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Testing Democracy’s Promise: Indigenous Mobilization and the Chilean State

Patricia Rodriguez and David Carruthers

In the late 1980s, following decades of authoritarianism and political violence, Latin America experienced a wave of transitions to democratic rule and social peace. Indigenous groups were prominent among the social sectors taking advantage of new spaces for political expression and dissent. By 1992, on the 500-year anniversary of the European conquest, indigenous organizations across the Americas had mobilized to demand the basic human and civil rights that their peoples have been denied for centuries. Striving to fulfil liberal-democratic ideals, reform-oriented governments in Latin America responded to indigenous protests with a variety of initiatives to grant constitutional recognition, improve the quality of citizenship, create opportunities for self-determination, and increase local control over land and natural resources. These reforms have created new opportunities for indigenous peoples, but have also exposed contradictory agendas and sharpened conflicts in many places, including southern Chile, ancestral home of the Mapuche Indians who are the focus of this study.¹

Chile’s restored democratic government sought to create laws and institutions in the early 1990s that would improve on a history of troubled relations between the state and indigenous peoples. State officials reached out to historically marginalized indigenous populations, promising to incorporate their demands into the formal policy realm. While some Mapuche leaders remained suspicious, others took leading roles in this process, hoping that indigenous rights, recognition, and self-determination might also yield resolution to longstanding land and natural resource claims.

This paper chronicles the dilution of that promise, revealing the ruling coalition’s attempts to instead implant its own policy priorities within a newly-created state institution, the CONADI (National Corporation for Indigenous Development). In practice, Mapuche demands for land and resource rights clashed with regional development schemes and the powerful financial interests behind them. When calls for indigenous recognition generated political opposition, the governing coalition seized control of the agenda, aggressively undercutting CONADI as an arena for dialogue. Policymakers employed wedge politics in Mapuche communities, promoting an entrepreneurship agenda among cooperative leaders, while forcefully criminalizing the militant actions of others. This approach widened the cleavages between the state and the Mapuche, exacerbated tensions between the Mapuche and private businesses, and worsened existing divisions among Mapuche communities. Still, Mapuche leaders continue to seek opportunities for true reform, challenging and engaging the state and its institutions. This evolving relationship between the Mapuche and the Chilean state presents a vital test of the quality of contemporary Latin American democratic consolidation.
The paper proceeds in four parts. The first offers a brief historical background, emphasizing the land usurpation underlying today’s conflicts. The second describes the new laws and institutions that brought both great hope and grievous disappointment to Mapuche communities. The third section, based on field research in Chile from 1998 to 2006, offers empirical illustration of the ruling coalition’s policy agenda in practice, analysing a set of important land, resource, and institutional conflicts. The paper concludes with an assessment of the prospects for renewing the promise of indigenous political participation in coming years.

People of the Land

The Mapuche history is one of fierce resistance to Incan, Spanish, and Chilean forces. Following the military conquest in the region known as Araucanía from 1860-1883, the government formed nearly 3,000 reservations, tasking Christian missionaries with evangelizing, educating, and integrating the indigenous population. These assimilationist policies challenged their cultural integrity and left them politically excluded and marginalized (Degarrod 1998). Early twentieth century governments further subdivided and distributed Indian lands to white colonists, eventually pushing the Mapuche onto about five per cent of their original territory (Muñoz Ramírez 2005). This land usurpation was culturally and economically devastating, dispossessing many families altogether, and pushing others onto small plots of the least productive land. It also deepened distrust of the country’s political centre, removing the Mapuche farther from national politics (Mallon 2004).

Presidents Eduardo Frei Montalva and Salvador Allende promoted ambitious national land reforms; by 1971 their governments had restored nearly 70,000 hectares of usurped lands to indigenous ownership. Indigenous agricultural cooperatives also thrived, strengthening solidarity, pride, and optimism among indigenous families (Mallon 2004, 121). Still, the reforms proved largely incapable of reversing the historical legacies of land injustice and political marginalization in Mapuche territory. Frustrated indigenous leaders turned increasingly militant, organizing land seizures, strikes, and protests (Repetto 1997, Mallon 2004).

General Pinochet’s military coup brought land restoration to an abrupt end, shifting policy priorities toward the radical neoliberal agenda of his ‘Chicago Boys’. In 1979, the military government issued Decree 2.568, which opened thousands of Mapuche territories to subdivision and privatization. Eager to promote market development in the Araucanía, the government extended concessions, subsidies, tax breaks, and favourable terms of investment to timber companies (Repetto 1997, Saavedra 2002). The land law entitled indigenous families to no more than six hectares, and prohibited traditional communal forms of land use (Aylwin 2004). The regime employed strategies of paternalism, clientelism, and manipulation, dispensing favours, pitting Indian groups against one another, and leveraging heavy state repression against Mapuche leaders who refused to cooperate. Nevertheless, some Mapuche forged resistance networks with a variety of civil society organizations, including the Catholic Church. Several NGOs (non-governmental organizations) offered workshops and legal advice, and launched initiatives in agriculture, fishing, and rural development. One important initiative was the Mapuche Cultural Centres (1978), which focused on cultural, socio-
economic, and political issues within communities. These forums would provide an important base for new Mapuche organizations in the 1980s.  

In 1988, as General Pinochet’s national plebiscite shifted the terrain of opposition back to the electoral arena, Mapuche leaders voiced longstanding demands for land justice and political rights. The centre-left opposition coalition, the *Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia* (Coalition of Parties for Democracy), embraced indigenous issues during the campaign. Presidential candidate Patricio Aylwin’s *Acuerdo de Nueva Imperial* (New Imperial Pact) promised that a Concertación government would address ancestral land disputes, and ensured constitutional indigenous rights. While some Mapuche leaders were suspicious, others joined the coalition and campaigned for the Concertación. They understood the Pact as a commitment to be treated fairly and taken into account in exchange for their electoral support (interview with Herrera 1999).

### The Promise of Democracy

With the Concertación’s electoral victory and the restoration of democratic rule in 1990, resolution to Mapuche social and land injustices seemed at hand. Indigenous leaders who supported the New Imperial Pact were rewarded with the opportunity to negotiate the mechanisms for returning usurped lands to Mapuche communities. This dialogue proceeded under the framework of the *Comisión Especial de Los Pueblos Indígenas* (Special Commission for Indigenous Peoples, CEPI), created by the Aylwin government in May 1990 to coordinate a new state relationship with indigenous communities. Embodying a discourse of ‘co-participation,’ CEPI consisted of ten indigenous representatives, ten government representatives, and a three-person directorate nominated by the president. The CEPI was charged with crafting legislation for a new indigenous law, developing constitutional recognition for indigenous peoples, and securing Chilean ratification of International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 169, concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (interview with Herrera 1999).

#### The Indigenous Law and the CONADI

In 1993, the Chilean Congress passed the Indigenous Law (*Ley Indígena* 19.253), representing the culmination of CEPI’s work and the promise of a new era of political participation and justice for Chile’s indigenous peoples. The law called for the creation of a new institution to promote indigenous cultures and development. The CONADI (National Corporation for Indigenous Development) would bring indigenous groups directly into the state as agents of their own political futures. Given the history of land injustice, the congress also created a Land and Water Fund (*Fondo de Aguas y Tierras*) for buying and transferring lands back to indigenous communities. After so many decades of betrayal and broken promises, it is easy to imagine how CEPI, the Indigenous Law, CONADI, and the Fund generated high hopes and great expectations among many indigenous people.

The objective was to create a venue in which indigenous people could express their own ideas about how their communities should develop. Lines of action would include the promotion and defence of political rights (recognition and repre-
sentation), education, economic development, territorial restoration, access to water, development of human resources, preservation of indigenous culture and identity, and strengthening civil society. During his inauguration as its first National Director, Mauricio Huenchulaf said, ‘CONADI must support an initial process of development, but in the future indigenous groups must decide themselves on their own development. CONADI will also embrace the missions of dignifying the original peoples, stimulating their participation, and contributing to tolerance and respect for ethnic differences’ (Diario Austral 1994a).

To its creators, CONADI would sustain the co-participatory spirit of New Imperial and CEPI, transforming the relationship between indigenous groups and the state. The executive council would consist of eight indigenous representatives, eight non-indigenous representatives, and a national director appointed by the president. The council would also reflect the population distribution of Chile’s main indigenous groups. CONADI’s indigenous councillors were eager to assume an even larger role than indigenous participants had played in the CEPI. They wanted direct and open dialogue with indigenous communities about land, technical support, productivity, and regional development.

For the first time in Chile’s history, its indigenous people could select representatives from their own communities to sit in a powerful national institution designed specifically to articulate their interests and respond to their concerns. Many indigenous people viewed CONADI’s participatory character as a long-overdue victory after years of sustained activism. Indeed, leaders and citizens alike adopted a proprietary sense, thinking of CONADI as an institution of their own (interview with Herrera 1999). Indigenous leaders emerged ready to take advantage of new opportunities to make a difference. According to Indigenous Councillor José Santos Millao, ‘I will be 100 per cent behind our communities, and I will not give in so easily when the intention [of political participation] is for us to make concessions to the government’ (Diario Austral 1994a).

A Bumpy Road Ahead

Despite this initial euphoria, other indigenous leaders remained sceptical about the sincerity of the Concertación’s promises and the authenticity of representation. Trouble was evident even before CONADI’s inauguration, when congress was considering the Indigenous Law. Furious debate ensued over constitutional recognition, as well as procedures for consultation with indigenous communities affected by development projects. In a last-minute legislative manoeuvre, a group of senators from the right eliminated those provisions from the final draft in 1993, marking a blow to indigenous aspirations, and watering down the spirit of the law (Sznajder 2003, Bengoa 2002).

Serious concerns also owe to Chile’s historic traditions of political centralism and elitism (Loveman 1979, Garretón 1989, Oxhorn 1999). The law granted President Aylwin unilateral authority to select interim indigenous councillors to serve from CONADI’s launch in early 1994 until the first council elections in May 1995. It also granted him the power to appoint the national director and three of the non-indigenous councillors. Moreover, the other five non-indigenous councillors held cabinet positions in the Ministries of Agriculture, Education, National Patrimony,
Planning and Development, and the General Secretariat of the Government (Haughney 2006, 91). Verticalism was first openly manifest in a dispute over the location of the headquarters, with executive officials lining up for a national institution centred in Santiago, and indigenous leaders promoting Temuco, the principal city of Araucanía. With the dispute ongoing, councillors were not able to assume office by the inauguration date (Diario Austral 1994c). Resolution ultimately involved the creation of a multi-tiered institution, with the national CONADI in Santiago, positioned in the powerful executive-branch Ministry of Planning and Development (MIDEPLAN), and two regional sub-directorates – Iquique in the north and Temuco in the south. Situating the agency in MIDEPLAN raised additional concerns about its independence and capacity for implementation, particularly for policies that would require cooperation with other ministries.

Sceptics also worried about the power of MIDEPLAN and other executive offices to influence policy decisions through their budgetary authority. As early as August 1994, Director Huenchulaf and his staff complained about insufficient resources to enact meaningful land redistribution. Huenchulaf anticipated that a serious programme for resolving land conflicts would require at least 14 billion pesos, but congress had only granted 3.5 billion for the entire 1994 CONADI budget, less than half of which would be available for land purchases or subsidies to land-poor indigenous peasants (Diario Austral 1994d). The bulk of the budget was destined instead to administration, infrastructure, services, technical support, soil productivity, and education.

One Mapuche group, the Consejo de Todas las Tierras (All Lands Council) denounced the manipulation of the nascent CONADI by party leaders and executive-branch officials. The fact that MIDEPLAN would organize the coming elections for indigenous councillors represented an unacceptable degree of central control. When the election took place in May 1995, the Consejo charged fraud and mismanagement, blaming the low turnout (under 40,000 of about 600,000 eligible indigenous voters) on poor organization and withholding of essential information (Diario Austral 1995).

CONADI’S Broken Promise

When CONADI launched in 1994, differing expectations about its democratic promise were evident in indigenous communities. While some leaders voiced concerns about executive control of the agenda, others hoped it would pave the road to more authentic citizenship for Chile’s indigenous peoples. Mapuche families hoped for educational opportunities and material improvements, and long-overdue redress of historical claims of land injustice. Over time however, those hopes gave way to deepening disappointment, a bitter sense of betrayal, and ultimately opposition, protest, and political violence. When indigenous demands ran counter to industrial and development interests, state agencies and policies perpetuated the Pinochet-era pattern of siding with the private companies against the expressed interests of indigenous communities. In the eyes of Mapuche and other Indian leaders, the promise of democratic co-participation deteriorated into a cruel fraud.

Hydroelectricity and industrial forestry provide telling demonstrations of this
pattern, and have been flashpoints for the sharpest conflicts. ‘Megadevelopment’ initiatives pushed by powerful international corporations, landowners, forestry companies, and energy development consortia have deepened the polarization and divisions within Mapuche communities, and thrust CONADI staffers into the middle of long-simmering conflicts. Brief analyses of these controversies reveal important lessons about the forces at play within CONADI, and the challenges that confront the larger quest for indigenous rights, recognition, and justice.

The Ralco Conflict

Concertación governments have shared and pursued Pinochet’s economic programme for the region, which rested on a chain of hydroelectric facilities in the Upper Bio Bio River Basin. In 1990, the National Electricity Company (Empresa Nacional de Electricidad, S.A., ENDESA) began construction of the first dam, the Pangue. Its construction generated substantial controversy, including a discourse of ‘ethnocide’ and an eventual denunciation by the President of the World Bank. However, because Pangue was well under way before the Indigenous Law or CONADI existed, those new protections and participatory mechanisms were not put to the test. That test would come, however, when ENDESA (now privatized and under the control of a Spanish industrial consortium) pursued a second dam, Ralco.

Mapuche leaders were determined to oppose the Ralco dam. It would bring massive ecological disruption, the destruction of indigenous villages and livelihoods, and the inundation of historic Pehuenche territories (the Mapuche subgroup that inhabits the highlands). In 1997, ENDESA began to negotiate the eviction and relocation of hundreds of Pehuenche families. The negotiations divided the communities, with some families signing relocation agreements, and others asserting they would never give up their ancestral territories.

As Pehuenche resistance captured the nation’s attention, indigenous leaders hoped to flex their new muscles in CONADI. The project could not go forward without the agency’s approval, and its co-participatory structure seemed to provide an ideal space to express their determined opposition. However, in April 1997, President Frei nipped that opposition in the bud by removing Ralco opponents from their CONADI offices, including the Temuco regional Subdirector, the lead CONADI attorney, and Director Huenchulaf. Upon his renunciation, Huenchulaf grimly predicted the disappointments to come:

I became an obstacle to the implementation of a political-economic path that does not take into consideration the damage it can signify to the indigenous population… Those in government who believe that this institution is simply another instrument for the state to accommodate a diversity of interests are wrong… [the president’s intervention] will only provoke an end to the pact between the state and indigenous peoples (Diario Austral 1997).

