way to know with certainty what the Maya thought
when Martí was there, but we can hypothesize that they would not have been inter-
ested in Western-oriented schools nor in liberal doctrines and practices. During the
1980s, the Quiché intellectual Rigoberta Menchú tells her anthropologist inter-
viewer that for her and her family not studying is preferable to becoming Ladinized
(Westernized) (1992, 230). Therefore what was indeed an enlightened and progress-
se stance for Martí’s time still does not negotiate with the subaltern to develop a
more inclusive paradigm. And Martí was still capable of stereotyping, describing
the Amerindian as encircling ‘us’ (1963-1973, 6:20), much the way they did in
those skewed Cowboy and Indian movies we all saw as children. At other times the
Native American is ‘artistic’, ‘resigned, intelligent’ or ‘passionate and generous’
(1963-1973, 7:117-118, 158). Fortunately, Martí does not categorize to colonize as
many of his land-owning contemporaries did, for he was also quite capable of assigning similar typologies to people of European extraction: ‘the worried French, the anxious North Americans, the recommendable Germans and the solemn English’ (1963-1973, 7:117118). The practice of pigeonholing has been around for a while, Las Casas himself saying that the indigenous were ‘modest, easily embarrassed, honest, mature, composed, mortified, and wise’ and that these features were ‘innate and natural’ (1988-99, 6:439-440). This way of thinking survived at least to Martí’s time. Susan Gillman reminds us that ascribing ‘psychic and social characteristics to different races, as Martí does, is typical of the nineteenth-century European intellectual tradition of romantic racialism’ (1998, 93). The Cuban revolutionary grew out of that value-system, overcoming it in some ways, using it to argue for a more tolerant social fabric that accepted all peoples into a regional liberal standard. Thus Martí enlightened his consciousness by great degrees, but not to the point the objective of coevalness demands in the fight to achieve societies free from the colonialities of the past.

Eugenio María de Hostos’s initial perception of Caribbean indigenous peoples is derived from two sources: the historical fact that they were wiped out due to hardship and disease soon after the Spanish took over the islands, and his reading of Las Casas’s Brevisima relación de la destrucción de las Indias. He is forced to conclude in his Caribbean novel La peregrinación that ‘people of the noble race […] now only live in history’ (1939, 8:55). Hostos also reads the 1569 poem La araucana de Ercilla whose Mapuche protagonists, still called by the colonialist term Araucanian in Hostos’ time, are portrayed as ‘the first defenders of the Araucanian nation’ (1939, 6:236). But those heroes as well as the Caribbean Taino nation no longer exist. There must accordingly be an effort to condemn what happened across two continents and to try to recover what has been forgotten: ‘Cortés and Pizarro have ruined in the name of Spain, two civilizations, that could and should be utilized [as models]’ (1939, 16:99; see also 2:242). A dual sentiment can be discerned in this protestation, the ‘civilized’ conquistadors are capable of destroying civilization, and the Queuchas (Incas) and the Nahuas (Aztecs) were humane societies, useful in giving form to subsequent American civilizations. In this he anticipates Aimé Césaire who, even from the perspective of the Francophone Caribbean, would also lament the destruction of both these same master civilizations (1972, 42). Hostos’s novel La peregrinación resurrects as a model the Tainos depicted in Las Casas’s Brevisima, which for its part tried to rectify the colonialist colloquy of Columbus’s diaries. Hostos’s rhetoric signifies an early attempt to cast off the intellectual forms that curb indigenous and black forms of life, innate to the subsequent discourses of indigenismo and négritude.

Later, when Hostos was able to spend some time in Peru and observe native Andeans up close, he would find certain faults with them, adapting the paradoxical attitude Méndez has described as ‘Incas Sí, Indios No’, the adoration of the Incan Empire and the sub-estimation of their descendants. Thus, despite coming down on the side of the Amerindian during the ideology wars of that time (1939, 2:121; 4:44), he duplicated Martí’s foilble, falling into the trap of stereotyping, declaring that the Andeans suffer from apathy (1939, 7:45). In this preconception he is closer to Sarmiento than Martí for the ‘apathy’ he perceived most likely was resistance to Creole debt-peonage practices. Nevertheless, it would be unfair to
judge nineteenth-century essayists by twenty-first-century criteria. We can simply say that Hostos, and to an even greater extent Martí, did not reduce the Amerindian to the non-sentient entities prescribed by extremely liberal intellectuals such as Sarmiento. In fact, as this paper begins to suggest, a detailed study would probably show them to be much closer to Bartolomé de las Casas who saw the first Americans as living and breathing humans.

