

**Irregularities and Pro-Government Bias
in Venezuelan Elections in the Chavista Era, 1998–2018**

	<i>Date</i>	<i>Election Type</i>	<i>Irregularity</i>	<i>Type</i>
1	04.25.1999	Referendum to create a Constituent Assembly	1. The figure of the Constitutional Assembly did not exist in Venezuela’s 1961 Constitution. The constitution required instead that changes to the constitution be made via Congressional initiative. Cajoled by Chávez, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of conducting a referendum, under the theory that “power resides in the people” (Brewer-Carías 2010). L	L
2	06.25.1999	Constituent Assembly representatives	2. The government chose a new electoral rule for electing delegates that violates Venezuela’s traditional notion of proportional representation for minorities. Voters chose representatives based on national and regional lists. They could issue as many votes as there were seats. The government provided its own list of candidates (the so-called <i>Kino chavista</i>). This system gave a special advantage to organized and cohesive groups (as was the case with the ruling party) and disfavoured independent candidates or disorganized parties (as was the case with the opposition). Consequently, with only 56 percent of the vote, the ruling party obtained 94 percent of seats (Maingón, Baralt et al. 2000; Rachadell 2007) https://konzapata.com/2014/11/el-kino-y-las-morochas-en-el-sistema-electoral-venezolano/	IS7
3	12.15.1999	Referendum on new constitution	3. In March 1999, Chávez decided to treat the constituent assembly as an “originating” (<i>originaria</i>) body, meaning that it had full powers to “transform the state,” not just the constitution (Maingón, Baralt et al. 2000; Viciano Pastor & Martínez Dalmau 2001:102; Combellas 2003). The concept of <i>originaria</i> did not exist in Venezuelan law, and the Supreme Court in April ruled against treating it as <i>originaria</i> (Viciano Pastor & Martínez Dalmau 2001:136-137). L 4. In August 1999, the Constituent Assembly, with the help of <i>chavista</i>	L L

			<p>supporters, seized the parliament building (the Capitolio) and deactivated congress.</p> <p>5. In September, the assembly began to penalize federal judges. The president of the supreme court, Cecilia Sosa, resigned, arguing that the courts preferred to “commit suicide” rather than accept assassination (Sosa Gómez n.d.). IS1</p>	IS1
4	06.30.2000	<p>“Mega-elections” for all public positions Presidential, National Assembly, Governors, Mayors, State Legislature, Andean & Latin Parliament</p>	<p>6. Shortly after the approval of the new constitution, the government fired all the members of the National Electoral Council (the country’s highest electoral authority in charge of organizing elections and certifying results). IS6</p> <p>7. The elections initially scheduled for May 28, had to be postponed due to “technical problems” by the new CNE. The CNE’s new members, all with little experience, were asked to organize this mega election in record time. The new CNE failed to have key electoral data ready for audits and was committing a number of errors, but still wanted to go ahead with the election. Following a national outcry against the CNE, the Supreme Tribunal called the government to postpone the election (Alvarez 2009). See also http://www.cartercenter.org/news/documents/doc273.html . T</p>	IS6 T
5	12.03.2000	<p>Municipal Councils, Civil Parishes; Syndical referendum</p>		
	09.12.2003	<p>1st request for a Presidential recall referendum</p>	<p>8. The CNE authorities were replaced again, this time with more experienced experts, but also more partial figures. Three of the five new <i>rectores</i> were openly aligned with the ruling party, and two with the opposition (Alvarez 2009). IS6</p> <p>9. The CNE rejected requests for a presidential referendum on the grounds that the signatures were collected before Chávez completed half of his</p>	

			<p>term in office, among other technical objections (Human Rights Watch 2008). IS11</p> <p>10. A second signature drive was deemed inadmissible because the number of valid signatures did not meet constitutional requirements. After a successful appeal by different NGOs in the Supreme Court’s Electoral body and street protests, the Court’s Constitutional Chamber annulled the CNE decision (Human Rights Watch 2008). Government officials encouraged voters to repent and withdraw their signatures (Carter Centre 2005). IS1</p> <p>11. The signatures of approximately 2.5 million voters who petitioned for the recall referendum were collected by Luis Tascón, a pro- Chávez member in the National Assembly, and posted on his website. This database (the so-called Lista Tascón) was used by the administration to deny access to government services, jobs and contracts. This political blacklist eroded the principle of secrecy of vote, and impartial treatment by the state, and equality under the law (Jatar 2006, Hidalgo 2009). IS4</p> <p>12. On August 2003, after the National Assembly couldn’t make up its mind about the fifth rector of the CNE, appointed all five members of the CNE (European Union 2006). The composition of the CNE became ideologically aligned with the ruling party. IS6</p> <p>13. Multiple changes in rules and procedures to verify signatures were created (38 in total), many of which after the signatures were collected). 44 percent of signatures were declared invalid (Martínez 2016). IS7</p> <p>14. The process to verify signatures generated a delay of approximately 184 days (166 days of which were devoted to verify signatures). T</p>	
6	08.15.2004	Presidential recall referendum	<p>15. In June 2004, the Tascón list was “perfected” into the “Maisanta Lista,” which now added more information about the signatories: whether they had ever abstained, whether they had contacts with social missions (Hidalgo 2009). IS1 and IS4</p>	<p>IS4</p> <p>IS2</p>