The firings did not stop CONADI councillors from voicing opposition to Ralco; they were outraged to discover that ENDESA commenced construction in early 1998 without awaiting CONADI approval. President Frei’s newly appointed national director, Domingo Namuncura, denounced the limitations on CONADI’s
decision-making and implementation authority, and endorsed closer involvement with Pehuenche groups, giving legal advice and blocking fast-track approvals of ENDESA’s land-exchange agreements (Haughney 2006, 122).

The next showdown came in July 1998, when two government councillors (appointed by President Frei) joined their indigenous colleagues opposing Ralco. Frei demanded their immediate resignations and replaced them with councillors sworn to vote in favour (interview with Vives 1999; Namuncura 1999a, 39). In early August, the council was set to make its ruling, with the indigenous councillors opposed, the government councillors in favour, and the deciding vote in Director Namuncura’s hands. When the president learned of Namuncura’s intention to vote against the permits, he requested his resignation just hours before the vote. Once again, executive intervention trumped representative democracy to secure the project’s approval (Namuncura 1999a). A month later, over the strenuous objections of the indigenous councillors, the president installed the first non-indigenous National Director, Rodrigo González, who predictably voted approval. Following Namuncura’s departure, González’s CONADI began authorizing the relocation agreements.

Tensions sharpened again in March 2000, when the government authorized ENDESA’s plan to flood 3,500 hectares of Mapuche land, including two villages. Several indigenous representatives quit the Ralco working group, and CONADI’s indigenous councillors refused to participate in council meetings between February and May 2000. They continued their attempts to stop the relocations, boycotting votes on land agreements and appealing to the courts, but to no avail (Haughney 2006, 144). In September 2003, the few holdout families finally acquiesced in exchange for money and land. By the end of 2003, all Pehuenche families were relocated and the dam was complete.

The Ralco conflict sheds light on the dramatically different visions that state officials and indigenous communities held of CONADI. For the government, CONADI should avoid political entanglement altogether, and should serve instead to facilitate a larger economic agenda of promoting market and entrepreneurial opportunities in indigenous communities (Haughney 2006). In April 1999, Secretary General of the Government Claudio Huepe said that the ‘objective of the CONADI is to act as a development agency, not as the representation of the indigenous world’ (quoted in Haughney 2006, 138). That assertion runs directly counter to the prevailing belief among many indigenous leaders that CONADI was conceived precisely as a venue for their long-denied political expression.

For indigenous people across Chile, Ralco generated bitter disillusionment. Revealing vestiges of an enduring, autocratic style of politics, the executive had ‘usurped’ and ‘de-indianized’ ‘our CONADI,’ and reconfigured it as a development agency rather than an entity for indigenous voice (interview with Namuncura 1999b). The process dealt a devastating blow to CONADI’s credibility, and shattered the government’s promise of a new era of political recognition and participation. With formal, institutional avenues of representation severely delegitimized, Namuncura believes militancy, protest, and radicalization were inevitable (interview 1999b).

The conflict also exposed the profound divisions within indigenous communities. Historic patterns of paternalism and manipulation further divided Pehuenche
families, who could not hold a united front. Indeed, the plight of the families garnished uneven support from other Mapuche groups, revealing even deeper fault lines within the larger Mapuche movement (Haughney 2006, 100).

Forestry and Land Conflicts

Industrial forestry has long been a government priority and a powerful economic force in southern Chile. Incentives under Pinochet’s Decree Law 701 (1974) included heavy subsidies for companies to establish forest plantations on former Mapuche lands acquired through privatization. Forest plantations received 75-100 per cent direct government funding during the dictatorship, and Concertación governments, dedicated to the export-driven economy, have continued the subsidies (Grass 1999, Maggio 2007). Timber products account for a high percentage (34 per cent) of the country’s overall exports, second only to copper (Maggio 2007). Many indigenous leaders view timber officials and workers as outsiders who are just as culpable as the Chilean state for the usurpation and destruction of their territories.

After the dictatorship, Mapuche leaders immediately pressed the Concertación for the restoration of ancestral lands and for mechanisms to prohibit forestry companies from continued territorial acquisition. Frustrated by the government’s lack of response and its ongoing dedication to timber subsidies and concessions, the more radical groups (such as the Consejo de Todas Las Tierras) reactivated the protest and land-seizure strategies of the 1970s. Aylwin’s government was quick to react against the militant turn, vigorously employing the same Anti-Terrorist and Internal Security Laws that Pinochet once used to silence his political opponents. By 1992, the government had imprisoned 144 Mapuche land protestors, setting a cynical tone for the restored democracy (Diario Austral 2000a; Haughney 2006, 72).

In spite of these bitter turns, some Mapuche leaders continued to hope that the new Indigenous Law and CONADI would provide legitimate mechanisms for land devolution. As the prime institution responsible for designing public policy in indigenous communities, CONADI attempted to address the problems via the Land and Water Fund. One of the first test cases involved 3,000 hectares in the community of Lumaco (IX region), which historically belonged to two Mapuche caciques (chieftains). After the conquest, relocations, and privatizations, the lands eventually became holdings of one of the largest forestry companies, Forestal Arauco. In 1997, the descendants of the caciques (85 families) initiated the land recovery through the CONADI Funds. The owners of Forestal Arauco fought back in the courts, bringing the process to a standstill. Frustrated families occupied the plots and interrupted forestry operations. Hostilities climaxed in December 1997, when Mapuche militants intercepted and burned three logging trucks. The Frei government arrested twelve Mapuche activists and imprisoned them under the anti-terrorism law. Land conflicts erupted throughout the southern region. By September 1998, 15,000 hectares were under dispute between 473 indigenous families and several forestry companies.

In the face of this stalemate, government strategies took two distinct forms, one reflecting the priorities of the executive cabinet, and the other coming from within CONADI itself. Our research reveals starkly different institutional visions between the government and CONADI staffers regarding the agency’s objectives and mis-
CONADI staff routinely felt pressure to fall in line with Concertación priorities. One CONADI official stated:

The Ministry of Finance pressed us to tell them about the economic return of such and such land devolution, when what we evaluated were the sociological and anthropological links between a community and a plot of land, the moral nature of the reparation... in principle, it was the same to us if [the indigenous] got the land and did not do anything with it (interview with Mansilla 2004).

MIDEPLAN was also intricately involved in land conflict decisions, because it controlled the budget allocations to CONADI and its Funds. MIDEPLAN Minister Germán Quintana made regular press announcements to address the crisis, calling for a national consensus on indigenous issues, and assuring the public that CONADI would have sufficient money to satisfy Mapuche land demands (Diario Austral 1999a). However, MIDEPLAN directives clearly gave preference to economic prerogatives over Land Fund allocations. In the midst of the intense conflicts of 1998, MIDEPLAN increased CONADI’s budget to 8 billion pesos; however, only 2.9 billion were allocated for resolution of southern land conflicts (Diario Austral 1998a).

With a limited budget for land dispute resolution, CONADI staff found themselves increasingly unable to deliver on government assurances. With the intensification of conflicts, executive interventionism became more commonplace, increasing confusion about and within CONADI. On the one hand, the agency was responsible for establishing order by imposing a ‘ceiling’ on the number and intensity of land claims (Llancaqueo 2005, 98). This order implied a tough stance on the part of the government and CONADI. In 1998, Frei’s appointment of Rodrigo González triggered bitter opposition from Mapuche leaders, who asserted that he had no credibility. The disputes divided the CONADI Council, generating a four-month rupture (August through November 1998) between the government councillors and the indigenous councillors. CONADI was by now so discredited that one Mapuche organization, Ad Mapu, announced the formation of a parallel indigenous commission to keep the agency in check (Diario Austral 1998b).

On the other hand, CONADI was still tasked with finding resolutions to land conflicts, whether indigenous communities viewed its director as legitimate or not. In the midst of pressures from both the executive and the indigenous communities, CONADI staff members (anthropologists, sociologists, and attorneys) managed to define, albeit somewhat informally, their overall objectives for the resolution of land conflicts. They hoped to establish close contact with communities, particularly as negotiators of financial settlements between indigenous communities and forestry companies. In the eyes of its staff, this diplomatic posture distinguished it from other state institutions involved in land disputes, particularly those concerned with maintaining security. As one CONADI staffer explained:

Many times we are able to negotiate with communities that are in conflict, establishing what the price of the land will be... In many negotiations, we also get the help of the indigenous councillors; they are a crucial help. But many times, we have direct orders from the president that we must keep the noise down in the most conflictive communities... We understand that our struggle is
permanent, we compete with intelligence agencies… we try to take control so that [the conflict] is not addressed with the involvement of police forces. This is hard. These are divided communities, without a central organization (interview with Mansilla 2004).

One government strategy for solidifying relations with indigenous communities was to strengthen technical, entrepreneurial, and cultural development projects. In January 2000, CONADI announced an investment of $900 million pesos for small irrigation projects in twenty indigenous communities in the Araucanía (Diario Austral 2000b). Other small projects included job creation and the restoration of degraded soils. However, evidence suggests that the rhetoric and aspirations were not matched by a consistent financial commitment. According to CONADI figures, only 12,000 (7.4 per cent) of the 164,000 hectares of land distributed to Mapuche communities between 1994 and 2001 had been targeted with follow-up subsidies and technical support from government sources (Rodriguez, Alvares, and Palomera 2002).

In 2001, the government announced the creation of Programa Orígenes, an integrated development project and entrepreneurship programme for indigenous people, which included a US $130 million investment in association with the Inter-American Development Bank. Although the programme envisioned community development programmes (in horticulture, artisan workshops, and cattle-raising) which aimed at enriching economic and cultural life, critics charge that the Orígenes programme lacks meaningful participatory mechanisms, reproducing classic verticalism (Vera et al. 2004, 44).

While reaching out to responsive Indian leaders, CONADI officials also encountered growing resistance from other Mapuche groups. Mapuche leaders of differing political persuasions adopted a variety of pressure tactics. When families succeeded in recovering land, some leaders demanded that the companies pay indemnities or leave the plantations intact. CONADI’s conflict resolution strategies were limited by executive orders. In early 1999, confrontations at another major forestry company, Forestal Mininco, turned violent. Mapuche organizations threatened more protests and land invasions if CONADI did not promptly restore their lands. CONADI negotiated the devolution of 59 hectares with leaders in the communities of Juan Loncoyán and Traiguén (Diario Austral 1999b). The indigenous councillors denounced the agreement, alleging that Mapuche communities ‘are not asking for 59 hectares, they ask for much more; this is not a concrete solution’ (Diario Austral 1999c). Although land occupations were making national headlines, government officials denied that Mapuche discontent was widespread. CONADI officials echoed the government’s assertion that the violent groups were not representative, but also recognized that they had significant mobilization power (interview with Agurto 2003; interview with Mansilla 2004).

The executive branch, however, addressed the violent conflicts forcefully, with police and military deployments. Among the targeted groups were the Coordinadora Arauco-Malleco (CAM), a group that had split off from the Communist Party (CP), and the Consejo de Todas las Tierras, led by Aucán Huilcamán. According to a CONADI official, the ‘visible faces within these movements were dealt with solely by the Ministry of Interior, the police, and the judiciary’ (inter-
view with Mansilla 2004). During a period of intense government repression in August 1999, one of the leaders of CAM, Victor Ancalaf, went into hiding, and denounced the lack of guarantees against abuse of power and the use physical force by police forces (Diario Austral 1999d). With land takeovers, equipment sabotage, arson, police brutality, and political imprisonments continuing into 2000, a group of Mapuche leaders (including Huilcamán) accused the government of militarizing the region. Mapuche organizations staged numerous roadblocks and protests against CONADI in Temuco and Santiago. Prosecutors blamed indigenous leaders for threatening armed mobilization. These accusations further divided the increasingly fractured Mapuche movement. Indigenous CONADI Councillor Hilario Huirilef denounced the militants and insisted that indigenous groups were open to peaceful dialogue. However, Frei refused to meet with indigenous representatives to hear Mapuche demands. To many Mapuche, Frei’s position represented a government stance in favour of wealthy landowners and corporations, and against the interests of indigenous peoples.

Further Institutional Failings

While land invasions and the Ralco relocations of Pehuenche families grabbed media attention, CONADI struggled with an array of additional political, organizational, and logistical problems. Its second national election in November 1999 was marred by low turnout, registration errors, missing ballots, and abuses of power that ultimately drove more wedges into the Mapuche movement. One candidate (Hilario Huirilef) charged two councillors (Francisco Chodiman and José Millao) with improper use of CONADI resources for their re-election campaigns, and Aucán Huilcamán accused some councillors of making pacts with MIDEPLAN officials to ensure their re-elections (Diario Austral 1999g). Ironically, in the end the process was little more than a non-binding consultation; President Frei simply designated the eight councillors of his choosing, irrespective of electoral results. Appearances of impropriety further eroded confidence. In October 1998, Congressman Eugenio Tuma accused the agency of mismanaging the Land and Water Fund, arguing that it was overpaying for territories destined for redistribution (Diario Austral 1998c). In July 1999, a congressional oversight agency’s investigation (Comisión Investigadora de la Cámara Baja) found that several staff members were engaged in illegal practices between 1994 and 1997, including false receipts for land sales, tax evasion, and falsified spending documents (Diario Austral 1999h). In May 2001, a CONADI attorney (Andrea Reyes) alleged irregularities in the land redistribution process. Another investigation into the Land Fund alleged that some CONADI officials had received commissions for the overvalued sale of lands between 1997 and 1999, though they were eventually cleared of all charges.13

Tensions with political parties also widened divisions between CONADI and indigenous communities, and among rival Mapuche leaders. As confrontations grew increasingly violent, some party leaders defended indigenous claims, while others denounced militant tactics. Although many leaders belonged to parties, the relationship became more distrustful (Haughey 2006). In the words of one Mapuche leader:14
We have realized that since the year 1978 forward, when the cultural centres were formed, the political parties have divided the Mapuche organizations, since each one of them took a part of those centres. That [period] marked the beginning of a lack of coordination, a disarticulation of the indigenous movement (*Diario Austral* 1999i).

By the late 1990s many indigenous people saw the institution as irredeemably tainted by partisan manipulation. One of the congress’ most vocal supporters of indigenous demands (Representative Tuma) said in a July 1999 interview that CONADI’s outcomes were so one-sided in nature that the entire architecture should be reconsidered:

> CONADI should become an exclusively statist technical organization that could function in unison with another indigenous entity that would resemble an indigenous parliament. That is the only form of legitimate representation of the demands of these peoples, since its hybrid character today enables the opinions of the government always to take precedence over those of indigenous community representatives (*Diario Austral* 1999g).