From ‘savage’ blacks, to ‘race-free’ and ‘harmonious’ blacks

As with Amerindians, Sarmiento views blacks as members of ‘a savage race’ (1895-1909, 7:221). He arrives at this conclusion by the same logic as always, people of African heritage impeded the integration of Argentina into what Wallerstein would later call the modern world-system. This is because blacks, who customarily came from the same regions of a diverse continent, clung on to their previous national cultures with surprising success in Argentina, a fact of which Sarmiento was acutely aware: ‘They form associations according to whatever African people they belong; they have public meetings, public funds, and a strong sense of belonging to the group that sustains them as they live among the whites’ (1895-1909, 7:221). While we cannot know with certainty how many belonged to each ethnic cluster, Sarmiento’s assessment is essentially correct and we do have a feeling for what those clusters were. Schávelzon lists several, Mandingos, Bantus, Congolese, and Benguelas (2003, 71). Since many still spoke the African languages of their heritage and were thus excellent purveyors of intelligence, Juan Manuel de Rosas and the power structures of his dictatorship (1835-1853) set them up as Federal spies against the Unitarians (Bernand 2003, 78-79). Thus on a basic level the Unitarians (cosmopolitan liberals) were at a tactical disadvantage in their civil war with the Federales (rural conservatives). And, taking the long view, as long as Rosas was the Governor of Buenos Aires (Argentina did not actually achieve a national presidency until the 1860s), there could be no fostering of a worldly wise climate that would generate free trade. Since blacks were part of that antiliberal force, Sarmiento had difficulty in accepting them. He admits this in another context. In an article lambasting José Martí’s criticism of the United States, he praises Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin for what he calls ‘the softening of the owner’s hearts’. Here is where Sarmiento’s honesty is both shocking and admirable: he finds that in the Uncle Tom scenario, ‘the black race was free and equal’, admitting that this is ‘something that we the whites can still not swallow’ (1895-1909, 46:172). Without reading too much into this bisemantic statement, we can simply say Sarmiento admired the slow march toward equality while acknowledging how difficult this was for the former slave owners. Summarizing his attitude toward blacks, they have been caught up in Porteño political intrigues adversely affecting the liberal nation; they have been freed from slavery in the great northern nation, and are now moving toward parity with the whites there, a reality that is difficult for elites to bear. What Sarmiento does not say, and what we hope he thinks, now that Rosas is gone, is that he himself wishes to accept black humanity, that it is in the national interest to do so.

Racial fear was not limited to the Unitarian-Federal dispute in the Southern Cone or to the plantation class in the United States. In a Caribbean defined by a
violent and successful slave revolt in Haiti, many were warning of a so-called ‘black danger’ (Vitier 1981, 13). In fact, Lewis asserts that the ‘dominant note of society became that of a virulent Negrophobia’ (1983, 17). A colonial order that was administered under the weight of these fears was the society into which the famous Cuban and Puerto Rican revolutionaries were born.

Martí was moving toward opposing racial categories, negating at times the existence of divergent races (1963-1973, 6:22). Part of this denial comes from his adherence to Krause’s philosophy whose most eminent Spanish adherent Giner de los Ríos wrote that ‘our soul tends to fuse, as much as its limitations permit, with all beings’ (1919-1936, 3:27). Martí takes an idea such as this one and connotes race to it: ‘the soul emanates, equal and eternally, from diverse bodies, in form and in colour’ (1963-1973, 6:22). Accordingly, he argues that blacks are entitled ‘to prove that their colour does not deprive them any of the capacities and rights accorded to human beings’ (1963-1973, 2:298). Thus with a stroke of the quill Martí overcomes the land-owning gentry’s unease around blacks. Despite his rejection of racial rankings, as seen above, he was capable of assigning traits to ethnic groups and nationalities allowing for black singularity, their generosity, a people often more capable of virtue than whites (1963-1973, 4:276-277). He also portrays them as musical, alone in the night singing music of the heart (1963-1973, 6:20). Such nineteenth-century stereotyping, positive as it tends to be in this case, does not take away from Martí’s progressive arguments, although it does show the limits of intellectual development in the quest to judge each individual in accordance with that individual’s character (a failing far from being overcome even in our time).