			<p>16. Bolivarian circles, informal groups of pro-government citizens created by the government, took an active role in managing social services (provision and resources) and monitoring “supportive attitudes toward the government,” especially during the referendum (Hawkins & Hansen 2006). (The <i>Círculos</i> were eventually replaced by <i>Consejos Comunales</i> in 2006 (Myers 2012)). IS1 and 2</p> <p>17. The day of the voting, the CNE decided to keep the polls open until midnight, presumably to accommodate the long lines. IS7</p> <p>18. Soon after the polls were closed the CNE issued the first report giving Chávez a victory. The two opposition Rectors of the CNE (Zamora and Mejías) stated that they were denied access to the electoral information and were excluded from deliberations surrounding the decision to make this first announcement (Alvarez 2009). IS5</p> <p>19. International observers were not allowed to review the internal review process (Carter Centre 2005). IS5</p> <p>20. The official results contradicted various exit polls, prompting the <i>Coordinadora Democrática</i>—the umbrella organization campaigning on behalf of NO—to claim fraud. A non-random and insufficient audit was conducted (covering less than 1 percent of ballots) by the National Electoral Council. There was widespread suspicion that the electronic voting machines were rigged. Independent reports found suspicious patterns in the voting report, based on comparison with prior votes and national surveys ((Delfino & Salas 2011, Hausmann & Rigobón 2011). Another forensic study found irregularities in the vote distribution mainly in electoral units that favoured Chávez (Jiménez and Hidalgo 2014) IS10, IS5</p> <p>21. The growth rate in the electoral roll was more than 9 percent per year, twice the average growth rate until 2000 (of 11 percent every 5 years) (Jiménez & Hidalgo 2014).</p>	<p>IS7</p> <p>IS5</p> <p>IS5</p> <p>IS10</p> <p>IS11</p>
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7	10.30.2004	Governors, State Legislature, Mayors	22. Originally scheduled for September, elections were moved to October 30. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/spanish/latin_america/newsid_3639000/3639616.stm T	T
8	08.07.2005	Municipal Councils, Civil Parishes	<p>23. Following the resignation of two CNE Rectors, the National Assembly faced the duty to appoint a new set of rectors. The ruling party wanted four pro-government candidates. The opposition wanted two opposition candidates, two pro-government candidates, and one independent president. The ruling party intentionally postponed a vote in the National Assembly, automatically prompting the Supreme Tribunal to take over the decision. For the second time under <i>chavismo</i>, the Tribunal appointed the vacancies. The result was a CNE with four openly pro-government <i>rectores</i>, further eroding the credibility of this third CNE under <i>Chavismo</i> (European Union 2006, Alvarez 2009). IS6</p> <p>24. The ruling party decided to create a parallel party, the so-called Unidad de Vencedores Electorales (UVE). Having two “twin” parties (<i>morochas</i>, in Venezuelan jargon) allows the largest party to avoid the electoral rule that subtracts seats that would otherwise go to the leading party to favour the second vote-getting party. By running with a political organization can benefit from a rule intended to benefit parties that come in second place. While neither illegal nor new in Venezuela, this practice contradicted the spirit of proportional representation, and in the context of distrust and polarization prevailing in Venezuela, only served to erode credibility of the system further (European Union 2006) . IS7</p>	IS6 IS7
9	12.04.2005	National Assembly, Andean & L. Parliament	25. On November 23, an audit of the fingerprint machines in Mariches, attended by CNE, opposition parties, the OAS, the European Union, and Ojo Electoral revealed that it was possible to reconstruct the sequence of voting and thus identify the identity of voters. The machine stored the identity of voters in XML format in a random matter, but by applying a	IS10