**Conclusion: The Renewal of Hope?**

Ricardo Lagos assumed the presidency in March 2000, promising more responsiveness than his predecessors to indigenous demands. He increased CONADI’s budget and distributed 50,000 hectares of land (*Diario Austral* 2000c). He raised the number of indigenous councillors (to eleven), and created three new posts for indigenous leaders to report directly to him, producing the institution’s first indigenous majority. He launched the ‘Historical Truth and New Deal Commission’ (*Comisión Verdad Histórica y Nuevo Trato*) to make recommendations for indigenous constitutional recognition and self-determination. Because the Senate again rejected ratification of ILO Convention 169 in April 2000, the Commission represented ‘the effort by the government to define a project that incorporates the demands of indigenous groups about recognition, as a kind of “halfway” between national integration and recognition of autonomy and territorial independence’ (interview with Krauss 2003).

Despite these promises, Lagos’s term saw few concrete policy advances. In 2003, after three years of deliberations under the leadership of former-President Patricio Aylwin, the Truth Commission issued its report, urging the congress and the president to pass legislation recognizing the constitutional rights of indigenous peoples. "Though the legislation received publicity, the Senate refused to pass it." The report generated intense debate in Araucanía. Southern landowners expressed a fear of Balkanization, asserting that self-determination provisions would generate more radical conflicts and a ‘dismemberment of the Chilean state’ (Rohter 2004). The *Consejo de Todas las Tierras* denounced the report as ‘assimilationist,’ since it omitted the theme of institutional responsibility for the usurpation of ancestral lands (*Diario Austral* 2003).

Although CONADI received a loan of US $88 million from the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and another budget increase (to 17.8 billion pesos) in 2001, its mechanisms for land devolution and conflict resolution failed to resolve
land and natural resource claims. In May 2002, Forestal Mininco sold a major holding, Fundo Alaska, ‘convinced that they could no longer exert normal control over the land, due to the constant occupations, fires, and other disturbances inside their property’ (La Tercera 2002b).

From the standpoint of Mapuche communities, Lagos’ government continued to intervene on behalf of the companies. For example, in March 2001, sociologist Jaime Andrade (appointed as chief government negotiator in the province of Malleco) negotiated a deal perpetuating forestry company operations in the region. When indigenous groups claimed they should receive the land with the trees still standing as a symbol of the historic debt owed to indigenous people, the companies refused to sell. When Andrade rose to the position of MIDEPLAN Director, he sponsored CONADI agreements granting land to dozens of Mapuche families, but requiring relocation to other regions of the country far from ancestral Mapuche territory (Alvarez 2003).

Another major blemish on Lagos’ policy record was the continued use of the anti-terrorism and internal security laws to imprison Mapuche protestors. Initially, he sought diplomatic alternatives, including an amnesty agreement between the government and the Consejo de Todas las Tierras before the Organization of American States (OAS) (Diario Austral 2000a). However, by the end of his term (2006), the Lagos administration had processed hundreds of Mapuche activists under the provisions, and several Mapuche leaders remained in prison charged with terrorist activities. The plight of Mapuche ‘political prisoners’ has persisted as a rallying cry for indigenous and human rights activists, including international support organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.

In a March 2002 interview, historian José Bengoa, one of the most-respected architects of the Indigenous Law and a founder of CONADI, presented a scathing assessment of the institution and its shortcomings:

CONADI is an institution that has been left behind. It is a new entity, without much history, and it possesses a very limited mandate to confront a phenomenon of such complexity as the construction of a hydroelectric plant. No one thought that the land devolution system would end up serving to remove people from their places for the construction of such a facility. The land devolution system was included in the Indigenous Law for individual and private cases, not for massive cases in which 100 families are removed from their lands… The biggest mistake by authorities has been to let the company negotiate with the Pehuenche families without the intermediation of any authority figure (Rojas 2002).

Five years after Bengoa’s denunciation, however, promising reform currents within CONADI signal new possibilities that might yet yield more viable solutions to indigenous issues in the long run. One positive indicator is the rapidly growing presence of indigenous representation in the higher echelons of the institution. For an agency that has suffered a mighty loss of credibility, a remarkable number of Mapuche representatives still see prospects for CONADI to someday realize the aspirations of its birth. In 2006, for instance, one of the most renowned indigenous women’s leaders, CONADI Councillor Isolde Reuque Paillalef, assumed the Directorship of the Temuco CONADI. Although she responds to the National Di-
rectorate, the presence of a popular indigenous leader at the head of the regional CONADI in Mapuche territory represents a significant victory.

CONADI reformers have also launched a number of important restructuring initiatives at levels below the Council and the Directorate. Individual staffers have tried to overcome scepticism and establish new relations with Mapuche community leaders. For instance, an anthropologist in CONADI’s Indigenous Development Department explains the new role his department can play in indigenous communities: ‘CONADI is working to establish new leadership and those [radical leaders] who seek autonomy do not agree with this path. We are emphasizing entrepreneurial skills, within the sphere of the family, to boost their development. That is what we are trying to build on, through more extensive, direct contact with community leaders’ (interview with Agurto 2003). A staff member in the Land and Water Department emphasized similar attempts to maintain direct contact and dialogue at the community level (interview with Vidal 2003). These kinds of contacts might help CONADI officials to better comprehend the ideas, demands, and propositions of some Mapuche community organizations.

Another development that may offer hope for improved relations between indigenous groups and the state has been the campaign to elevate local human rights and indigenous issues into the international arena. In the midst of the conflicts of 1998-1999, a delegation of indigenous leaders went to the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations to present evidence of police abuses, disappearances, and political imprisonments. Because of these efforts, the UN Special Commissioner for Indigenous Rights, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, has repeatedly asked the government to pursue all efforts to find solutions to land conflicts and to avoid imprisonments of the Mapuche (La Tercera 2006a).

Mapuche links with international indigenous and human rights organizations and activists might also strengthen their hand in dealing with the state and with Chilean and international companies that operate in their territories. In March 2006, four Mapuche leaders imprisoned since 2001 (for setting a fire on land owned by Forestal Pidenco) launched a prolonged hunger strike. The hunger strike again brought international attention to Chile’s human rights record. In response, President-elect Michelle Bachelet declared her determination to ban the use of anti-terrorist and internal security laws against Mapuche protestors. Since taking office, she has proposed a legislative initiative to eliminate threats to property from the anti-terrorist law (the rationale for most Mapuche imprisonments).20 And in April 2007, President Bachelet’s office announced a ‘new indigenous policy’ to focus on enhancing indigenous political participation, granting constitutional recognition, pressing for congressional authorization of ILO Convention 169, and promoting new initiatives to support urban migrants, indigenous women, education, and culture (MIDEPLAN 2007). At the time of this writing the legislation has not yet been presented, but perhaps she will find the political will to succeed where her predecessors have failed.

The story of the Mapuche struggle to secure land restoration, citizenship, and socio-political rights in democratic times has been both hopeful and sobering. While liberal reformists sought to create institutional mechanisms to grant constitutional recognition, self-determination, and a voice in regional land and development policies, initial hopes faded in the shadow of administrative problems, verti-
calist intervention in decision making, and serious divisions among Mapuche leaders and communities, both within and outside of those institutions. Still, in spite of betrayals and setbacks, indigenous groups continue to pursue resolution to their demands with strategies of dialogue, negotiation, mobilization, alliance building, and the quest for political agency. Mapuche land and natural resource conflicts are centuries in the making, but Mapuche communities and their advocates will continue to press the Chilean state to fulfil its democratic promise.

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Notes

1. Chile’s main indigenous groups include the Aymara, Colla, Quechua, Rapu Nui, Yamana, and Atacameños. The Mapuche are the majority (98 per cent) of the indigenous population. The 2002 census counted 604,000 Mapuche, 4 per cent of the national population (Informe del Programa de Derechos Indígenas 2003).
2. Most landowners could produce titles and demonstrate sufficient productivity, so the state could not legally expropriate and return the vast majority of ancestral Mapuche lands (Mallon 2004).
3. Contemporary Mapuche organizations such as Ad Mapu, Nehuen Mapu, Sociedad Califulecán, Choin Foliché, Lautaro, and others were formed out of the Mapuche Cultural Centres (Repetto 1997).
4. The eight indigenous councilors include representatives from five main groups: Mapuches (4), Atacameños (1), Rapu Nui (1), Aymaras (1), and one urban indigenous leader (1).
5. Leaders from one Concertación party, the Christian Democrats (PDC), wanted the president to appoint a PDC candidate to the directorship (Víctor Painemal). Another Concertación party, the
Party for Democracy (PPD) insisted on their candidate. Aylwin broke the deadlock by granting the directorship to Mauricio Huenchulaf, an indigenous leader with ties to the PPD, and granting the sub-directorate to Painemal (Diario Austral 1994b).

6. There are six additional Offices of Indigenous Affairs in other cities in indigenous regions throughout Chile, including Easter Island (Rapa Nui).

7. For instance, CONADI officials have been shut out of critical decisions by the National Environmental Commission (CONAMA) concerning land and resource issues in indigenous territory (Carruthers and Rodríguez 2007). Similar problems have been documented in other MIDEPLAN agencies, such as the National Women’s Service (Servicio Nacional de la Mujer – SERNAM) (Franceschet 2005).

8. For complete accounts, see Morales et al. (1998), Namuncura (1999a), Universidad ARCIS (2000), and Baquedano (2004).

9. Nicolasa and Juan Quintremán, famous symbols of Pehuenche resistance, closed a deal with ENDESA in December 2002, securing 77 hectares and 200 million pesos each (Alvarez 2002). In September 2003, with the dam 90 per cent complete, the last four holdout families settled under the same conditions, plus 1,200 more hectares to distribute among their twelve children (Guzman and Morales 2003).


11. According to an attorney for several indigenous groups (José Lincoqoeo), the actual number of disputed hectares was closer to 400,000 (La Tercera 1998).

12. In spite of generous eligibility rules, only 18,994 votes were counted (out of an expected 70,000 – 80,000). In the community of Padre Las Casas only 16 per cent of 5,000 registered voters actually cast their votes (Diario Austral 1999e). The councillor receiving the greatest support (Huirilef) garnered a mere 1,500 votes (Diario Austral 1999f).

13. In July 2002, an investigation by the prosecutor’s office in Temuco (ordered by MIDEPLAN Minister Alejandra Krauss) cleared CONADI officials of all corruption charges (Palomera 2002).


15. The complete report can be found at http://www.serindigena.org.

16. In the latest attempt by the Concertación to pass legislation regarding constitutional recognition in January 2006, politicians from two main right-wing parties again blocked the legislation (Cubillos and Rendic 2006).

17. The agreement involved the 1996 Supreme Court decision condemning 144 representatives of the Consejo de Todas Las Tierras to 510 days in prison for land occupations in October 1992. In March 2001, Frei’s government decided not to implement the agreement, and Aucán Huilcamán took his protest to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Diario Austral 2001).

18. The precise number is difficult to pin down, depending on how one defines ‘political prisoner’ and what legal provisions led to the convictions. Mapuche activists assert that the Frei and Lagos governments jailed 500 Mapuche protestors using the laws (La Tercera 2006b). A scholarly report found only four imprisonments during Lagos’ term (in addition to those remaining in prison from Frei’s term), but 210 Mapuche protestors processed under the laws (Seguel and Bonniec 2004, 354). A recent report cited ‘more than 20’ remaining in prisons in 2007 (Zibechi 2007, 1).

19. A glance at the list of directors of various levels and in different offices within CONADI on the institution’s website (www.conadi.gov.cl) reveals a predominance of Mapuche and other indigenous surnames.

20. The proposed amendment leaves threats to life, physical integrity, liberty, and public health intact (La Tercera 2006a, Viena 2006). In her first year in office, President Bachelet adopted less sympathetic language, arguing that international human rights advocates misunderstand the situation and that the Mapuches remaining in jail are not political prisoners, but violent criminals. For information about ongoing efforts to address the imprisonments, see www.meli.mapuches.org and www.observatorio.cl.
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Ethnic Self-regulation and Democratic Instability on Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast: The Case of Ratisuna

Ken Henriksen

Despite the formal transitions to democracy in most parts of Latin America, a range of economic and political impediments have thwarted the processes of democratic consolidation and resulted in a huge gap between the formal political acquisitions and the harsh political and economic realities (Torres-Rivas 1996, Koonings and Krujits 1999, Cruz 2000). This article explores a particular source of democratic instability in Latin America: the proliferation of self-regulation in regions marked by endemic ethnic conflicts. Self-regulation should be understood very broadly as referring to vernacular forms of authority and rule that emerge in civil society. The notion of self-regulation concerns the forms of authority below the level of the central state and its administrative institutions (Barry, Osborne and Rose 1996). The article will attempt to shed light on some of the shortcomings associated with the mantra of self-regulation by taking an empirical case study as a starting point. Drawing on the specific case of Ratisuna, a small Miskitu community on Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast, this study seeks to address informal types of political initiatives to solve the ongoing land conflicts in the area. The emphasis will thus be on the self-regulatory practices community members engage in as they seek to reassert their sovereignty over local territory.

The questions to be discussed include the following: What types of informal politics emerge in the community? In what ways are everyday forms of hostility, violence and conflict expressed in practices of self-regulation? What are the processes of inclusion and exclusion produced as part of the self-regulatory practices? Does the absence of standard state institutions make room for alternative and non-emancipatory practices? What is the impact of these practices on the processes of democratic consolidation? And finally, are democratization, the retreat of the state, and increasing self-responsibility perhaps too naively conflated?

Politics of identity, self-help and democratization in the neo-liberal era

In recent decades there has been a growing scholarly interest in the role of civil society in the processes of democratization in Latin America. In this article I advance a conception of civil society as an avenue of social change, but one which also seeks to go beyond notions of civil society as the home of the good and enlightened. Civil society groups do often engage in purposive collective actions that lead to progressive transformations of society. Yet processes of social change in Latin America, and elsewhere, often take the form of fanaticism and violence, which is usually not associated with democratic change (Castells 1997, Kay 2001). Based on Central American experiences, some scholars, for example, have argued that an authoritarian political culture has developed in civil society. Some of the
indications of this culture are a general increase in violence as a means to solve conflicts and widespread support for authoritarian political figures (Cruz 2000, Koonings and Kruijt 1999).

I therefore argue that instead of taking the democratic potential of civil society for granted, we must ground the study of civil society activities in the contradictions and conflicts of the social context from which they emerge. Only by applying such an approach is it possible to grasp the enormous diversity, if not contradictory plurality (Castells 1997, 4), that civil society often encompasses. It can be useful to draw on Castells’s distinction between resistance identity and project identity (Castells 1997, 8-12, 60-67, 356-362). Although both identities are constructed in opposition to dominant institutions in society, they differ in the role they play in social change. Project identities, on the one hand, may lead to the transformation of social structures and to the redefinition of social positions in society. Resistance identities, on the other hand, generate defensive and secluded communities organized around religious, ethnic and territorial principles. Accordingly, whereas the former are potential sources of social change, the latter reinforce existing boundaries in society (1997, 66-67).