An early novel by Victor Hugo’s depicted the ‘horror’ of the Haitian slave revolt. Offering a counter discourse to Bug-Jargal, Hostos proclaims the need for justice regarding blacks, especially in Haiti where they have proven that they have a spirit, a spark, implying that they are like whites. For him, justice has left its mark on the Francophone nation where blacks ripped from the African jungle to become slaves rose up in arms and created an empire (1939, 8:53-54). As with Martí there is a stereotype here, blacks coming from jungles when we know now that cities, towns and a hierarchical nobility were oftentimes features of African society (such as the Wolof aristocracy, see Searing 2002). Such an erroneous view does not take away from Hostosian respect for Haitian strength, the push for justice, anticipating the goal of liberation for Cuba and Puerto Rico, which also have large darker-skinned populations.

Hostos’s rejection of slavery is rooted in the Krausist philosophy he shared with Martí who recognized the Puerto Rican’s Krausism as the variety formulated by the Tiberghien school (1963-1973, 8:53). During an 1871 trip to Brazil, part of a South American tour in search of Antillean independence, Hostos came upon a mule train transporting bondsmen. Reflecting on the ugly sight, he juxtaposes the ‘wickedness of slavery’ against ‘nature’s harmony’ (1939, 6:380). In Tiberghien’s brand of harmonic rationalism, there are laws of free human activity and of social relations. These are developed in relation to ‘goodness, beauty, truth [and] justice’ (1865, 1:257). Slavery, which is bad and ugly, curtails the possibility of truth and justice. The only solution is to temper artificial ‘wickedness’ with natural ‘harmony’. In another commentary on Brazilian slavery, Hostos brings the Tiberghien quest for harmony even further than the respect he showed for the Haitian revolu-
tion in *Peregrinación*. He sees two victims, the slave and society itself, the first having the right ‘to seek revenge with honour’, the second, ‘without a conscience to rise up heroically against inequality’ (1939, 6:403-404). Consciousness, in a Tiberghien sense, is imminent in nature, is structured harmoniously, and occurs when ‘the subject and the object of thought are the same’ (1865, 1:395). What this means for Hostos is that there must be absolute harmony between the people who see and the people who are seen, or put differently between those who are aware of slavery and those who are enslaved by it. If the ‘subject’ has no conscience, then the ‘object’ imposes consciousness in the form of ‘black virtue’ thereby solidifying subject and object.

The national-unity problem resolved: from bad conductors to ideal mestizaje

The national-unity solution that Sarmiento offers in the *Facundo* holds an inherent contradiction. On the one hand, he tells us that ‘the Pampa is the worst conductor’ through which civilization can flow (1895-1909, 7:23) implying that the capital can only partially enlighten the provinces, while on the other, he proclaims that ‘Buenos Aires is so strong in elements of European civilization, that it will eventually educate Rosas and contain his bloody and barbarous instincts’ (1895-1909, 7:61). So which one will it be? The fight will be long and merciless, but a European-style civilization must prevail.

This model rejects any cultural hybridity not adapted from European forms (essentially France and the United States), a typical straightjacket in defenders of Western Civilization who, as Césaire reminds us, traditionally assume cross breeding to be the enemy (1972, 63). For an America which boasts of both African and indigenous roots, notions such as Sarmiento’s can only imply an appalling misinterpretation of all non-European modes of being; ‘misrecognition’, as Etienne Baliber points out, being part of the racist complex (1991, 19). There is a danger in Sarmiento’s stance because he conceives Continental civilization as if it were all-inclusive, yet in fact, as Nicola Miller observes, his country Argentina is distinct from other American republics which also grew out of transatlantic conquest and settlement. It has not developed a sense of pride for an Indian past like Mexico or Bolivia, nor has it cultivated a tradition of ‘civil rights’ like the United States or Canada, despite a prolonged history of immigration (Miller 1999, 12). Without a respect for homegrown cultures, the national-unity conundrum in Argentina has been ‘resolved’ by force with the enforcement of rigid racial hierarchies.14