			<p>particular software program (Last MFT Modification) to the Smartmatic machine’s software, one could identify the time of voting. While auditors concluded that the possibility of reconstructing the voting sequence was “remote,” the key parties demanded that the finger-printing device not be used (OEA 2006). Due to unresolved claims of lack of voting privacy, fear of the government’s use of <i>las morochas</i>, and new privacy fears raised by the Maisanta List, all opposition parties except MAS decided to boycott this election four days prior to the vote. They hoped to generate international outcry and force the government to postpone the elections, but the government proceeded with the election as planned. IS10</p> <p>26. The European Union produced a report that, without challenging the results of the election, strongly criticized the conditions leading up to it, emphasizing a lack of confidence in the CNE (European Union 2006). The president of the CNE at the time, Jorge Rodríguez, would go on to become the ruling Hugo Chávez’s vice-president, and then, campaign director for the ruling party. IS6</p>	IS6
10	12.03.2006	Presidential	<p>27. The opposition complained about the rapid increase in the electoral registry, of almost 27 percent in the last three years. The CNE accepted to do an independent review process asking all public universities to participate. The CNE rejected the review presented by the Central University of Venezuela, Simón Bolívar University, and the Andrés Bello Catholic University. Many errors were found, but reviewers did not find pro-government biases in the errors. Many contended that the errors did not modify the results of the election Carter Centre (July 2006): http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/americas/EstudioElectoralVenezuela1%20CarterCenter.pdf. IS11, IS5</p> <p>28. During the campaign, the opposition released a video showing energy minister and head of PDVSA, Rafael Ramírez, urging state oil workers to back President Hugo Chávez or to leave their jobs. He said PDVSA is</p>	IS11 IS1

			<p>“red, very red,” “from top to bottom.” The European Union declared that while election day adhered to national laws and international standards, the “participation of State public servants in campaign activities, as well as the circulation of manifestoes of adhesion of public servants in favour of President Hugo Chávez’s candidature, regardless of whether this participation was voluntary or induced, would also be contrary to Venezuelan law itself, and infringes against international election good practices” (European Union 2006). IS1 and IS2</p> <p>29. The Tascón and Maisanta lists affected the psychology of opposition voters, possibly leading to high abstention among the opposition, who feared the secrecy and freedom of the vote were at risk (Kornblith 2005; Jatar 2006; Kornblith 2006). An academic paper found that signers who appeared in the Maisanta database, “suffered from an average 5 percent drop in their earnings and a 1.3 percentage point drop in their employment probability.”(Hsieh, Miguel et al. 2011) IS1 and 4</p>	IS1
11	12.02.2007	Constitutional referendum	<p>30. The President proposed 69 far-reaching constitutional amendments to Venezuela’s 350-article constitution, violating the constitutional provision that major changes to the constitution (e.g., abolishing term limits) require a new constituent assembly, rather than a yes-no referendum. Only close associates of the president participated in the drafting of these proposed reforms; none from the opposition. L, IS7</p> <p>31. The government refused to renew the license of RCTV, reducing to essentially two the number of independent TV stations covering politics. IS3</p> <p>32. For this election, the CNE discontinued the protocol of inviting international electoral observers. This refusal to invite electoral observers is still in place (Carter Centre 2012). IS5</p> <p>33. The definitive results, including the behaviour of 11 percent of the electoral census, remains undisclosed (Jiménez & Hidalgo 2014). L</p>	L IS3 IS5 L

			<p>34. Unlike in other elections, the audits did reflect important differences between the votes cast and those audited (Jiménez & Hidalgo 2014). IS10</p>	IS10
12	11.23.2008	Governors, Mayors	<p>35. In February 2008, the Comptroller General released a list of nearly 400 people (eventually reduced to 270) barred from running for office, the so-called Russian List. The ban was based on untried accusations of corruption. The majority of those banned (<i>inhabilitados</i>) belonged to the opposition, including several key leaders and favourites in the electoral race. In August, after criticisms of “undue delay” from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Supreme Court ruled in favour of the ban. Opposition leaders like Leopoldo López, widely favoured in the race for General Mayor of Caracas, was one of the blacklisted candidates (BBC News 2008) (El Universal 2008). IS9, SL, IS7</p> <p>36. The administration threatened to cut funding and even “send tanks” to those states that elect opposition figures. IS1</p> <p>37. Prior to the elections, the government announced the nationalizations of ports in Zulia, Carabobo and Nueva Esparta, states in which the opposition was strong. These nationalizations deprived local officers of revenues and asserted the president’s controls in municipal affairs. IS2</p> <p>38. The administration relied on <i>Morochas</i>. To take advantage of the complicated mixed-majority electoral system, two presumably independent but in reality pro-incumbent parties run in both electoral systems, allowing pro-incumbent forces to win a larger share of the votes. In Táchira and Carabobo, the <i>morochas</i> gave the government a seat bonus that allowed it to win legislative majorities, even though it lost the popular vote (Hidalgo 2009). SL</p> <p>39. After the election, the central government began to harass the winners from the opposition. The administration tried to prevent the governors from Táchira and Carabobo from taking office. Maracaibo-mayor Manuel</p>	<p>IS9</p> <p>IS1</p> <p>IS2</p> <p>L</p>