Today, Castells argues, project identities sometimes emerge out of resistance communities, but this does not mean that a community formed out of resistance identity automatically evolves toward more progressive forms. On the contrary, it may often remain defensive and enclosed (1997, 357). In these cases, the search for a better future takes place ‘in the reconstruction of defensive identities around communal principles’ (1997, 11). According to Castells, resistance identities are mainly constructed by poor and marginalized populations who are excluded from the global networks of wealth, power and information. The living conditions of these groups have worsened in recent years by the general removal of social safety nets and the privatization of public agencies. One of the central points in Castells’ analysis is therefore that neo-liberalism is a primary engine in the formation of defensive communities. I agree on this point, but I also venture the hypothesis that the neo-liberal trend of self-help contributes to forming self-help communities. This is because the neo-liberal politics with the privatization and decentralization of governance, and the general turn to civic associations to help execute politics, often originate in self-sustained patterns of development, where the language of free enterprise, self-regulation and self-responsibility prevails (Long 2001, Weltmeyer and Petras 2000, Vilas 1997). Practices of self-regulation are thus particularly salient in social environments marked by the retreat of the state and associated cuts in the expenditures for social provision, health care and security. In this situation, the communities become organizing units that fill the social and political vacuum created by a state in retreat. Defensive communities, therefore, emanate from a dual process of political, cultural and economic disfranchisement on the one hand, and the organization of self-help communities formed around excluded identities on the other.

In Nicaragua, the neo-liberal reforms began with the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas in 1990, and since then an epoch with subsequent governments ideologically dedicated to neo-liberalism has deepened the adjustment policies (Prevost and Vanden 1999). Some have argued that the neo-liberal structural adjustment programmes in Nicaragua were more strident than anywhere else in Latin America
(Pisani 2003, 112). Perhaps for this reason, Florence E. Babb goes so far as to argue that ‘a systematic undoing of economic reforms introduced by the Sandinistas’ has taken place (Babb 2001, 155). Apart from cutbacks in state-sponsored services and subsidies, industry, health and education have been privatized. Consequently, today the country is suffering from even higher unemployment and underemployment, as well as from declining levels of health, education and living standards among the majority of the population. The informal sector has experienced a simultaneous increase, particularly as the state sector has been cut back (Pisani 2003). A permanent crisis with ongoing political and economic deterioration has thus characterized the 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium (Pérez-Baltodano 2006). The result has been growing frustration, political chaos, and a disillusioned population that has taken matters into its own hands. Post-revolutionary Nicaragua therefore provides a case for the study of self-help initiatives under neo-liberal rule.5

Politics of identity and place in the community of Ratisuna

Ratisuna was selected as a case study for two reasons. First, it has an unusual political history. Ratisuna has a regional and even national reputation as being one of the most politically assertive communities on the Atlantic Coast. The approximate 1,500 inhabitants are known to nurture deep resentment against the Nicaraguan government. Together with members of other ethnic communities on the Atlantic Coast, many men and women from Ratisuna fought against the Sandinista revolution in the 1980s. When the hated Somoza dictatorship had finally been defeated, the new Sandinista government launched an ambitious plan for social and economic development. Central chapters in this plan focused on the integration of the Atlantic Coast, and in the first years after the revolution large sums were invested on the Coast. Nevertheless, in 1981 a large number of Miskitu-Indians and members of the other ethnic minorities left their communities to receive military training in Costa Rica or Honduras, and to take part in the ongoing war between the U.S.-backed contras6 and the Sandinista government. Existing research on the underlying reasons for the anti-Sandinista mobilization argues that fundamental aspects of the state’s anti-imperialistic, nationalist and paternalist approach to the modernization of the Atlantic Coast clashed with an emerging ethno-political consciousness and with a historical antipathy toward Spanish-speaking Nicaragua on the Atlantic Coast (Hale 1994, Gordon 1998, Vilas 1989). Accordingly, what the Sandinistas saw as progressive and revolutionary initiatives to create progress and development was interpreted as dishonest colonization by the Coast people. But a historical absence of the state is also part of the explanation. The Atlantic Coast has been part of the Nicaraguan nation-state since 1894, but during most part of the twentieth century a disinterested Somoza state had given rise to a de-facto U.S.-dominated enclave economy (Vilas 1989). Until the Sandinista Revolution there had thus only been very little human and institutional interaction between the Atlantic Coast and the rest of the country. The rapid appearance, however, of different state institutions, including the military, and many benevolent, but also paternalistic and often racist, Mestizos was therefore a source of widespread resentment on the Coast (Hale 1994).
Many community members of Ratisuna and other communities therefore decided to take part in the anti-Sandinista mobilization. In part, for this reason the inhabitants are known to be perhaps the most militantly anti-Sandinista combatants in the entire country. Moreover, the community has a long history of being one of the most belligerent in terms of safeguarding its communal lands (Henriksen 2002).

Second, Ratisuna has an unusual ethnic and colonial history. The community is located on the southern part of Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast, which is home to six different ethnic groups. The colonization by Great Britain and Spain still makes its presence felt in the community. Today most community members identify themselves as Miskitu people, although their first language is Creole English, the language spoken by the Creole descendants of the African slaves who worked on British plantations. Not far from Ratisuna are Miskitu-speaking communities as well as villages where people identify themselves as belonging to the Creole population or to some of the other ethnic minorities. Moreover, as a result of the influx of landless peasants and other Spanish-speaking Mestizos from the Pacific Coast and central parts of the country, the area is extremely diversified today. This means that local identity is being constructed along a combination of spatial/territorial and ethnic lines. But much suggests that land rights have played a decisive role in Ratisuna and other ethnic communities on the Coast for many years.

Historical background: the development of a communal property regime in Ratisuna

Because Ratisuna is placed at the margin, and with a largely illiterate population, written sources of this history are very scarce. However, due to townspeople’s vivid memory and the little, but very useful, CIDCA-archive in Bluefields on the coast of Nicaragua, it is possible to reconstruct fragments of Ratisuna’s property history. The evidence available suggests that Ratisuna received its first communal land title in 1915, a few years after the Harrison-Altamirano Treaty of 1906 had been established between Great Britain and Nicaragua. The Treaty recognized full Nicaraguan sovereignty over the Coast, and it created the legal conditions for the recognition of Indian and Creole lands. But a national Land Title Commission, formed shortly after, remained inactive in the first five to six years (Vilas 1989; Hale 1994, 48; Gordon 1998). Governmental indifference is part of the explanation, but the fact that the local population harboured ‘the deepest distrust of all Nicaraguans’ must also have been a major obstacle. British diplomacy decided to take a more active role, and much suggests that this enabled the commission to work more satisfactorily. The Nicaraguan Governor of Bluefields was a member of the land commission, and in a letter sent to the British Consul H. O. Chalkley he reported that the commission had had positive experiences surveying land in the Indian and Creole communities. It was only in Ratisuna that the appearance of Spanish-speaking commission members appears to have triggered the inhabitants’ anti-Nicaraguan sentiments:

[C]on idéntico fin se visitó al pueblo de [Ratisuna], en donde no fue posible hacer nada, por tropezar con obstinada resistencia por parte de aquel vecinda-
Although Ratisuna, in fact, later received a land title, the Governor’s experiences in the community suggest that Ratisuna has a long history of collective resistance and political mobilization. There also seems to be an inward orientation in the activities. Although there must have been some communication and coordination between the communities about how to deal with the Land Title Commission, there is no indication of common ‘pan-ethnic’ or inter-communal manifestations. On the contrary, the people in Ratisuna seem to have reacted in a different and more aggressive way than the neighbouring communities. The collective orientation was, thus, apparently more local than regional or ethnic in character.

About 25 years later community members wrote a letter to a prominent and influential American citizen living in Bluefields, in which they expressed complaints about the illegal exploitation of community land:

> From the British Commissioner Mr. Chocolate [sic, Consul H. O. Chalkley] gave to the inhabitance of [Ratisuna] a block of land..., as our personal property which we have our title for same. From that time we had no trouble with no one…. Since this few years ago this Alexander Carr is claiming a portion of our property that was granted to us…. We are having plenty of trouble with this man Alexander Carr, we are almost tired of making complain to the Jefe Político, and also to the Court, and we can’t get a decided answer, they are just putting us of…. The Jefe Político told us that we are making too much trouble…. Even after having our Title for our property they are trying to take it away from us..., for which reason we are compel to apply to the higher authority for our rights.11

Some of the older people in Ratisuna clearly remember Alexander Carr. He appears to have been a man from Providence Island, who bought a large portion of land about ten miles south of the community from a community member. However, according to rules established by the community, individual plots are part of the communal property regime and cannot be sold. Compared to contemporary land conflicts, this incidence must be considered of minor importance. But it shows us that the arrival of an outsider was seen as a threat to the community and that the communal land areas were closely related to a communal identity.

This concern with the immediate setting and the communal soil was also present during my stay in the community. It was often expressed in community members’ historical memories, which went far beyond lived experience. An extensive part of the residents ‘remember’, for example, the events leading to the foundation of the community, and subsequently to the annexation of vast areas of community land. One community member, known to be a descendant of one of the ‘founding fathers’, put it this way:

> The Miskitu King give the Indians them that amount of land, that’s why up to the day we the forth generation claiming for our territory, for our demarcation and our line where belongs to [Ratisuna].... Well, they have work for the Miskitu King, all kind of work they do. They do lots of work for the Miskitu King. In them time plenty people start to living here, you know! So he come into Ra-
tisuna and asks [asks]: who is the one that found [Ratisuna]? So they say Philip Haman and the Julias. So he take them two of them and carry them to Bluefields. After he carry them to Bluefields, he take them and give them axe and machete and file and carry them to one place name Rio Escondido, the Rama River, one place name Mango Plantation. They carry them there and work them. Let them chop bush from the day of April till December month. After December month Christmas was close. They tell the King them want to come to them wife, so they want their money. So the King say: ‘money!!’ I don’t owe you no money. The work what we bring you to work here that is the payment of [Ratisuna]. But them days Indians didn’t have no education, they didn’t have no learning so they didn’t take out no document.12

Expressed in a common sense form, the ideas and assumptions linking the residents to the locality were not solely having a territorial dimension; they had an emotional and symbolical sense about them, denoting an almost metaphysical rooted-ness. I suggest that we view this local attachment as a struggle, which includes not only ideas of rights and entitlements, but also a sense of belonging to and identification with the community and a communal past.

The ethnic mobilization in the 1980s

The construction of a communal identity does not imply a historical absence of broader and more regional or ethnic orientations. The anti-Sandinista insurrection in the 1980s is one of the outstanding moments in which pan-local alliances were constructed in the quest for territorial autonomy and political self-determination. In his interesting study of this mobilization Carlos Vilas points at the decisive role of the ethnic and indigenous organizations (1989). Formed shortly after the revolution, and officially recognized by the Sandinista leadership, MISURASATA is one of the organizations that gets the most attention. The name, MISURASATA (Miskitu, Sumu, Rama and Sandinistas working together), symbolized the hope of an alliance between the indigenous minorities and the Revolution. But the demands of MISURASATA rapidly radicalized (Vilas 1989, 79ff and 237ff). In December 1980, only a little more than a year after its formation, MISURASATA issued the Plan of Action (MISURASATA 1981, reprinted in Ohland and Schneider 1983, 89-94). This document introduced the discourse of indigenous nations and it proposed the establishment of parallel institutions on the Coast. Former communal land claims were now replaced with territorial demands. A short excerpt from a speech held in Creole English in Rama Cay by the important MISURASATA leader, Brooklyn Rivera, is illustrative of this radicalization:

It is not time to get afraid of somebody! But we are ready to die for our rights…. We have to fight. We have to strengthen our organization. In the future we have to look, how we can get the power in this Atlantic Coast. We have to work for the autonomy of the Atlantic Coast! Power in production and in administration of the Coast…. We don’t need to go to somebody from Managua…. It is no good that they bring all these institutions to us. In the future we must do that ourselves (Rivera 1980, printed in Ohland and Schneider 1983).
Although the discourses of rights, self-determination and political autonomy to a large extent resonated with existing ideas among the ethnic minorities (Hale 1994, 160; Henriksen 2002, 141), it is beyond any doubt that the new ethnic organizations played a decisive role in deepening and transforming collective consciousness on the Coast. The leadership of these organizations was familiar with the emergent focus on the global movement for indigenous and historical rights, which can be dated back to the 1970s. These ideas were quickly appropriated by the ethnic minorities, especially in Ratisuna, where an increasing indigenous identification with Miskitu culture took place.

This ethnic revival occurred alongside the emergence of new conceptions of territory, which implied that the struggle for land also became a struggle for autonomy and self-determination. A new sense of belonging was thus created, which was linked to the political construction of a collective ethnic life project based on ethnicity and on indigenous and historical rights. However, we should be careful not to analyse the transformations from the previous, more local orientations to the pan-ethnic and qualitatively different alliances in the 1980s according to a prospective logic, which views the changes as a linear process of modernization towards more developed and complex organizational forms. Below I will argue that the neo-liberal turn in Nicaragua, with the general retreat of the state and the promotion of self-responsibility, have had a new impact on collective orientations in Ratisuna. Whereas the ethno-political ideas of self-determination and autonomy have been left intact, the regional, multiethnic alliances have resided into the background, and a new local identity has been constructed. Accordingly, today a new combination of self-determination and local community has gained strength.

Neo-liberal adjustment and constructions of ethnic and spatial identities in Ratisuna

It follows from the short historical narrative above that ethnic and spatial identities in Ratisuna have been in flux. One ubiquitous boundary, however, established between ‘Us’ and the ‘Spaniard Them’ – the Creole expression most often used when talking about Nicaraguans of Mestizo origin – has been relatively stable. Since the Nicaraguan annexation of Atlantic Coast territory in early 1894, this distinction has been a driving force in shaping ethnic identities on the Atlantic Coast in general and in Ratisuna in particular (Hale 1994, Gordon 1998, Henriksen 2002).

Despite these continuities, however, the values attached to ‘Them’ and ‘Us’ have undergone some important changes. Some of the ethnographic and historic research that has been done on the Atlantic Coast observes that until the 1980s the ethnic minorities were ashamed of their ethnic status and afraid to publicly remember their collective history or to speak their native language outside of their homes (Gabriel 1996, 168; Gordon 1998, 183). Nevertheless, in 1998-99 when I was doing fieldwork in Ratisuna, many people demonstrated an amazing concern with local history and identity (Henriksen 2002). Community members expressed deep-felt pride in the fact that many male and female community members took part in the anti-Sandinista insurrection, and they are aware of their belligerent reputation. Self-denigration has been replaced by ethnic pride. In this case, however, pride does not automatically lead to forbearance and indulgence. Instead, community
members have embraced old nationalist and racist imaginations, which construct other indigenous populations as backward and uncivilized relics from the past. One community member, for example, put it this way:

I am a Miskitu. But you see we have two classes of Miskitu. We the Miskitu from Ratisuna are descendants from Sandy Bay Tara [Big Sandy Bay] and we have self-ambition and pride. The Miskitu them from the north they come here with different clothes. We don’t want to be like them. The Miskitu race is the lowest in Nicaragua. We are a little higher than them.