José Martí’s solution to this problem is synthesized in a single idea: ‘Individuals cannot claim any special rights because they belong to one race or another: say human being and all rights are understood’ (1963-1973, 2:298). While this stance reflects a tactic of the independence movement that, according to Ferrer, tended to focus on the Cuban-ness of the insurgents (1998, 231), Martí was aware, as we have seen, of ethnic diversity. Tolerance and acceptance therefore were and are fundamental to his message. From his model of dignity, we can conclude that indigenous peoples, blacks, rural folk, and all others have value, and consequently deserve the authority to exert their liberty in the ideal colour-blind community which he puts forth for our consideration.

Both Sarmiento and Martí thought about how to measure cultural differences
relative to the other side of the Atlantic. Although the former, commenting once on a European-authored biography about Simón Bolívar, was able to perceive the distortion that the foreign lens could effect upon its American object (1895-1909, 7:15), he never stopped prescribing the importation of an overseas ‘civilization’ to solve Argentina’s woes. In contrast, the latter wrote as if he had just finished reading Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s formulations on the injustice of unnatural law, affirming, in an oft-quoted passage, the importance of legislation that coincides with the national medium:

[...] the good governor in America is not the one who understands how the Germans or the French govern themselves, but the one who knows with which elements his or her country is constituted, and how to guide them together, to arrive, by methods and institutions born from the country itself, at that desirable state where individuals become familiar with themselves [...] (1963-1973, 6:17).

The harmony that this passage evokes reveals the poet-diplomat’s familiarity with the philosophical doctrines of Krause with whose thought he came into contact, paradoxically, when he was exiled to Spain. This partial rendering of harmonic rationalism is further developed in his essay ‘My Race’. Here Martí takes his definition of cohesiveness to the limit: ‘Everything that divides people, all that itemizes them, sets them apart, or traps them, is a sin against humanity’ (1963-1973, 2:298). For Martí the white person who becomes vain about race is no different from the black one who does so, either way it partitions the nation, and makes the crafting of public policy difficult (1963-1973, 2:298). Taking this idea further, he proposes common rights in nature, dismissing differential prerogatives as unacceptable. He specifically shuns separation of whites from blacks, and blacks from whites (1963-1973, 2:299), and finds in clothing an appropriate metaphor to illustrate his point.

The genius would have been in harmonizing, with the charity of the heart, and with the boldness of the founding fathers, the vincha [hair band or slide] and the toga; in releasing the indigenous peoples, in taking sides with the suitable black, in adjusting liberty to the body of those who rose up and were victorious for her (1963-1973, 6:20).

Through the apparel metaphor vincha-toga, Martí completely casts off Sarmientine dualism as he recommends civic coexistence. The only method of unifying diverse sectors is by eliminating the ‘impossible empire of urban castes divided over the natural nation’ (1963-1973, 6:20). And here a key presumption presents itself: social strata are not natural and should be eradicated. All economic classes and all cultural variations should be included equally in the visionary organic nation.

There is only one way to institute these changes: with self-reflection and awareness, self-criticism being health (1963-1973, 6:21). By the simple act of knowing, we begin the process of resolving (1963-1973, 6:18). This understanding of one’s own nature is the same prescription as his previously mentioned exhortation that ‘individuals become familiar with themselves’. Such self-awareness should also take place on a larger educational level. Martí repeatedly warns that when studying ancient Greece, for example, people from the Americas become far removed from their natural reality (for example 1963-1973, 6:20). Thus Aristotle,
whose philosophy was so detrimental to blacks and Amerindians by alienating them from their own societies, cannot possibly serve as a girder for the edifice of New World society. This is not to say that scholarship on Mediterranean antiquity is inherently detrimental. We have just seen that Martí envisions the Roman toga on the same plane as the Quechuan *vincha*. Yet, if the American hemisphere is not considered first, the process of familiarization with our distinguishing conditions is not initiated. Martí affirms that:

> The history of America, from the Incas on, should be taught by rote, even if we do not teach the Athenian magistrates. Our Greece is preferable to that Greece which does not belong to us (1963-1973, 6:18).