			<p>Rosales was accused of corruption and forced to leave.</p> <p>40. Caracas mayor Antonio Ledezma and Carabobo governor were stripped on many powers and significant parts of his budget. IS8</p>	<p>IS8</p> <p>IS12</p>
13	02.15.2009	Referendum to abolish term limits	<p>41. The Constitution bans referenda on items that were already voted down, The abolition of term limits was part of the constitutional reforms that voters rejected in 2007. President argued that the question was different this time because the new proposal abolished term limits for all elected officials, rather than just the president. L</p> <p>42. The administration encouraged communal councils—which are local civic organizations appointed by the president and showered with government money—to mobilize voters, thus violating the constitutional prohibition against the use of the public budget for electoral campaigning (Hidalgo 2009). In the 2007, voters rejected the government’s idea of legalizing these community councils. L, IS2, IS7</p> <p>43. There was no state funding for the No campaign (El Nacional 2009). IS2</p>	<p>L</p> <p>IS2</p> <p>IS2</p>
14	9-2010	Deputies for the National Assembly	<p>44. A local watchdog group documented 120 cases of aggression against the media and reporters between 2008 and 2009, including 32 cases in which radio stations had their freedom to broadcast suspended, prompting Freedom House to downgrade Venezuela, along with Russia, from “Partly Free” to “Not Free” in its most recent annual media-freedom assessment. IS3 and 4</p> <p>45. The 2009 Organic Law of Electoral Processes introduced at least two major changes in the electoral system deemed deleterious to the opposition. First, the law diminished the number of seats for parliament that are chosen by proportional representation (from among the so-called <i>lista</i> candidates) in favour of selective majorities, so that the ruling party,</p>	<p>IS3</p> <p>IS7</p>

			<p>where it is a majority, has fewer chances of sharing seats with minority parties. IS7</p> <p>46. The second change was one-sided gerrymandering. Opposition-stronghold districts were merged with pro-government districts so as to dilute or destroy the opposition's edge. This was done to benefit the ruling party in the states where it was weaker. In most democracies, gerrymandering occurs with some opposition involvement. In Venezuela, it was essentially a closed, cabinet-level operation (Corrales 2011). Gerrymandering was applied to only the capital city and seven states: Amazonas, Barinas, Carabobo, Lara, Miranda, Táchira, and Zulia. Barinas aside, these are—not coincidentally—Venezuela's most populous regions, where opposition leaders govern, or where the largest shares of opposition voters reside (Corrales 2011). Together with the heavy malapportionment introduced by the 1999 constitution, which guarantees three deputies to each state regardless of population, the new electoral law explains why the PSUV ended up with almost 60 percent of the seats in the National Assembly despite winning only 48 percent of the vote (Corrales 2010; Monaldi, Obuchi et al. 2011). IS7</p> <p>47. The National Assembly appointed two high-level members of the PSUV as new directors of the CNE: Socorro Hernández (former Minister of Telecommunications) and Tania D'Amelio (former MVR deputy), violating the CNE rule that CNE members must be independent figures. Hernández and D'Amelio argued that they had recently resigned to their ruling party membership http://eltiempo.com.ve/venezuela/politica/retirada-en-elecciones-a-la-an-2005-un-error-muy-caro-para-el-pais/200179. IS6</p>	IS7
15	10-2012	Presidential Elections	<p>48. The opposition was forced to adhere to the CNE's strict limit of three minutes of free airtime coverage per day, while the government enjoyed on average 48 additional minutes per day to broadcast, under the guise of</p>	IS3