In addition, ethnic boundaries were constructed vis-à-vis other ethnic groups as well, especially in relation to Spanish-speaking Mestizos. Any person of Mestizo origin finding him/herself in Ratisuna will undoubtedly meet distrust or sometimes even overt deprecation. As mentioned above, this hostility towards Nicaraguan Mestizos has historical roots. Sandinista military cadres located in Ratisuna in the 1980s were subjected to blatant distrust, and people accused of cooperating with the ‘Spaniards’ were either expelled or killed (Gordon 1998). Even Mestizos with apparent benevolent intentions have been faced with community members’ hatred of anything ‘Spanish’ (Henriksen 2002). Accordingly, in Ratisuna ethnic and spatial identities are deeply politicized. This becomes evident if we focus the attention on the position of the síndico, politically one of the most important institutions in Ratisuna.

The position of the síndico

In 1919, a few years after the Land Title Commission had finished its work on the Atlantic Coast, a government decree established the position of the síndico in most of the communities. Originally a Spanish institution, the position of the síndico has been implemented in most Central American countries as a person responsible for land measurements and establishment of property boundaries. According to the decree, the síndicos appointed on the Atlantic Coast were to have similar responsibilities:

[El síndico] podrá dar poderes generales o especiales para que represente a la comunidad en los negocios judiciales o extrajudiciales que se relacionen con los terrenos.13

Importantly, the decree stipulated that the síndico was a government appointee, and that he was a political leader whose primary responsibilities were to guard the land documents, to oversee the communal land possessions, and to represent the community before the state in matters related to the land.

Within a few years the position of the síndico had been established in most communities, and it now provided the communities with a ‘place’ from which to speak and express concerns about land rights and to articulate protests against violations and illegal exploitation of the communal possessions. But the state was also provided with direct access to the newly annexed communities.

The síndico quickly became the highest political authority in most communities and in many cases he started to function as an intermediary or a facilitator of communication between the community and the Nicaraguan government (Hale 1994).
In Ratisuna, community members often claimed that the position of the síndico was the most important in the community and because of the illegal exploitation of the land he was now more important than he had ever been before. The man holding the position of the síndico during my fieldwork explained the transformations in this way:

In Somoza time there wasn’t too much problem about the land. The changing of government bring these problem. Especially with this government right now, the Alemán government. He want to take away land, you see! [...] First time it was not like this. The changing of government is bringing these problems. The problem is from my take over. So I received the problem. It’s hard and you see what I fight for, and I win it. And right now I think I get it clear [...] we [unintelligible] with the Spaniards them. No more people can go in and cut no land, you see, no more cutting of these big woods there I am fighting for. You see, on the next side, the Wawashang, I have to see what I can. I have to have meeting there, talk to the people them, I will be running around there and if I capture anything I taking them out, I just tell them move out, giving them some time, maybe they have something planted to eat; when they done take that out, OK, leave out. Sorry but what to do [...]. Those people who are there they don’t come under a good acuerdo [agreement], under a good position to come and situate there. Because they didn’t come to ask [ask] for no land to live there. They just come in mala fe [bad faith]. I can take them out, that my job. That is my position to fight for the land, as a síndico. In Sandinista time another kind of problem, the war.

Charles Hale writes that the síndico of a community close to Ratisuna took up the role of promoting dialogue and reconciliation between local contras and the government during the war in the 1980s. He therefore developed close working relations with government officials (Hale 1994, 149f and 181ff). This type of cooperation is absent from the síndico’s narrative above and outweighed by a discourse that stresses the síndico’s (and the community’s) capacity and right to handle his/its own affairs. Consider this account about a nearby village (Pueblo Nuevo):

If them [the people of Pueblo Nuevo] go to the government to ask [ask] for help the government don’t have nothing to do with our community land…. They have to come here; they have to come here the Pueblo Nuevo people and the government if they want. The Central government he don’t have nothing to do with us, what he is looking is war, he is dangerous, it is very delicate…. We don’t want no more war.

Pueblo Nuevo is a Mestizo village located on what people in Ratisuna hold to be community land. Community members argue that the village is illegitimate and that the campesinos have no rights to clear land for cultivation. This situation suggests that today the síndico faces problems associated with larger societal transformations, in this case a growing number of landless peasants and a concomitant eastward migration into agrarian frontier areas on the Atlantic Coast. Such a problem usually requires close cooperation between the state and the parties involved in the conflict. It is however interesting that the síndico of Ratisuna does not reproach the state for its institutional passivity. Instead of calling for heightened state en-
gagement, his discourse is loaded with ideas of self-responsibility. This discourse portrays the state as an alien that has no right to intervene in matters concerning the communal properties. The community is perceived as located at the margins of the Nicaraguan nation-state, and the sindico as a primary local authority with the capacity to take his own measures in order to solve the problems. Moreover, he constructs the Spanish-speaking Mestizos as alien ‘Others’ residing on foreign territory.

If we compare the sindico’s narrative with the legal, institutional identity provided around 1920, it becomes clear that the position has undergone profound transformations. Originally a state institution, it is now re-signified as a local phenomenon and the ties that connected it with the state have been cut. Part of the explanation for this is undoubtedly a disinterested and weak state, which has created an institutional vacuum that has allowed the localization or domestication of the position of the sindico to take place. Forgotten by the state, the people in Ratisuna have transformed it into a local, indigenous institution whose primary task is to defend the community against outsiders. Again, the sindico offers a precise explanation of this, in which he reconstructs his responsibility in a moral link with the past:

A sindico, he elected by the community… The sindico is from the community…. He is the responsible one for the community property; he is the one that take caring about the whole community land property. He have to take care of the whole community property, land, sea, and everything. The town elect you, the town, not no one else, the town elect you. That is from our ancestors’ time, you see. Those land our ancestors get them working for the Miskitu King. So all those land what my old ancestors have those mojones [territorial markers] put we owning them. Through that we have our land ubicated [situated]. And from our own ancestor time we have a sindico in this community. That is the one who see about the welfare of this whole territory, land, water, sea and everything, the land for the community.

Importantly, the sindico dates it back to a distant past, long before the Nicaraguan annexation of 1894. This interpretation echoes most community members’ historical memory, which constructs it as an indigenous institution rooted in pre-colonial society (Henriksen 2002, 182-186). In local imaginations, the position of sindico is thus not an offspring of the land title granted by the Nicaraguan Land Title Commission in 1915, but rooted in the above-mentioned remembrance of the hardworking founding fathers of the community. Accordingly, due to a combination of governmental neglect and local imagination, the position of sindico has been domesticated and, in this process, it has been transformed into an indigenous institution.

How does this indigenization affect practices of self-regulation? What types of boundaries and identities are constructed in processes whereby local land conflicts are regulated and eventually resolved?

The self-regulation of land conflicts in Ratisuna

A large number of external factors contributed to a reactivation of the agrarian frontier on the Atlantic Coast (Mordt 2001; Acosta 2000; Howard 1996, 1998). It can be useful to distinguish between risks caused by land that is being cleared for
speculation and the threats associated with areas that are being cultivated for subsistence by poor Mestizo peasants. Both illustrate the complexities surrounding the demarcation and upholding of indigenous land rights, and they reflect the governmental indifference and institutional weaknesses that have allowed Ratisuna’s land problems to go unresolved (Vanden 1999, Howard 1998, Mordt 2001). As a sign of this neglect, the state has not developed a framework for implementing the Autonomy Statute, which was passed by the Sandinista government in 1987 (Prevost and Vanden 1999, Butler 1997, Kindblad 2001, Henriksen 2002). The statute introduces a set of collective rights for the ethnic communities, among those, the right to control communal land. But although the law may have been changed, governmental attitudes have not (Acosta 2000; Butler 1997, 229). It is therefore important to emphasize the fact that the mobilization for land rights in Ratisuna is the direct result of a deep sense of desperation and frustration, which stems from years of governmental neglect. In this situation the ideas of self-responsibility help fill the legal and political vacuum created by a state in retreat.

In an attempt to control and reduce the influx of campesino settlers, the síndico, along with other leaders of the community, has taken a range of political initiatives, including the creation of a cartographic map of the Ratisuna territory. This map includes local place names (in Miskitu) that are unknown to outsiders. But from the point of view of the community members they serve to embed local history in the landscape and as a medium for mobilizing and maintaining a sense of belonging and attachment to local territory. As recent work on cartography has demonstrated, map making is an ideologically encoded discourse that facilitates surveillance and serves to produce national identities (Hansen 1998, Harley 1997, Harvey 1996, Anderson 1983, Radcliffe and Westwood 1996). Here, I highlight the ideological practices involved in ordinary people’s map making, which go beyond and contest official cartography. Apart from indicating the communal land possessions, it strengthens people’s local sense of belonging, and it contributes to constructing a communal ethnic territory through the inscription of local history and meaning into place.

The flip side of the coin is, however, disclosed if we consider the multiethnic context with its historical ethnic conflicts and cleavages. In this light, the map does not only create a sense of local belonging; it also serves to re-enforce existing divisions in society through the exclusion of undesired ‘Others’. Just as the síndico portrayed the Mestizo campesinos as undesired aliens, the map creates a local territory and a local type of citizenship to which foreigners only have access insofar as they are invited. The result is the dichotomization of people into insiders and outsiders. Two different social groups are thus constructed: one group, which consists of the members of the community, and who have the right to make use of local resources and another group of aliens whose rights are denied. Moreover, the map also functions as a technology of surveillance that enables the reduction of the influx of ‘outsiders’, especially Mestizo campesinos.

Importantly, whereas the síndico and community members paid much attention to the problems related to the influx of Mestizo settlers, they largely ignored the commercial exploitation of natural resources. I often inquired into plausible reasons for the lack of action against illegal land concessions granted to logging firms. Many leaders expressed deep-felt frustration, but they were unable to suggest any
solutions. They claimed that the state or high ranking persons within the state apparatus took part in the illegal activities. The use of formal legal procedures would therefore be of little avail, they said. Another problem is undoubtedly the illegal and clandestine nature of the activities where corruption, violence and the dissemination of fear are widespread. Any type of action would therefore be dangerous, even life-threatening. This is probably part of the explanation as to why there was this exaggerated concern with Mestizo settlers. The failure of the state to properly regulate the exploitation of communal lands, thus, creates a deflection of the political priorities. On the one hand the illegal and commercial exploitation of the land are largely ignored; on the other hand the understandable frustration of the community members is taken out on poor Mestizo campesinos, who have tried to find means of surviving in the tropical lowland forests. These campesinos are in positions devalued and stigmatized by the logic of neo-liberal modernization. However, when trying to survive as internal immigrants on the Atlantic Coast, they are faced with another source of exclusion: angry and frustrated Miskitu Indians who perceive them as alien and deportable Others. The historical hatred of Spanish speaking Nicaraguans is thus expressed as a local citizenship constructed along ethnic lines. Mestizo campesinos are seen as illegal intruders residing on foreign territory, and, thus, with no rights to land or other privileges. Whatever the campesinos had expected when moving into the forest, they must therefore have realized that it is difficult to totally avoid social control and surveillance. Settled far from the formal institutions of state surveillance, they have instead been faced with ‘alternative’ governmental practices, enacted by angry community leaders and their associates. The local police volunteers have played a pivotal role in this surveillance of the communal possessions.

The emergence of police volunteers in Ratisuna and in other marginal locations is another project of the neo-liberal state in Nicaragua. Shortly after the Sandinista defeat in the 1990 elections, the police and the military outpost were removed from Ratisuna. The leaders of the community have therefore formed a squad of police volunteers, whose primary task is to handle thefts, violence and other more immediate problems that emerge in the village. During my fieldwork in the community, the volunteers were mainly recruited among former ‘freedom fighters’. ‘Freedom fighter’ is a local expression used for the young men and women who took part in the anti-state insurrection in the 1980s. As in many other post-conflict situations, the integration of former combatants in Nicaragua has proven difficult. The leaders of the community had therefore decided to appoint some of the ‘freedom fighters’ as police volunteers. Apart from securing better integration into ordinary community life, this initiative would eventually contribute to improving security in the community.

Another important task of the police volunteers is to assist the sindico and other community leaders in ‘overhauling the land’. Once or twice a year they arrange a three or four-day trip into different parts of the forest. The sindico states that the purpose is to survey the influx of Mestizo campesinos and to review the damages caused by swidden agriculture. But on one occasion, when I joined the leaders in the jungle, I realized that they also try to control the number of ‘strangers’ settling on the communal territory. The method applied was the dissemination of fear. Whenever we came to a settlement or a place where a family had cleared a plot of
land, the police volunteers, dressed in official police uniforms, approached the people with loaded arms in their hands. In an atmosphere of distrust and menace, they told the campesinos that they were staying on foreign territory, that the land belonged to Ratisuna, and that the clearing of land was against the rules established by the community. They also interviewed the settlers on various private issues. Then they required additional information about other campesinos living in the area. Finally, although they did not utter explicit threats to the settler’s lives, they told them that the communal authorities intended to use every means at their disposal to stop the foreigner’s illegal exploitation of community land.

The rationalization of these surveillance activities lies in the name, ‘freedom fighters’, which is an explicit attempt to create continuity with the recent past. Whereas the ‘freedom fighters’ of the 1980s struggled for autonomy and ethnic self-determination, the later incarnation of the ‘freedom fighters’ is concerned with more immediate threats: illegal settlements. In both cases, however, ‘freedom’ is interpreted in ethnic and spatial terms. ‘Freedom’ means ethnic self-determination, and breaking the ties with Nicaragua and Spanish-speaking Mestizos.

The settlers have tried to find a way out of a desperate situation as excluded landless peasants in the western part of Nicaragua. One of the few options available is to try to make a living at the agricultural frontier on the Atlantic Coast. This strategy, however, is not without setbacks. Apart from trying to survive in an extremely difficult environment, the campesinos find themselves in the midst of a conflict where hostile ethnic groups with a historically grounded hatred of anything ‘Spanish’ actively exert a chauvinist and violent form of ethnic dichotomization. The campesinos’ situation is therefore compounded by having to live in a dangerous and uncertain situation as excluded and unwanted ‘Others’.

**Conclusion**

In this article I have argued that discourses and other practices of self-regulation have a negative impact on ethnic relations and, thus, on the processes of democratization on Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast. A main reason is the character of the self-regulatory practices. They are informal, self-chosen, and not subject to any type of governmental control. They emerge not as the implementation of a governmental act or as an outcome of an agreement between community authorities and the state, but of necessity. A disinterested state, which lacks the resources and the political will to create a just multi-ethnic society, has generated a social and political vacuum that has to be filled out. With the absence of the state, community members have to take matters into their own hands. It is therefore important to note that, whether we like their methods or not, the community members’ activities are borne out of frustration and desperation, and this frustration results from many years of governmental mismanagement.