Each society should be proud of the ancestral forms that relate to its own medium. This principle is repeated in a review of a French-authored book on the Argentine pampa. There, Martí informs us that it is not necessary to read Homer in Greek when there is another ‘Homer’ who roves the South American plains with a guitar over his shoulder (1963-1973, 7:368). Of course Martí is referring to the gaucho, a precursor to the US cowboy, living a solitary life, herding cattle, and oftentimes stout-heartedly resisting civilization’s reach. This figure attained its pinnacle in José Hernández’ *Martín Fierro* (1872, 1879) and inspired a whole range of verse, from the lyrical to the political, approaching what could be called a New World form of epic poetry.

Appraising one’s own circumstance and codifying it in a format that can be interpreted by others can then lead toward acknowledgment by those others. This process is important because an individual requires liberty in order to be able to self-criticize and to enjoy an autochthonous, nonexotic government based on the ‘natural nation’. Gadamer tells us that insight of this type is linked to tradition:

> All self-knowledge arises from what is historically pregiven, what with Hegel we call ‘substance’, because it underlies all subjective intentions and actions, and hence both prescribes and limits every possibility for understanding any tradition whatsoever in its historical alterity (1989, 302).

Any colonial legacy must first be dissolved before excavating the true national heritage, an unavoidable process before reaching a stage of sentience. This step is imperative because as African liberation theorist Molefi Asante warns, ‘consciousness precedes unity’ (1980, 31). If all the ingredients of the melting pot are not self-aware, then any attempt at national cohesiveness will be fruitless.

In Eugenio María de Hostos’s case, his comments on the Andean ‘civilization decivilized by colonialism’ posit an inverse relationship between civilization and imperialism. Such a construct negates Sarmiento’s position, a necessary manoeuvre in the process of achieving a racial and social equilibrium. For this early defender of civil rights, ‘becoming civilized is nothing more then elevating oneself on the scale of human rationality’ (1939, 16:192). He adds the proviso that this cognitive process is not just something that randomly happens to someone, it should be seen as a duty (1939, 16:192). Achieving an advanced stage of human development, then, is not the result of any particular culture, but of the degree of learning achieved.

The way Hostos derives his national paradigm can be deduced from his notions
of ‘people’ and ‘society’ and the impact structures of subordination have over them. In his Peru essay, he inveighs against the ‘abominable colonial government’ that ‘did not leave societies’, that ‘did not leave a people, resulting in a heterogeneous population, spread out over enormous distances […]’ (1939, 7:43, 44). The model for him was the Antilles, a ‘laboratory to fuse human elements that, united, will form in the future the true race’ (1939, 2:250). For a Hostos who searched for a Krausist harmony, the various incohesive ethnicities retarded the possibility of nation-ness. He may have gotten this idea from Giner de los Ríos who saw the Middle Ages as ‘an immense laboratory’ forming a unified humanity in Europe (1919-1936, 3:184). Yet here we come to a sociological ‘catch-22’ for to make multitudinous peoples alike is to repress them. For Richard Rosa, then, Hostos does not respect his own praise of nature in the face of civilization. The very act of approaching the ‘natural order’ of things implies doing so ‘by means of a series of artificial mechanisms which belie its intent’ (68). Unless, of course, if people come together of their own accord, then the hegemony of Hostos’s proposal would dissipate. If that were the case, a new brand of civilization would be created, one based on a distinctly American construction. With a footing in history, he foresees forming an all-inclusive nation in Peru, starting with the indigenous peoples as a population base and building a society including the cholos, the blacks, the zambos, the mulattoes and the white creoles (1939, 7:45). These peoples would be united by the ‘the principal of unity in variety’ (1939, 2:253). Such a multilayered schema runs Sarmientine dualities completely into the ground and coincides with Martí’s quest for equality, albeit with an intriguing difference.