			<p>“public announcements (Corrales 2013). IS3</p> <p>49. The government strictly applied a constitutional ban on public financing to all parties except the PSUV. Government spending nearly double between the end of 2011 and October 2012 (Ecoanalítica). IS2, IS7</p> <p>50. In previous elections the opposition complained that the regime was unwilling to guarantee the right to secret voting. But for this election, the government chose instead to focus on coercing <i>Chavista</i> votes. By midday, the government was able to determine how many and which individual had not yet voted, and checked this information against its lists of people registered for Misión Vivienda, a housing program with a million applicants. Party representatives visited the homes of these people and insinuated that eligibility for housing benefits was contingent on voting. Secrecy of voting is no longer guaranteed for <i>chavistas</i> (Corrales 2013). IS4</p> <p>51. The electoral registry was not audited. The last independent audit of the registry was in 2005 by CAPEL. IS11</p> <p>52. Although the MUD did have witnesses inside the CNE’s totalization room, at the last minute it was banned from having witnesses inside two other operational centres that monitored voter turnout and problems with the voter and fingerprint machines (Carter Centre) IS5</p> <p>53. In January 2012, the government shuts down the Venezuelan consulate in Miami, which has the largest concentration of Venezuelan expatriates (with 19,544 registered voters), forcing them to travel to the Venezuelan consulate New Orleans to vote (which has 638 registered voters). The closure took place several days after the U.S. declared persona non grata the consul Livia Acosta Noguera following revelations of tape recordings implicating the consul with an Iranian plan.</p> <p>http://globovision.com/articulo/conoce-el-orden-en-el-que-participaran-los-venezolanos-en-el-extranjero-segun-su-zona-horaria;</p>	<p>IS2</p> <p>IS4</p> <p>IS11</p> <p>IS5</p> <p>IS7</p>
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			<p>http://www.ultimasnoticias.com.ve/noticias/actualidad/politica/venezolanos-en-miami-se-movilizaran-nuevamente-par.aspx IS7</p> <p>54. Asymmetrical media bias. The Carter Centre reported bias in the tone of coverage among both public and private media, but more pronounced among state media. In state-owned television, 95 percent of reporting was positive about Hugo Chávez, while in private outlets this number reached 48 percent. Capriles' news coverage in state television was 78 percent negative, while in private outlets it was 59 percent positive. This pattern is replicated by radio outlets (Carter Centre 2012). IS3</p> <p>55. Timing. The government, aware of Chávez's deteriorating health, scheduled the elections two months ahead of schedule.</p>	IS3 T
16	12-2012	Governors and Mayors	56. MUD candidate for governor of Bolívar, Andrés Velazquez, claimed fraud in his state (undercounting of 126 <i>actas</i>). There was no response from the state. IS10	IS10
17	17.4.13	Presidential	<p>57. Resignation skipped. Maduro should have resigned as <i>presidente encargado</i>. The constitution mandates that all public officials who are running for election (but not for re-election) resign. L</p> <p>58. Defense minister Diego Molero declared full support for Maduro's candidacy. The constitution expects the military establishment to be neutral. L, IS2</p> <p>59. The opposition discovered a member of the ruling party had the passwords to the voting machines. While this alone did not constitute a security breach capable of tampering with the vote tally, it could be used to tamper with the functioning of machines (turning them on and off arbitrarily), causing delays in in opposition zones (Nagel 2013). IS4</p> <p>60. <i>El Nacional</i> revealed how PDVSA had been supporting elections, not just financially, but also operationally. Accordingly, employees are notified</p>	L L IS4

			<p>that they will serve as <i>patrulleros</i>. For the 2010 elections, <i>patrulleros</i> were instructed to: 1) work with local PSUV coordinators in designated municipalities to monitor the voting attendance; 2) provide snacks for PSUV activists, witnesses, and table members; 3) pay motorcycle drivers to carry out “tug operations” (<i>operación remolque</i> (Rivera & Zerpa 2013). IS1, IS2</p> <p>61. The voting registry was not changed from the one used in October, disenfranchising newly eligible voters. The opposition claimed that more than 600,000 deceased people are listed on the voting registry. IS11</p> <p>62. According to the opposition, 535 voting machines that did not work (affecting 189,982 votes)</p> <p>63. Irregular results and behaviours. The opposition claimed that</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 1,176 voting centres showed that Maduro won more votes than Chávez (one of them showing more 1000 percent more). - Opposition witnesses were forced out of 286 voting centres (affecting 722,983 votes). - 564 voting centres had assisted voting (affecting 1,479,774 votes). - 397 voting centres reported harassment of voters (affecting 1,240,000 votes). - Some voting centres had more votes than registered voters. <p>http://www.el-nacional.com/politica/tu_decides/Capriles-asegurado-asistido-millones-votantes_0_173382958.html IS10</p>	IS1
18	8.12.13	Municipal	64. Originally scheduled for April, 14, 2013, elections were postponed until December.	T
19	6.12.15	Legislative	65. Delay and Uncertainty: The CNE took long to announce the official date. T	T
			66. New rules. On June 25, one day after the opposition released its list of candidates, the CNE announced a new electoral regulation: at least 40 percent of each party’s candidates must be female. Only 11 of the 110	IS7