In fact, the interethnic frictions in and around Ratisuna begin with the negative impact of neo-liberal adjustment in the western part of the country where the politics of modernization have resulted in a massive eastward migration of landless campesinos, who have to find new ways of surviving in the forests. The agricultural frontier is therefore extended into the indigenous land areas. The Autonomy
Statute could have been one legal and political institution applied in the prevention of the problems. Instead, the governmental neglect of this Statute accentuates the frustration of the indigenous population and, thus, the ongoing conflicts and cleavages. The state’s failure to pursue a just and fair development strategy for the country in general and for the Atlantic Coast in particular has thus created the social context in which the practices of self-regulation in Ratisuna are embedded. This means that although the community members of Ratisuna are the actual agents of self-regulatory practices the state assumes the primary responsibility for the undemocratic outcome.

However, since inciting individuals and communities to self-regulation is a common neo-liberal governance strategy there is also a need to reconsider the underlying assertion that civil society is necessarily an arena of virtue. Surely, this is often the case. The inhabitants of Ratisuna, for example, actively defy their historical exclusion and marginalization by defining themselves, forming a community, and creating a space of ethnic and social rights. But in doing so, they deny membership to other excluded groups, and they actively violate the rights of these undesired ‘Others’ through the use of illegitimate forms of control and castigation. In this study I have pointed out three different, but interrelated, explanations for these undemocratic practices.

First, a deep sense of desperation and frustration – with new and more serious incursions and violations every day, and therefore a growing sense of despair – are some of the hard social realities that give rise to such practices. The tragedy of it is a sort of obscure retribution whereby the collective desperation is taken out on poor Mestizos whom the indigenous people on the Atlantic Coast have always associated with colonization and overthrow.

Second, there is a historical presence of ethnic violence and exclusion. In general terms, the history of the Atlantic Coast is one of exploitation, marginalization and governmental neglect. Often, the ethnic minorities have contested this policy, sometimes through the collective mobilization for rights and recognition. The ethnic revival in the 1980s and the broad alliances struggling against the Sandinista state and for autonomy and self-determination has been one of the outstanding moments. This was a mobilization that was built on a project identity, and thus on the struggle for redefining ethnic relations and changing the social structures of exploitation and exclusion. Today, with the turn to neo-liberalism and the institutionalization of a laissez-faire political and economic structure, a new combination of resistance and self-regulation seems to have emerged. This combination is based on a new interpretation of the state. Whereas the state was actively contested in the 1980s, local discourses today construct it as an alien entity with no legitimate rights to interfere in local politics. The community acts as a state surrogate, and local institutions, such as the sindico, search for influence through the execution of political authority and the creation of social and political space. These practices are built on an idea of local citizenship, where membership and political authority are defined and established by the community. The political influence thus lies not in the ability to mobilize against or challenge the state, but in the fact that non-official bodies have acquired regulatory functions and in this way have obtained a substantial impact on what has traditionally been viewed as official politics. Unfortunately, self-regulation is enforced in a social and political environment where ex-
clusion and violence have always been standard ingredients in everyday politics. Accordingly, instead of contesting exclusion, the new informal authorities reproduce existing political culture.

Finally, when reproducing the historical presence of violence and exclusion, the community relies upon the discourses of indigenous and historical rights that were introduced and disseminated by the ethnic organizations in the 1980s. In the case of Ratisuna, the reasons for the undemocratic practices are to be found not only in a history of ethnic cleavages and hatred, but also in the nativist sentiments that community members act upon when they claim historical rights to land and other natural resources. Ideas of indigenous rights are strategically important assets when ethnic minorities claim rights to land, but they may also serve to exclude and marginalize other vulnerable groups, who cannot as easily claim these rights.

In the examples presented above, self-regulation combined a defensive attitude concerned with loss of control of social and spatial boundaries with an ethnicity on the offensive, which was focused on expansion and domination. This contradiction is inscribed on the campesinos, who were constructed as undesired aliens. The nativist sentiments are therefore important ingredients in the formation of resistance identities very similar to those theorized by Manuel Castells. The social outcome of such identities is an exaggerated fragmentation of society into secluded and autonomous spatial units based on inward-looking principles. The collective allegiance for the community is thus formed at the cost of sharpening and potentially aggravating existing conflicts vis-à-vis the surrounding society. The consequences are the cultivation of fear, the exclusion of undesired ‘Others’, and an exaggerated enclavization of society into disconnected spatial and social units.

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Notes

1. I would like to thank the anonymous referees who made a number of very helpful comments on an earlier draft.
2. The main source of data for this article is fieldwork done on the Atlantic Coast in 1998-99 and again in 2001.
3. Ratisuna is a pseudonym.
4. Castells also introduces a third form of identity: legitimizing identity.
5. The recent electoral victory of the former revolutionary leader Daniel Ortega can be seen as the beginning of the end of neo-liberalism in Nicaragua. It is, however, too early to evaluate Ortega’s willingness and capacity to impose institutional changes.
6. The term *contra* is an official contraction for the *contrarevolucionarios*, a large group of Somoza-supporters and others who fought against the Sandinista revolution.
7. The ethnic population living on Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast includes Mestizos (approximate population 180,000), Miskitu-Indians (70,000), Creole of African descent (25,000), Sumu-Indians (5,000), Rama-Indians (1000), and a group of black Caribs called Garífunas (1,500).
8. CIDCA, Centro de Investigaciones y Documentación de la Costa Atlántica, is a cross-disciplinary research institution with chapters in Managua, Puerto Cabezas and Bluefields.
11. Letter from Ratisuna to Mrs. Ana Crowdell, 30 November 1941. Crowdell files, CIDCA Bluefields archive. The British Commissioner Mr. Chocolate (sic) to whom they refer is probably an inadvertent euphemism, which refers to the British Consul H.O. Chalkley.
12. Unless otherwise mentioned, the quotes are transcribed tape-recorded interviews. Interviews have been transcribed using a method that has removed idiosyncratic elements such as pauses, non-verbals and involuntary vocalizations. I have, however, tried to make accurate transcriptions of the local Creole-English language. This means that the use Spanish and Miskitu loanwords, grammar and spelling/pronunciation have not been corrected. In some cases translations of loanwords and correct Standard English spelling are added in brackets.
13. Decree # 61, article # 5, 13 March 1919.
14. In 1996 a national commission for the demarcation of indigenous territories was formed, but it has remained inoperative since then.
16. For unknown reasons the land titles from 1915 had disappeared. Some argued that they had been stolen, others that they were lost during the war, and some people argued that a corrupt *síndico* had sold them many years ago. The map had thus been created, not according to formal demarcation guidelines but to a local collective historical memory.
17. Drug abuse is one of the problems.
18. The volunteers were often armed with weapons (from the war) when patrolling the streets.
19. In order to enhance the police volunteer’s authority, the leaders had requested the national police to donate a few police uniforms.
20. I never heard about any campesino settlers being killed, but the leaders seriously discussed the idea on many occasions.
21. Here I am merely concerned with Atlantic Coast interpretations of the term ‘freedom fighters’. In the United States the term has a long history. During the Cold War it was used to describe rebels in countries under the control of the Soviet Union. When Ronald Reagan used the term to describe the *contras* it therefore also embraced ideas of anti-communism.
References


Retos y perspectivas de la gobernanza del agua y gestión integral de recursos hídricos en Bolivia

Sergio Antonio Ruíz e Ingo Georg Gentes

La crisis del agua es a menudo una crisis de gobernabilidad
Foro Mundial del Agua 2000, La Haya, Países Bajos

En enero del 2006 Evo Morales se convierte en el primer presidente indígena boliviano, después de obtener el 54 por ciento de los votos de las elecciones nacionales, frente al 29 por ciento de su principal opositor, Jorge Quiroga. La victoria contundente de Morales y su partido Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) puede explicarse en parte al fracaso político de tres de los más importantes partidos políticos bolivianos (MNR, MIR y ADN), los cuales se alternaron el poder del Estado en los últimos 20 años de historia democrática.

La nueva oferta del MAS radica en otorgar mayores espacios de poder a la población indígena y originaria, tanto en la toma de decisiones estatales, como en el acceso y control de los recursos naturales. Pero las ideas de cambio no fueron percibidas de igual manera en todas las regiones y por todos los sectores; los mayores opositores se encuentran principalmente en los departamentos de Santa Cruz y Tarija, caracterizados por formar el eje económico del país, y por albergar una vasta oferta de recursos naturales. A la mitad del periodo presidencial, el gobierno de Morales se caracteriza por acentuar los conflictos regionales existentes, y por la indecisión de ejecutar las reformas estatales prometidas (véase Mayorga 2006).

El nuevo gobierno creó en el 2006 el Ministerio del Agua como respuesta a las demandas de movimientos sociales y los sucesos en la "guerra por el agua" en Cochabamba en el año 2000. Por primera vez en la historia del país se consolidó una representación estatal entre varios sectores socioeconómicos, procurando revertir los modelos y experiencias neoliberales aplicados desde inicios de los años noventa. En el marco de la nueva política estatal se planteó la gestión integrada de recursos hídricos, considerando la gran diversidad económica, cultural y ambiental boliviana. Además, se esperaba que el Ministerio del Agua articulara los tres sectores hídricos históricamente separados: agua potable y saneamiento, riego y cuenca.

Similar al proceso de cambio propuesto por el partido oficialista, ésta política sufrió una crisis existencial a dos años de su gestión. Las razones son múltiples y incluyen, por una parte, obstáculos indirectos que afectan al sector que van desde las disputas partidarias internas del MAS, los intensos conflictos por más autonomía y control de las regalías petroleras entre el gobierno nacional y los departamentos, hasta los problemas estructurales de legalidad y legitimidad del gobierno, incluso en las regiones occidentales de Bolivia inicialmente simpatizantes a su gobierno (véase Veltmeyer y Petras 2007). Entre los obstáculos directos que afectan a la gobernanza del agua en Bolivia se encuentran: la falta de coordinación institucional entre el gobierno nacional y los gobiernos locales, la escasa coherencia entre...
los marcos regulatorios existentes, los impredecibles cambios de funcionarios públicos y la deficiente capacidad técnica institucionalizada.

En el presente artículo se examinan los obstáculos directos que impiden la aplicación de la política hídrica sostenible, tomando como referencia los diferentes delineamientos políticos, decretos, leyes y documentos técnicos, así como un análisis de determinadas iniciativas de las cooperaciones internacionales en el sector agua y saneamiento, principalmente en los departamentos de Tarija y Santa Cruz. Ponemos énfasis, a propósito, en los sistemas (locales) de gestión de agua ya que surgen a partir de una necesidad (o amenaza) básica de distribución y conservación del recurso hídrico entre los diferentes actores. La GIRH requiere de un sistema político-institucional estable que articule los diferentes niveles jerárquicos de administración, donde el nivel local es fundamental en el proceso de control y monitoreo. Si bien, la información técnica e hidrológica proviene principalmente de instancias nacionales (sobre uso de la tierra, distribución efectiva de derechos de usos entre los actores, etc.), también existen sistemas de comunicación y control social en el nivel local, decisivos para una GIRH (véase Hofwegen y Jaspers 2000; Jouravlev 2003; Solanes y Jouravlev 2005; Moreno Díaz, Renner 2007). En detalle nos interesa ilustrar la pregunta de cómo el Estado pretende promover e implementar, desde su perspectiva centralista, casi autoritaria, una política integral, participativa y sostenible que contribuya a la conservación y buen uso del agua.

En la primera parte se analizan los aciertos y desaciertos de la GIRH, considerando los problemas administrativos, técnicos e institucionales a nivel nacional y local, y se plantea como alternativa la ‘cuenca social’ como unidad de excelencia para la GIRH. Luego se enfoca la coordinación institucional en Bolivia y la permanente fricción entre los marcos regulatorios, el partidismo político y las demandas sociales emergentes en el agua. Y, finalmente, se plantean algunos retos para un nuevo modelo de gestión administrativa de gobernanza del agua, sobre la base de los problemas y aciertos analizados.

**Hacia la legislación de gobernanza y cuenca social en la gestión integrada de cursos hídricos (GIRH)**

El término GIRH ha sido recientemente consensuado a nivel internacional para definir un ‘proceso que promueve el manejo y desarrollo coordinado del agua, la tierra y los recursos relacionados, con el fin de maximizar el bienestar social y económico resultante de manera equitativa sin comprometer la sustentabilidad de los ecosistemas vitales’ (Global Water Partnership, citado por Rogers y Hall 2003).

Esta perspectiva holística tropieza a menudo con problemas debido a la misma estructura y organización de las políticas públicas. Entre los retos que plantea la GIRH está la definición de intereses sobre el agua desde una perspectiva que incluya a todos los usuarios por iguales, con o sin derechos formalizados. Aspectos como este, así como la distribución y, por ende, la competitividad y conflictividad entre grupos de interés, no admiten una solución única, sino que requieren de soluciones diferenciales acordes con cada contexto socioeconómico. Similar a otros paradigmas modernos como el ‘desarrollo sostenible’, la GIRH demanda nuevos modelos de gestión pública, como la gobernanza, entendida aquí como el conjunto de procesos formales e informales en la toma de decisiones, que involucra a los
actores públicos, sociales y privados, con intereses similares u opuestos (Jong y Ruiz 2007).

Para autores como Centelles (2006) y Prats (2006), la gobernanza resulta de la creación y gestión de redes o estructuras de relación que involucran a diferentes tipos de actores, cuya interacción es crucial para enfrentar los desafíos más urgentes. Una buena gobernanza, entonces, no implica anular o subestimar las atribuciones del gobierno, sino propone más bien un cambio en el ejercicio de la administración pública tendiente a la coordinación y organización de un espacio deliberativo, basado en la confianza, la participación y el control social.

Entidades internacionales de asesoría a las políticas hídricas nacionales, como el Global Water Partnership (GWP), enfocan la gobernanza del agua o gobernabilidad como la habilidad del oficialismo en el diseño compartido de políticas públicas y estructuras institucionales socialmente aceptadas y que movilizan recursos sociales en su aplicación (Rogers y Hall 2003). De aquí que la gobernanza no debe ser considerada como un concepto rígido: su implementación requiere bastante creatividad, flexibilidad, coordinación y capacidad de aprendizaje local. Algunas condiciones necesarias para establecer la gobernanza del agua son: fomentar la fragmentación, es decir, la descentralización y dispersión de poder entre un grupo grande de instancias gubernamentales y cuasi-gubernamentales (Andrew y Goldsmith 1998); incrementar la participación social sin exclusiones; compartir la responsabilidad de conservación del recurso; multiplicar el valor de la transparencia y comunicación en la red de actores; y establecer un régimen regulatorio que incluya equitativamente las diversas necesidades e intereses sociales (véase Solanes y Jouravlev 2005).