As a response to South American populations that are ‘civilized’, ‘half-savage’, or somewhere in between, Hostos tenders a solution which anticipates Vasconcellos’s 1925 work on the ‘Cosmic Race’: ‘In all of these population zones there is a swarming of races which delights the traveller who passes through them, imagining a future in which all ethnic shades blend into a homogeneous race’ (1939, 7:51-52). This model is best represented in the Peruvian capital, ‘and in no centre of civilization is this confusing and fusing of races so animated, so lively, so interesting as in Lima’ (1939, 7:52). Later, when disparaging Peru in its military defeat during the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), Hostos sides with Chile not so much because of her enemy’s contrasting ethnic groups, but because they did not form a congenial organism like Chile, as demanded by Krausist doctrine. Nor did the Andes hold water when compared to the base line, Hostos’s own Antilles, ‘the natural centre of fusions’ (1939, 1:185)

In his essay on ‘Latin America’, Hostos builds on Giner’s idea of a medieval laboratory of cultures and situates his explicit programme for race blending as a response to overseas criticism of American civilizations:

> Until the fifteenth century, none of the European societies had achieved, even in the homogeneity of their populations, the creation of a feeling of national unity. What is their historical basis for demanding that the improvised nations of Latin America immediately derive a spirit of nationality? (1939, 7:11)

Inserting the newer Spanish-speaking countries into a context with fifteenth-century Europe is thought provoking, and strides toward establishing an awareness of the possibility of coevalness between two hemispheres. Nevertheless, as Hostos
himself would recognize, any attempt to achieve parity alone does not ultimately solve the problem of nationhood. Neither does homogeneity in itself constitute a nationality. This question absorbed his energies as he trudged unsuccessfully toward the goal of Puerto Rican independence. For him there is a series of requirements that transcend a simple intermingling of races. Here are his conclusions: First, a people must develop an appreciation of sovereignty, of the right to liberty and to work. Second, to achieve nationality, human emotions must be fused with all forces that establish society. Third, each ethnic group must heal its maladies. Specifically, the indigenous must be cured of their apathy, the *cholos* must be cleansed of their idolatrous fanaticism, and the Africans can no longer suffer from a spirit of subservience. Furthermore, the mestizos must be purged of their turbulent spirit while whites can no longer aspire to sensual laziness (1939, 7:45). There is a dynamic in Hostosian thought informed by two attitudes, one regressive and the other progressive. Hostos suffers from typical Western arrogance, defining what others need to do, an elitist paradigm reprinted in his *Treatise on Morals* where he prescribes developed nations civilizing ‘those that are in the first grade of sociability’ (1939, 16:99). While defining paternalistically what he sees as the thorn in each group’s side (as noted, a common practice during his century), he does, nonetheless, avoid any hierarchal framework that discriminates between different *ethnie*. He warns that no one can prevail over another if a true nationality is to be forged: If one dominates for whatever reason, and if others let themselves be dominated, a coherent society cannot be formed (1939, 7:53). As Tiberghien states, ‘the subject and the object’ must exist on the same intellectual plane. Conversely, despite the patronizing tenor of his propositions, Hostos’s stance on the internal equality necessary for constituting a truly sovereign state must be understood in terms leaning toward postcoloniality. Moreover, his recommendation for total miscegenation represents nothing less than a radical solution that would, over millennia, undoubtedly resolve the racial dilemma. While the recommendation itself cannot be implemented without the ‘artificial mechanisms’ described by Rosa, the end result, if people were allowed to interact on their own terms, would be an organic society harmonious in nature.

As with Martí, Hostos does not reduce the concept of civilization to its European variety. In ‘Latin America’, he fancies a continent with ‘more than thirty million inhabitants, all with equal aptitudes for civilization and identical desires for progress’ (1939, 7:7). Responding to transatlantic broadsides against the Americas, he reminds us that civil society is the product of education:

If civilization results from the number of individuals educated by science and conscious of social ends, please keep in mind the intellectual resources the Europeans have at their disposal, as well as their scarcity in Latin America, and then you decide (1939, 7:13).

Hostos sees Latin American limitations as a problem of limited progress, not of barbarism. Like his Cuban confrère, he distances himself from Sarmiento’s speculation which associates the notion of civilization with European-ness. Yet like both of his colleagues, Hostos’s ‘artificial mechanisms’ must be understood as compliant with nineteenth-century liberalism, a linkage Rosa also suggests (71).