			<p>MUD candidates were women. The regulation was announced before the PSUV held its primaries (Castillejo 2015). IS7</p> <p>67. Bans on the opposition. 10 opposition candidates were barred from running. This includes María Corina Machado and Enzo Scarano, banned from running for public office for a year. The Comptroller General imposed penalties on both based on their failure to include non-salary meal tickets in their sworn tax declarations (Stolk 2015). These are administrative penalties, not political penalties, but the government treated them as political offenses. No judge offered a ruling. Pablo Pérez was barred for 10 years (Latin American Herald Tribune 2015) Daniel Ceballos (home arrest), as well as Raúl Baduel, son of general Raúl Isaías Baduel, and Ricardo Tirado http://www.abc.es/internacional/20150805/abci-veto-opositores-cavismo-201508042004.htm. Leopoldo López and Antonio Ledezma (mayor of Caracas) are in jail. Manuel Rosales (formerly in Peru) also banned and was arrested. Abelardo Díaz (Copei, Táchira).</p> <p>68. Intervening in political parties. The Supreme Court intervened in the internal affairs of opposition party COPEI, based on demands from warring factions of COPEI, to appoint a new leadership, that was less pro-MUD. http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/150730/tsj-nombra-junta-directiva-ad-hoc-en-el-partido-copei. Other opposition parties (Bandera Roja) or parties that could have offered dissident <i>chavista</i> candidates (MEP, Vanguardia Bicentenario Revolucionaria) were also intervened http://www.el-nacional.com/siete_dias/divisiones-amenazan-desarmar-mayoria_0_683931749.html. IS9</p> <p>69. Targeting former <i>chavistas</i>. Candidates from a former <i>chavista</i> dissident group, Marea Socialista, led by Nicmer Evans, were banned from presenting candidates (in association with other party), challenging them on their choice of name or for violating the gender-parity law.</p>	<p>IS9</p> <p>IS9</p> <p>IS9</p>
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			<p>70. Party ban. The government banned some parties from registering, including Vente (María Corina Machado’s party). IS9</p>	L
			<p>71. Nepotism. First lady Cilia Flores, an official resident of Caracas, was allowed to run for the state of Cojedes, in violation of article 188 of the Constitution, which requires candidates to hold a 4-year residency in the district they are representing http://www.infolatam.com/2015/08/17/el-caos-la-ultima-carta-del-chavo-madurismo/. L</p>	
			<p>72. Media clampdown. Data showed that the traditional media (broadcast TV) hardly covered the campaign activities of the opposition (Corrales & Von Bergen 2016). IS3</p>	IS3
			<p>73. Illegal campaigning. Members of the Executive branch participated in the campaign, which violates the constitution Starting November 13, Maduro made 25 public appearances in campaign rallies for party candidates http://prodavinci.com/2015/12/16/actualidad/cuan-efectiva-fue-la-campana-de-nicolas-maduro-por-franz-von-bergen/ L</p>	L
			<p>74. States of exception. The government declared states of exception or deployed military security operations in key districts, thus banning public rallies: This affected 58 districts: 26 are districts swing district or lightly leaning <i>chavista</i>; 25 are strongly <i>chavistas</i>; and 7 are strongly opposition http://www.el-nacional.com/siete_dias/Gobierno-saca-trucos-circuitos-clave_0_712728976.html. IS1</p>	IS1
			<p>75. Uneven gerrymandering. The government changed the number of deputies to be elected in 7 districts, giving more seats to pro-government districts. IS7</p>	IS7
			<p>76. Obstacles for witnesses: A total of 1,012 new voting centres (916 had only one voting table), making it harder for opposition witnesses to monitor. Other voting centres were established in geographic zones that were</p>	IS5