¿Cuáles son los límites geográficos y administrativos recomendados para la gobernanza del agua? Resultados de conferencias internacionales enfatizan que las cuencas hidrográficas son el marco de referencia indicado para la gestión de los recursos hídricos, reiterando que: ‘[...] ‘las cuencas hidrográficas, fluviales, los lagos y los acuíferos deben ser el marco de referencia primario para la gestión de los recursos hídricos’. Por lo tanto, es ‘preciso crear mecanismos institucionales y participativos a este nivel’.

¿Por qué se toman las cuencas como unidades territoriales para la gestión del agua? Según Dourojeanni et al. (2002) existen tres razones principales: i) las cuencas son las principales formas terrestres dentro del ciclo hidrológico, ya que captan y concentran el agua que proviene de las precipitaciones. Estas características físicas, en general, generan una interrelación e interdependencia (externalidades o efectos externos) entre los usos y usuarios en una cuenca; ii) en el espacio de las cuencas interactúan e interdependen los recursos naturales no renovables y bióticos (flora y fauna) en un proceso permanente y dinámico; iii) en el territorio de las cuencas se interrelacionan también los sistemas socioeconómicos, formado por los usuarios de la cuenca, sean habitantes o interventores externos de la misma, cada grupo con sus propios intereses.

El ‘éxito’ en la gestión del agua dependería entonces, según los ‘hidrólogos funcionalistas’, de la capacidad y eficiencia de dirigir y coordinar los intereses con relación a los recursos hidrológicos en cuencas. Estas actividades requieren información y un sistema de comunicación que permite: i) conocer los límites de aguas subterráneas frente a los límites superficiales; ii) definir distintos niveles de gober-
nanza para facilitar el buen funcionamiento de los procesos de gestión de recursos hídricos y de prestación de servicios por ejemplo para agua potable; e iii) definir formas institucionales de coordinación e implementación de políticas hídricas, ya que a menudo los límites naturales de las cuencas no coinciden con los ámbitos de acción de los organismos públicos.

Ahora, es ampliamente reconocido que en Bolivia se ha avanzado muy poco en la gestión del agua con enfoque de cuencas.7 Si bien existen cuencas hidrográficas conocidas, su información y el conocimiento entre la población son muy escasos; los acuíferos son menos conocidos aún y sus balances de extracción y recarga se basan generalmente en estudios puntuales (Gutiérrez 2006, Hendriks 2006).

Para superar esta deficiencia, el gobierno central ha formulado en 2006 el Plan Nacional de Cuencas, que asume a la cuenca como la unidad de planificación por excelencia para garantizar la gestión social del agua. De esta manera se intenta ‘territorializar’ y ‘sociabilizar’ la gestión del agua, a fin de reconocer las estructuras de órganos y atribuciones locales, de reglas de conducta y de sistemas de sanción, sobre cuya base se resuelven los conflictos derivados del uso, goce y disposición de los recursos8 (Gentes 2006).

La nueva Constitución Política del Estado de diciembre del año 2007 – presentada en plena polémica por la paralela presentación de un estatuto de autonomía para cinco departamentos – declara al agua como ‘un derecho humano fundamental para la vida, en el marco de la soberanía del pueblo boliviano. El Estado promoverá el uso y acceso al agua sobre la base de principios de solidaridad, complementariedad, reciprocidad, equidad, diversidad y sustentabilidad (art. 37, I)’. Al mismo tiempo que respeta y reconoce ‘los usos y costumbres de las comunidades, sus autoridades locales, organizaciones indígenas campesinas; sobre el derecho, el manejo y la gestión del agua’ (art. 38), también el Estado se otorga la facultad de definir las condiciones y limitaciones de todos los usos mediante una ley y reglamentos generales aún en espera.

La nueva Constitución define además la propiedad colectiva y comunitaria tanto del recurso mismo como de la infraestructura adyacente en su función social, cultural y ambiental e impidiendo su apropiación privada, al reconocer que ‘[...] los recursos hídricos en todos sus estados, superficiales y subterráneos, constituyen recursos finitos, vulnerables y estratégicos; que cumplen una función social, cultural y ambiental. Estos recursos no podrán ser objeto de apropiaciones privadas y tanto ellos como sus servicios no serán concesionados’ (art. 37, II).

En la actualidad, es evidente que la aplicación de la GIRH no carece de conceptos y marcos administrativos a nivel nacional; el problema radica, entonces, en la imposición y ratificación legal, que integra los diferentes sectores y formas de uso y determina las facultades para los gobiernos departamentales, municipales y comunidades rurales. Tanto en el Plan Nacional de Desarrollo (2006) como en el Plan Nacional de Cuencas (PNC) (2006) se considera la importancia de la gestión social del agua. En el PNC se estima que las políticas adecuadas se construirían mejor ‘[...] a partir de la implementación y desarrollo de los diferentes componentes de acción, y en particular desde los proyectos de iniciativas locales, una red interinstitucional de promoción y fortalecimiento de la GIRH, con participación de actores, sectores, municipios, organizaciones de base y el apoyo de la cooperación internacional [...]’. En ambos planes queda expreso que la unidad básica de planificación
y gestión de los recursos hídricos es la cuenca, que relaciona los espacios de gestión pública y social. En torno de ello se establecerá la gestión integrada de los recursos hídricos, priorizando el consumo humano, la producción agropecuaria, las necesidades de la flora y fauna y otros usos.

La cuenca es vista, entonces, como un espacio (de organización) social delimitado por los nacimientos de los cursos de agua y las zonas altas que los protegen y nutren, y se extiende hasta donde llegan las aguas de forma natural o hasta donde se conduce el agua por los lazos construidos por las sociedades (Yañez y Poats 2007).

Dicho concepto es complementario al concepto de cuenca hidrográfica, en donde el punto de análisis es el medio biofísico y hidro-geográfico. La ‘cuenca social’ parte de un rights-approach en que se reconoce la existencia de un pluralismo legal en la gestión de agua basándose en un reconocimiento de las múltiples y complejas relaciones de la acción colectiva en el agua (Boelens et al. 2007). De acuerdo a Yáñez y Prats (2007) la ‘cuenca social’ determina la cuenca geográfica y las actividades y organizaciones en sus zonas de influencia, ambas determinadas por los usuarios del agua. Una ‘cuenca social’, por ende, suele implicar un traslape de varias cuencas geográficas entrelazadas por el tejido social que construyen los múltiples usuarios, y, por tanto constituye una unidad de análisis apropiada para entender las relaciones sociales conflictivas en el agua. Esta situación se presenta en muchas zonas medias y bajas de las cuencas andinas, donde grupos humanos desde tiempos ancestrales se han organizado para conducir el agua desde sus fuentes hasta sus tierras secas que en muchos casos se encuentran lejos de la cuenca geográfica donde ésta agua normalmente fluye. Los grandes proyectos de transvases modernos siguen esta tradición cuando dirigen el agua de una cuenca a otra, para suplir las necesidades de poblaciones urbanas o de proyectos de desarrollo agrícola o industrial en zonas carentes de agua.

Tomando en consideración estas variables, es aconsejable que las políticas públicas ambientales y de descentralización incidan en la territorialidad del agua, uniendo los conceptos de cuenca con los de las unidades político-administrativas. Esto implica avanzar en definiciones y entendimientos acerca de la ‘cuenca social’, incorporando variables históricas, culturales, sociales, económicas y ambientales, e incluyendo variables organizativas, productivas y jurídicas. El desafío es indagar en un sistema de principios, valores, instrumentos y acciones que, fundados en las particularidades culturales y la gestión de las comunidades locales, estructuren el derecho del agua sobre la base de las formas tradicionales de uso y conservación del recurso.

El objetivo de gobernanza local hídrica, entonces, se puede alcanzar de diferentes maneras; en nuestro análisis proponemos dos ámbitos paralelos de acción: i) desde las políticas públicas del Estado, respetando y haciendo respetar la autonomía de derecho consagrada a favor de los actores locales en el interior de las ‘cuenca sociales’; y ii) desde las propias comunidades y municipios, acompañando y apoyando la autonomía y poder de decisión otorgado, por ejemplo, en el manejo de redes de riego, el suministro del agua y la conservación de los recursos naturales.
Construcción social de políticas hídricas: historia y realidad

Si, de acuerdo a funcionarios de la CEPAL los sistemas de agua y saneamiento son un clásico ejemplo de monopolio natural local, y como tal, excepcionalmente resistentes a la competencia del mercado (Jouravlev 2003), las instituciones –como reglas de juego – constituyen la base para el funcionamiento eficiente de las redes sociales y el establecimiento de políticas públicas eficientes de estos monopolios: por una parte, determinan los niveles jerárquicos de decisión y, por otra, establecen las atribuciones y obligaciones de cooperación entre los interesados.

En Bolivia, las divergencias entre políticas públicas y demandas sociales sobre la gestión del agua salieron a la luz a inicios del 2000, cuando en la ciudad de Cochabamba estalló el severo conflicto denominado la ‘Guerra por el Agua’. La historia oficial es que la compañía ‘Aguas del Tunari’, ligada al consorcio multinacional Bechtel, había logrado la concesión del suministro de agua potable para la ciudad mediante un proceso de licitación poco transparente y participativo, en que prácticamente se ignoraron los intereses de la población local (Bustamante 2005, Orellana 2007). La primera medida de los ejecutivos de la empresa fue subir los precios de suministro del agua potable, a fin de mejorar el servicio. Este hecho resultó decisivo para unir los intereses afectados de los consumidores urbanos y de los regantes de las áreas alrededor de la ciudad, disconformes con la aplicación de políticas neoliberales del gobierno de Sánchez de Lozada (2002-2003) tendientes a la privatización de los servicios públicos y la modificación de la Ley de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado Sanitario (Assis 2006).

La Guerra por el Agua marcó el inicio de una serie de protestas a lo largo del país en contra de la privatización de recursos naturales como el gas y el petróleo, que finalmente terminaron con los gobiernos de Sánchez de Lozada (octubre de 2003) y su sucesor Carlos Mesa (junio de 2005). A este último, en enero 2005, la Junta de Vecinos de El Alto, ciudad cercana a La Paz, compuesta por inmigrantes del interior del país, lo forzó a rescindir el contrato con Aguas de Illimani, compañía que forma parte de Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux de France, debido al desinterés por extender el servicio a los sectores más pobres y vulnerables de la población.

Las semanas de protestas callejeras reiteraron los problemas regulatorios y gubernamentales existentes en cuanto a la definición de políticas nacionales y sustentables. Desde mediados de los años ochenta, los gobiernos bolivianos han intentado crear una política de aguas coherente, basada en la reformulación de la Ley de Dominio y Aprovechamiento de Aguas de 1906 aún vigente.

¿Por qué Bolivia no cuenta aún con un marco regulatorio de la administración del agua, que permitiría la formulación de un sistema de recurso hídrico sólido? Al mismo tiempo, es sorprendente que el país aún no dispone de un sistema estructurado e único que permita registrar y certificar debidamente los derechos de agua hasta ahora otorgados.

La tendencia hasta el año 2006 en todos los borradores ha sido siempre la misma: el gobierno central optaba por una ley que introduzca el agua en el mercado y que el precio de la misma se fije por las reglas de oferta y demanda mientras que las organizaciones indígena-campesinas y ambientalistas proponían un sistema más regulado y protegido, con severas exclusiones de la participación de las empresas privadas.
Diferentes comisiones de parlamentarios y organizaciones sociales han presentado más de 30 borradores de ley en los últimos años, a través de los cuales se ha ido perfeccionando el criterio común de escasez y necesidad de regulación. La aprobación de la ley permitiría la creación de un sistema formal de administración, basado en la cuenca hidrográfica que planifique el uso del recurso de acuerdo con los parámetros económicos, sociales y ambientales (Orellana 2007). Pero la administración pública del recurso por cuenca ha pasado por varios Ministerios, hasta establecerse en el actual Ministerio del Agua recién en el 2006, por lo que se espera que esta multiplicidad de responsabilidades y autorías supuestamente haya llegado a su fin.

La importancia que ha adquirido el tema del agua en las reivindicaciones de los pueblos indígenas y campesinos se evidencia en su inclusión en los documentos de demandas de prácticamente todas las movilizaciones realizadas durante los últimos 8 años. Si bien influyó directamente en la elaboración y aplicación de criterios de la nueva política nacional hídrica del 2007, tampoco el rol que ejerce este sector ha llegado a que se avance en la ratificación de una nueva Ley de Aguas. En el Consejo Interinstitucional de Agua (CONIAG), encargado de elaborar un nuevo marco regulatorio, entre otras, se observa una determinante participación e influencia de los representantes de diversas organizaciones sociales, principalmente de regantes poderosos de sistemas de riego como Tiquipaya en las cercanías de Cochabamba. Ellos insisten en una relación de colaboración de poderes facultativos entre sectores (riego y agua potable, por ejemplo) y la administración nacional, y un rol predominante de los regantes en la jerarquía institucional y legal. Entre otros aspectos, dichos grupos de interés rechazan tácitamente la fijación de tasas y patentes por el uso de agua para las comunidades rurales. La presencia de sus representantes en el gobierno mismo o como asesores del presidente, y el prestigio y poder que han ido adquiriendo internacionalmente como ‘la organización social’ que ha encabezado la lucha contra la comercialización del agua crea un escenario nocivo para reiniciar el proceso de formalización de la Ley de Aguas. Se podría afirmar que la pugna entre sectores productivos y sociales y el acentuado debilitamiento político que sufre la gestión del Presidente Morales están bloqueando toda posibilidad de aprobación legal hasta el final de su gestión.

Desafortunadamente para los intereses de los más pobres y regantes sin derechos formalmente adquiridos, las pugnas entre sectores sociales populares también se reflejan en el interior del Ministerio del Agua, lo que no permite articular las políticas integrales con los intereses de las regiones o departamentos, entre otros, también debido a la capacidad institucional del Ministerio, cuyos funcionarios se hallan limitados para realizar despliegues mayores.

Panorama actual de las políticas hídricas regionales y sectoriales

En paralelo a los intentos de incorporar nuevos componentes en el manejo y gestión del agua, a partir de la década de 1990, Bolivia ha dado pasos determinantes en la descentralización administrativa del Estado, sobre la base de un modelo que reivindica las demandas locales y devuelve a los municipios el derecho de decisión y planificación comunitaria local. Desde 1994, el número de gobiernos municipales aumentó de 25 a 327, con el respectivo incremento de los ingresos de administra-
ción e inversión local. También los departamentos han ganado mayores espacios de decisión política, desde que los prefectos departamentales son elegidos directamente por el pueblo (Ruiz 2005).13

A partir de enero del 2006, el gobierno del MAS promete al menos una nueva correlación de fuerzas entre los actores políticos, abriendo la posibilidad de establecer un nuevo principio hegemónico, capaz de articular de otra manera las relaciones entre Estado, economía, política y sociedad en torno de un proyecto de reforma estatal que cuenta con un innegable protagonismo del movimiento campesino e indígena (Mayorga 2006). El proyecto se plasma en las reformas a la Constitución Política del Estado, en cuyos contenidos se refleja el dilema de la gestión presidencial: por un lado, se reconocen los anhelos departamentales de autonomía, pero al mismo tiempo se debilita la gestión de las prefecturas al proponer la creación de dos nuevas formas de autonomías territoriales: las regionales e indígenas. Pero la relación y jerarquía entre ambas formas institucionales aún no ha sido reglamentada, especialmente en vistas a las facultades de decisión sobre explotación y explotación de recursos naturales, entre ellos el agua, en tierras comunitarias.