Given the unrelenting coloniality of the American hemisphere (Puerto Rico’s
unresolved status, the embargo on Cuba, US interference in Latin American elections), Hostos’s endeavors were incontrovertibly Utopian. According to Fernando Ainsa, this dimension in his thought is a result of the tension between the reality that is and the ideal that could be (1989, 72). His project of miscegenation coincides with and builds on the inclusiveness championed by Martí. It is a project to be achieved, ‘in favour of the emancipation of human reason, in favour of women, of indigenous peoples, of Chinese, of Chilean cowboys (huasos), of the lower social classes (rotos), of the cholos and the gauchos, all of them drudges of social inequality’ (1939, 2:121; see also 4:44). To expect parity between the sexes, races and classes is nothing less than a revolutionary posture, one that anticipates Dussel’s transmodern project, ‘the mutual fulfilment of the “analectic” solidarity of centre/periphery, woman/man, mankind/earth, western culture/peripheral postcolonial cultures’ (2000, 474). The destruction of these Western dualisms represents the adaptation of what Alfonso de Toro has termed ‘a transverse rationality’ (1999, 56-57), one that flows back and forth in search of a new paradigm. That Hostos anticipated both Dussel’s ultra inclusive human construction and de Toro’s postcolonial rationality speaks to the pioneering multipronged thrust of his proposal. In a Utopian world, if Hostos had had it his way, Mignolo might not have felt the need to develop his ‘border-thinking’ apparatus (2000). Since he did not, it was inevitable that Dussel, de Toro and Mignolo would develop their critical models thereby inadvertently substantiating the validity of his arguments.

Conclusions

Regarding Martí and Hostos’s relationship to Sarmiento, the most reasonable thing to assert is that all three lived during a racially charged time (not the only one in history!) and all were concerned with the modernity associated with nineteenth-century liberalism, Sarmiento with Argentina’s transatlantic trade relations, Martí and Hostos with the rupture of political ties to Spain inserting their respective islands into a hemispheric system of commerce constructed upon precepts of fairness. While the modernity of Sarmiento’s proposition was favourable to economic progress, the subjugation of heterogeneous peoples it implied was nothing more than internal colonialism. Thus the two Caribbean intellectuals subscribed to Sarmiento’s quest for modernity insomuch as it could include Cuba and Puerto Rico while still respecting non-European forms of life. They were thus faced with a dilemma, work toward independence with the Latin American establishment while not alienating that establishment by praising what it considered ‘barbarity’.

The similarity between Hostos and Martí resides in their both being from the multiethnic Antilles, their mutual adhesion to Krause’s doctrines that set them apart from Sarmiento’s budding positivism, and their frustrating experiences vis-à-vis liberating their respective islands from the colonial regime. Their thought was a Caribbean hybrid of three processes. First they were both reacting to the continued subjugated status of their respective islands. Second, they were responding to the racial hierarchies that defined the slave societies into which they were born. Third, they were reacting against positivist theories of racial superiority, such as Sarmiento’s, which could only have negative consequences for the nation-building enterprise. These considerations were progressive for their time, but do not achieve
the surrealist identity quest found in the twentieth-century, such as in the poetry of Nicolás Guillén where in poems such as ‘The Last Name’, he looks for the submerged African culture palpitating under his Spanish surname. Nevertheless, it is unreasonable to think they could approach the tenets of Guillén’s *négritude* in that way. What they did was forge a simple path for later intellectuals to follow.

The significance of Martí and Hostos’s national-unity formulations is not just that they represent a substantial advance over other speculative enterprises of their time, or even that they anticipate multicultural, postmodern, and postcolonial ideas presently being developed at academic institutions in the United States and Europe, but that, given their reformist concept of cultural inclusiveness, they can still serve as an inspiration in the pursuit of a modernity unfettered by coloniality. This is true because they advocate eliminating prejudices by means of what Gadamer might call a ‘fusion of horizons’, based on many traditions, resulting from an interethnic ‘horizon of understanding’ (1989, 307), shedding light, in the process, on the notion of a shared identity, as the nation-state treads lightly into the future.