			<p>alimentos_0_856114474.html L</p> <p>81. Technicalities, such as misspelling the name of the president at the top of the form, become grounds for disqualifying not just one signature, but entire forms of signatures containing as many as 10 signatures (Duarte 2016). Illegibility of names in print are also ground for disqualification. IS5</p> <p>82. Signature verifiers and digitalizers were trained exclusively by the CNE, without MUD participation. IS5</p> <p>83. Maduro orders ministers to fire high-ranking public workers signed the petition for a recall referendum. The sackings would affect the ministries of food, finance, work and basic business, as well as workers in the office of the president (Dreier 2016). IS1</p> <p>84. In September, after a 128-day waiting period, the CNE established the timeline for signature collection (26-29 October), meaning that it would be impossible to hold the referendum before January 10, 2017, as the opposition wanted. If the referendum occurs after Jan 10, 2017, and the president is revoked, the constitution says that no election will be held (Martínez 2016). T</p> <p>85. The CNE made signature collection especially hard: 1) the opposition has 21 hours (7 daily hours between 26-28 October) to collect signatures; 2) it must collect signatures from 20 percent of the electoral registry for each state (<i>padrón electoral de cada Estado</i>) changing the norm used in 2004 of 20 percent of the entire registry; 3) only 1355 registry centres will be established (covering an average of 3,600 voters per centre, whereas the average in a typical election was 480 voters per electoral centre); 4) fewer centres are being established in districts where the opposition did better electorally; 5) most centres are of hard to reach; 6) will set up 5.392 electoral machines, whereas the opposition had requested 19.500 (Martínez 2016); 7) citizens will need to provide their fingerprint</p>	<p>IS5</p> <p>IS5</p> <p>IS1</p> <p>T</p>
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			<p>alongside their signature, potentially stoking fears of possible government reprisals for those who support the recall petition. IS7</p> <p>86. On 20 October Venezuela's national electoral council (CNE) ordered the suspension of the recall referendum. The CNE issued a statement after courts in five states ruled, almost simultaneously, that there was fraud in the first signature collection round in June, when the MUD collected the signatures of 1 percent of the registered electorate (per state). The CNE had already validated those decisions (<i>LatinNews</i> October 21, 2016). IS8</p> <p>87. Eight opposition figures, including Capriles, reported that they had been ordered not to leave the country, and Diosdado Cabello called for the arrest and imprisonment of opposition members for alleged fraud in relation the recall referendum process (<i>LatinNews</i>, October 21, 2016). IS10</p>	<p>IS7</p> <p>IS10</p> <p>IS10</p>
21	7.30.17	Constituent Assembly	<p>88. No citizen consultation. According to the Constitution, the people need to express whether they want a change of the constitution or not. The government did not hold a referendum. L</p> <p>89. Elimination of the relationship between seats and population. Government assigned one seat per district regardless of population size. This favoured small and rural districts, where the ruling party is stronger. In capital cities, where the government is weaker, the government created two seats, with the rule that the second seat goes to the loser. IS7</p> <p>90. Elimination of the rule one person one vote. Government created eight sectors that would elect their own representatives: indigenous, students, peasants and fishermen, business people, people with disabilities,</p>	<p>L</p> <p>IS7</p>