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**Notes**

1. All translations are mine.
2. Two authorities, Rama and Miller, got me thinking about this trend toward hybrid authors. Both talk about writers increasingly trying to ‘replace the priesthood’ (Rama 1984, 111) or at least ‘cast[ing] themselves as alternatives to priests rather than their direct opponents’ (Miller 1999, 104). Thus came a new paradigm for the social thinker who was no longer solely a *letrado*, a man of letters, now ‘bringing into the mix the new disciplines along with the old, historians, sociologists, economists and literary types’ (Rama 1984, 107; see also 110). This new public figure brought to the fore an unparalleled passion for analyzing hybrid societies in the throes of modernization.
3. A good place to begin to understand the thorny relationship Martí had with Latin Americanism would be Santí (1998). Also helpful is a recent article by Gaztambide-Geigel (2004).
4. My view of modernity, derived from Wallerstein (1974) and Mignolo (2000), is that it comes with the Conquest and functions in sync with the sixteenth-century globalization that came on the heels of Portuguese and Spanish world empires.
5. The most complete treatment of Martí’s relationship with Krausism is still Tomás Oria’s.
7. The Andes were the seat of the Inca Empire that ran along most of the Pacific coast. That ultra-sedentary civilization given form by roads and irrigation systems, a priestly class, and a powerful
succession of dynastic overlords lived by rules substantially different from the nomadic peoples who populated the southern lands that later became Argentina.

8. By proposing education as a prescription against noncivilization, Hostos coincides with one of his contemporaries, the Peruvian essayist and poet, Manuel González Prada who took a similar posture in his famous essay ‘Our Indians’, included in the second edition of Horas de Lucha.

9. I use the term subconscious here to imply that many times racial constructions go unanalyzed, leaving them in the realm of the subconscious.

10. Some pre-Colombian symbols or hieroglyphics have been deciphered in our time as with Michael Coe’s Breaking the Maya Code (1992). Recent research on Nahua tlaquilo documents has advanced our knowledge of the pre-colonial Nahuas. The khipu, though, still remains a mystery, despite some recent investigatory achievements.

11. The ‘colonial mentality’ has recently received some attention by psychologists David and Okazaki (2006).

12. Hostos’s stay in the Peruvian capital, where he spent a short time working as an opinion editor in Lima’s press, has been examined in my ‘Four Days in November’, an article which also offers some preliminary ideas on his racial observations on that country. After being fired from his post at La Patria, Hostos journeyed on horseback to Chile where he most certainly came into contact with many peoples of non-European extraction.

13. Sarmiento was not alone in his fear of blacks; for similar reasons the novelist José Mármol developed an almost identical attitude. See my ‘Mármol, Sarmiento y la relación inversa entre raza y mercado occidental’ (2006).


15. Marti’s de-emphasizing of the Mediterranean world anticipates Enrique Dussel’s argument that nineteenth-century European philology ‘kidnapped Greek culture as exclusively Western and European and then posited both the Greek and Roman cultures as the center of world history’, a perspective which ‘can be considered erroneous’ (2000, 468).

16. In the Andean region a cholo is a mixed-race person of indigenous and Spanish heritages reflecting varying degrees of assimilation into criolla culture. Stephens (1989) offers some three pages of variations on its meaning.

17. Vasconcelos believed that fusion in Latin America was creating a fifth race that was cosmic. His La raza cósmica is the primary source for twentieth-century borderlands theory, especially as developed in Gloria Anzaldúa’s influential Borderlands, La Frontera, a work which in turn serves as a springboard for Walter Mignolo’s intriguing Local Histories/Global Designs.

18. It noteworthy that Hostos, in his desire to overcome coloniality, brings us back to the Europe of the fifteenth century, the place and period, more or less, where Mignolo (2000) situates the birth of modernity.

19. Thus Guillén adapts a back-to-Africa posture akin to another surrealist Caribbean author, Aimé Césaire who in a 1967 interview stated the following: ‘if I apply the surrealist approach to my particular situation, I can summon up these unconscious forces. This, for me, was a call to Africa’ (1972, 84).

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