			<p>2017. But on September 12, the CNE moved them to October 15, giving the opposition 2 months to get ready (select candidates, conduct primaries, organize campaigns, and appoint witnesses). http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2016/10/06/america/1475763594_641432.html</p> <p>96. CNE refused to change the names of opposition candidates on the ballot to reflect the real winners from primaries held. The MUD held primaries for candidates in September, days after the deadline established by the CNE to change the ballot (August 16). Initially, MUD registered 70 candidates among 23 states, tentatively, with the idea of removing them after the primaries. According to articles 62 and 63 of the Organic Law of Electoral Processes, parties can replace candidates up to 10 days prior to an election. All 49 candidates who lost asked to be removed from the ballot. The CNE refused to remove them. Votes that went to those candidates (90,537) did not get transferred to the official MUD candidate. This affected the results in Bolívar. If those votes (3.787) had counted for the MUD, the MUD would have won that state easily. http://www.notimerica.com/politica/noticia-venezuela-paises-latinoamericanos-piden-cne-permita-mud-sustituir-candidatos-regionales-20171005235540.html; http://yvnoticias.com/2017/10/cne-no-habilito-sustitucion-de-candidatos-en-tarjeton-electronico; http://elvenezolanonews.com/estas-son-las-trampas-del-regimen-madurista-para-ganar-en-las-regionales/</p> <p>97. Short registration period. The CNE allowed less than two weeks for new voters to register, from July 6 to 15. Some have estimated that approximately 500,000 potential new voters did not manage to register. http://globovision.com/article/cne-inicia-jornada-de-inscripcion-para-nuevos-votantes-este-jueves https://www.infobae.com/america/venezuela/2017/10/21/5-claves-para-</p>	<p>L</p> <p>T</p> <p>IS7</p>
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			<p>entender-como-sigue-venezuela-tras-las-escandalosas-elecciones-regionales/</p> <p>98. Centres were moved and reduced. Days before the election, the CNE announced that it would relocate 75 voting centres mostly to areas that are either inconvenient to reach or in hard-core <i>chavista</i> districts. This relocation was expected to affect more than 700,000 voters. In addition, the government eliminated 7,000 voting booths out of 13,559), increasing the average number of voters to be handled from 597 to 800. http://prodavinci.com/blogs/las-claves-de-los-resultados-de-las-elecciones-regionales-2017-por-eugenio-martinez/.</p> <p>99. No outreach to electoral staff/officials. For this election, the CNE decided to rely on the same people who staffed the 2015 voting centres to staff the voting centres. It's not clear that they were notified with instructions to get training, get certified, or even to show up the day of the voting. Unless designated people checked the CNE website, they would not have known to report to duty. When selected officials don't show on election day, CNE officials have the right to select anyone from the crowd to serve as election official http://www.oevenezolano.org/2017/09/27/cabos-sueltos-en-la-eleccion-de-gobernadores-5-preguntas-sin-respuestas/ IS5</p> <p>100. Increase in political prisoners and <i>inhabilitados</i>: At least 16 opposition mayors are facing some type of legal trouble, with six under arrest: Antonio Ledezma, Daniel Ceballos, Delson Guárate, Alfredo Ramos, Ramón Muchacho, and David Smolansky. Also, Henrique Capriles, governor of Miranda and leader of Primero Justicia, and Liborio Guarulla, governor of Amazonas, were banned from running for re-election. Other potential MUD candidates banded were: Adriana D'Elia, Manuel Rosales, and Pablo Pérez. http://efectococuyo.com/politica/inhabilitaciones-impiden-a-varios-dirigentes-opositores-participar-en-regionales-2017. IS9</p>	<p>IS5</p> <p>IS9</p>
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		Municipal	<p>109. Elections were scheduled in October, violating the rule providing for 6-month advanced notice. Only five days were given to propose and certify candidates. T</p> <p>110. Elections for municipal council members were excluded, even though the law required them. Likewise, the CNE suspended elections for the mayor of Caracas and Alto Apure, in violation of the law. IS7</p> <p>111. No updating of the Voter Registry took place. No new voters were included. IS11</p> <p>112. No effort was made to certify new election observers and poll witnesses. http://efectococuyo.com/politica/observadores-electorales-detectan-11-irregularidades-en-el-proceso-de-municipales IS5</p>	<p>T</p> <p>IS7</p> <p>IS11</p> <p>IS5</p>
23	4.22.18	Presidential	<p>113. In January 2018, the government announces the date for presidential elections: April 22, 2018, violating the constitutional stipulation that at least 6 months be provided to prepare for an election (Art. 298). (Hernández 2018). T, L</p> <p>114. The body that called for the election was the National Constituent Assembly, violating the constitutional stipulation that only the “Electoral Power” (currently, the CNE) has the right to call for elections (Art. 293).(Hernández 2018). L</p>	<p>T</p> <p>L</p>

			<p>115. The Supreme Tribunal banned the opposition to run as a coalition (currently called MUD). It argued that the MUD cannot present itself as a single party, thereby impeding the opposition to run united http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-42827734 IS7</p> <p>116. Illegalization of parties. On December 2017, President Maduro ordered the CNE to sanction those parties that boycotted the 2017 municipal elections and demanded that five parties be revalidated. This decision violates the law: there is nothing in the law that requires parties to participate in elections.(Martínez 2018) IS7</p> <p>117. Arbitrary change in rules for validating parties. The rules for validating parties (involving the collection of signatures) was established on January 17, 2018, days before the actual validation needed to take place, scheduled for 3-4 February. Rules for obtaining the possibility of having a second chance to collect signatures (<i>jornada de reparo</i>) were also changed to make it more restrictive. As a result of this measure and the one before, the number of legal parties in Venezuela declined from 62 in 2016 to 17 in 2018, of which only 2 belong to the opposition.(Martínez 2018) IS7</p>	<p>IS7</p> <p>IS7</p> <p>IS7</p>
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