Con respecto a la GIRH, desde mediados de los años noventa, las normas vigentes atribuyen a los gobiernos municipales la responsabilidad del servicio de agua potable y alcantarillado sanitario local, la administración de la infraestructura de micro riegos, y la concesión de licencias para la explotación de áridos que se encuentran al margen de los ríos. Las instituciones vigentes identifican también a los gobiernos departamentales (prefecturas) como las instancias centrales para hacer operativa y ejecutar la política ambiental y de GIRH. Las secretarías departamentales de recursos naturales asumen una serie de atribuciones específicas, con miras a la reducción de los impactos ambientales generados por las actividades económicas sobre los cuerpos de agua y las cuencas. Según la normativa correspondiente, son los gobiernos departamentales que deben crear sus Consejos Departamentales del medio ambiente, formular políticas regionales acordes con las condiciones departamentales y colaborar en la gestión ambiental municipal. No obstante los avances institucionales, el mismo Ministerio del Agua considera poco factible la integración sectorial y de los niveles regionales, argumentando que ‘[…]’ el marco institucional establecido por las diferentes leyes y su reglamentación no es adecuado para realizar una GIRH, ya que existe una gran cantidad de actores con competencias, funciones e intereses superpuestos’ (Ministerio del Agua 2007, 6).

El reglamento de la Ley de Riego, aprobado en 2004, ha sido uno de los procesos legales con mayor participación de los actores locales del sector hídrico. Mediante este cuerpo normativo, las iniciativas emprendidas por las organizaciones rurales han logrado incorporar un régimen de derechos de agua favorables para comunidades y familias campesinas e indígenas, y principios para establecer políticas públicas y comunitarias.15 No obstante, la normativa existente tiende a privilegiar y favorecer determinados grupos de derechocones, según el momento de su aprobación, sin constituir una respuesta a los problemas estructurales – de erosión, salinización e ineficiencia en el uso, entre otras – por los que atraviesa el país. También para el sector hídrico cuenta que debería ser la Ley General de Aguas la norma que defina los incentivos concretos dirigidos a aplicar la GIRH a nivel local, y no una ley sectorial que además otorga al Viceministerio de Riego potestades de control e intervención, por ejemplo, en las cabeceras de cuencas.
Aunque en la actualidad la superficie bajo riego en Bolivia cubre solo el 11 por ciento del total de superficie cultivada, es el sector que consume los mayores volúmenes de agua (Mattos y Crespo 2000). Al mismo tiempo, la agricultura es la actividad económica que representa mayores riesgos de contaminación de acuíferos y uso irracional del agua, y que demanda mayor necesidad de inversión y conocimientos. Por ejemplo, en zonas secas no existe tecnología apropiada para la cosecha de agua; las principales cabeceras de cuenca, como fuentes de agua dulce, no se manejan bajo una visión integral, y el cumplimiento del Plan Nacional de Desarrollo del 2006, referido a la autogestión y sostenibilidad de los sistemas de riego, requiere el fortalecimiento y capacitación de las organizaciones de regantes (Agua Sustentable 2007, Orellana 2007). El mismo Viceministerio de Riego plantea el fortalecimiento de dos nuevos servicios: el Servicio Nacional de Riego (SENARI) y los Servicios Departamentales de Riego (SEDERI). Pero en la mayoría de los departamentos estos organismos no se han constituido y solo existen en el papel, y los registros de derechos de agua aún no se han completado ni homogenizado. Investigadores locales cuestionan seriamente su puesta en marcha y funcionamiento.

Con referencia al sector agua para consumo, la constitución de las Entidades Prestadoras de Servicios de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado Sanitario (EPSA) ha recibido en 2003 especial atención en el extranjero, debido a su enfoque como empresas sociales, sin fines de lucro. Las EPSA deben cumplir estrictamente con la función social y pública, y su ‘[...] patrimonio no podrá ser desagregado o individualizado entre sus componentes, ni convertido en acciones, debiendo mantenerse a cargo de las empresas mancomunitarias sociales en forma indisoluble, sin llegar a ser objeto de transacciones comerciales ni de reparto de dividendos u otra forma de beneficio lucrativo’ (Ley 3602, art. 6, par. 5).

En cuanto al sector de cuencas, la ley ambiental las propone como unidades básicas de planificación y gestión de recursos naturales, especialmente hídricos, a objeto de aglutinar los intereses públicos, sociales y privados en relación con el uso del agua. Las instituciones y políticas de cuencas se encuentran, sin embargo, en desventaja frente a los demás sectores: estas se hallan bastante dispersas en las Leyes Ambiental, Agraria, Forestal y de Municipalidades y compiten con otros instrumentos de planificación con mejores mecanismos de control social y financiamiento, como los planes de desarrollo, los planes de usos de suelo y planes de ordenamiento territorial. A partir de esta situación, ‘… la formulación de una ley general del agua entraría condicionada a refrendar legislaciones y políticas sectoriales y a resultar incoherente’ (Ministerio del Agua 2007, 5).

Se evidencia que contrariamente al discurso de la gestión integral, en Bolivia se corre el riesgo de actuar separado por sectores y subsectores, mucho más ahora, cuando las regulaciones sectoriales no tienen coherencia para articular a los ministerios, viceministerios, prefecturas y gobiernos municipales. Un buen ejemplo es la potestad del SENARI y los SEDERI en cuanto a la fiscalización y control de las cabeceras de cuencas, sin necesariamente ser articuladas con leyes como la de descentralización administrativa, participación popular o saneamiento básico, ni con el rol de las EPSA que también deben controlar las fuentes de cuencas para asegurar el abastecimiento de consumidores urbanos.

La desarticulación institucional origina conflictos de coordinación de políticas públicas, hasta llegar a serias disputas sociales por el acceso y control del recurso.
entre sectores económicamente dominantes y actores sociales emergentes. Si la aprobación de la Ley de Aguas no avanza, se prevé que los actuales conflictos sociales sobre la tierra – política priorizada por el actual gobierno – se transformen en un futuro muy próximo en conflictos sobre el agua, esta vez con disputas sociales más drásticas debido al carácter finito del recurso.

**Luchas por el poder de decisión**

El Ministerio del Agua se creó a partir de un pacto social entre líderes de los movimientos sociales, organizaciones no gubernamentales y el gobierno nacional, para revertir e impedir las privatizaciones en la prestación de servicios de agua potable y saneamiento. Hoy en día, tanto en el diseño, ejecución, control y evaluación de las políticas de agua, las organizaciones sociales no están presentes, e incluso muchos de sus precursores han sido marginados de la gestión gubernamental. Las causas parecen estar más bien ligadas a las pugnas personales por acceso y mantenimiento del poder del ministerio, antes que a desacuerdos en la aplicación técnica y metodológica de la GIRH.

En el interior del Ministerio se observa una notoria falta de comunicación entre los tres Viceministerios, mientras que el Viceministerio de Riego se auto-adjudica el liderazgo en las políticas de gestión de agua. Especialmente éste último y el Viceministerio de Cuencas están compitiendo abiertamente en la asignación de fondos públicos y espacios de poder, lo que afecta la calidad e implementación de una visión integral en el agua y redundan en una baja aceptación de las políticas gubernamentales en los ámbitos locales y regionales. Los sectores de riego y cuencas, que en la GIRH forman una sola constelación, en Bolivia históricamente se encuentran separados (Agua Sustentable 2007). En un país con constatados problemas de erosión, los grandes proyectos de riego carecen todavía de criterios y procedimientos que favorezcan las necesidades básicas o mínimas de conservación, ni tampoco cuentan con mecanismos que definan los grados de participación comunitaria en la ejecución y control de la inversión público-privada (Agua Sustentable 2007).

La coordinación entre las prefecturas y el gobierno central está aún más afectada, dado los conflictos políticos entre los dirigentes del MAS y de los movimientos políticos tradicionales, muchos de ellos elitistas, que todavía controlan el poder en los departamentos. A las autoridades nacionales les cuesta priorizar proyectos de inversión pública e incluso de cooperación internacional en prefecturas y municipios contrarios al partido de gobierno. Algo similar ocurre en la relación entre prefecturas y municipios: incluso entre instancias con las mismas tendencias partidarias se duplican esfuerzos y recursos financieros, por ejemplo, en la elaboración de planes de manejo de cuencas en espacios con planes de ordenamiento territorial ejecutados, cuya implementación es cuestionada por la falta de asignación de recursos financieros. En el caso de los departamentos productores de petróleo, que hasta 2007 contaban con importantes fondos procedentes de los impuestos de hidrocarburos, los ingresos que podrían invertirse en la aplicación de planes son destinados a la construcción de ‘obras de cemento’, que aumentan la popularidad de las autoridades de turno, en algunos casos vinculados a la corrupción. Las fallas de coordinación entre autoridades departamentales y locales aumentan el riesgo de
daños ambientales y sociales, originados por la construcción de grandes emprendimientos de riego –atribución de las prefecturas o del gobierno nacional – en que no se consideran los intereses de los más afectados, es decir, de los gobiernos municipales y de la población local.

La coordinación se agudiza aún más debido a la poca capacidad técnica de las instancias públicas para cumplir con sus funciones. De todos los niveles jerárquicos, el nivel nacional es el más afectado: a 10 meses de asumir el gobierno, Morales soporta fuertes críticas por la ineficiencia en el manejo del aparato gubernamental y la incapacidad de gestión política (Mayorga 2006). La reducción de salarios a los funcionarios públicos aplicada a inicios de su gestión en el marco de sus políticas de austeridad, más la distribución de cargos públicos sobre la base de criterios netamente partidarios a los simpatizantes del MAS, provocaron el éxodo de buenos profesionales en el interior o exterior de la república.

En el Ministerio del Agua la gestión se caracteriza actualmente por repentinos y constantes cambios de personal, que no distinguen jerarquías administrativas, capacidad técnica o liderazgo político. Los gobiernos departamentales son los que mejor aprovechan esta situación, ofertando mejores condiciones de trabajo a personas técnicas capacitadas. Así, las Secretarías Departamentales Ambientales de Tarija y Santa Cruz, al igual que las direcciones técnicas del agua, son dirigidas por técnicos con más alto nivel profesional. A este nivel jerárquico los problemas se refieren a la cantidad de personal, así como a los medios logísticos y financieros asignados por las autoridades departamentales al sector hídrico.

A nivel local, los gobiernos municipales se encuentran sobreexigidos para cumplir sus funciones ambientales. Sus múltiples tareas van en aumento, asumiendo por ejemplo la regulación de la extracción de áridos, la asistencia en el control forestal, el catastro de predios rurales o la administración de áreas protegidas locales. En municipios con grandes centros urbanos, como es el caso de Villa Montes en el Departamento de Tarija, las unidades ambientales también han recibido atribuciones orientadas al cuidado de las áreas verdes y el reciclaje de derechos sólidos en las ciudades. Aquí como en otros lados, los alcaldes municipales priorizan las acciones que aumentan su popularidad, como el mantenimiento de los parques urbanos o el aseo de la ciudad en vez de preocuparse de la gestión integral (Gentes y Ruiz 2007).

La poca capacidad técnica en materia hídrica, extensiva a los tres niveles jerárquicos analizados, es en parte compensada por las organizaciones no gubernamentales (ONG) que cuentan con mejor personal técnico y mayores recursos financieros, muchos de ellos provenientes de organismos internacionales. Su principal aporte ocurre a nivel local, asesorando la formulación de políticas diferenciales o la elaboración de instrumentos técnicos que contribuyan a la aplicación legal. Pero su presencia ocurre en el marco de la ‘lógica de su proyecto’ que está dirigido a ‘producir resultados’ sectoriales y dejan de lado una análisis sustentativo e una estrategia para la ‘cultura del cambio’. En el área de conservación, a pesar de la retórica sobre la ‘participación’, la mayoría de las iniciativas aún se verifican de arriba hacia abajo dirigidas por enfoques externos que ven a la población local como parte del problema y no como parte de la solución (Vermeulen y Sheil 2007).
Lecciones aprendidas de la experiencia boliviana

El enfoque de la GIRH sobre la base de los principios de gobernanza local plantea nuevos desafíos en el desarrollo de nuevos acuerdos institucionales, mayor educación y capacitación de los usuarios y actores locales, pero principalmente demanda cambios de concepción en la relación entre Estado y sociedad. Es decir, los derechos y obligaciones respecto de la conservación ambiental no sólo corresponden a los políticos y actores públicos, sino también a otros actores que conviven en la comunidad política que conforma el Estado: empresas públicas y privadas, población urbana y rural, instancias de cooperación técnica, comunidades campesinas y pueblos indígenas. Esto implica un empoderamiento local en aspectos de manejo, control e interacción entre actores y organismos públicos, pero también capacitación consensuada y apta con miras al ejercicio de una nueva cultura sustentable del agua.27

El empoderamiento local no se aplica por ley, sino por un gran ‘pacto’ o ‘acuerdo’ social que, utilizando técnicas de gestión de redes, promueve una amplia participación de actores locales, como instrumento clave para superar las visiones de corto alcance que el ciclo electoral induce en los gobernantes (Centelles 2006).

La conformación de pactos ambientales en Bolivia y en otros países de la región se enfrenta con el problema de que la gobernanza local todavía es un proceso en construcción. En concreto, todavía no existen interrelaciones coherentes entre actores públicos, sociales y privados orientadas a la conservación del agua o a garantizar la cantidad y calidad del suministro del recurso. De allí que en muchos municipios, los problemas del sector hídrico no pasen necesariamente por la disponibilidad de recursos financieros: gobiernos locales bolivianos con altos presupuestos públicos, debido a la presencia de yacimientos de hidrocarburos, enfrentan serios problemas de degradación ambiental, sin que sus programaciones financieras en temas ambientales sean coherentes con la alta necesidad de conservación de sus recursos. El principal problema es la ausencia de una coordinación institucional que articule la gran variedad de intereses sectoriales y el poder de convocatoria de instancias públicas locales con mandatos ambientales.

La creación del Ministerio del Agua no ha contribuido a la gobernanza local hídrica. Las políticas de este ministerio están lejos de poder articularse con procesos institucionales instaurados en Bolivia, como la descentralización y participación popular. De allí que la política nacional hídrica todavía no sea capaz de ofrecer alternativas a las ‘discapacidades’ técnicas y financieras de las instancias locales y revertir la larga historia centralista del país. Para las autoridades del agua en Bolivia, el desafío radica en orientar la política pública hacia el diseño de normas y programas con enfoques participativos que no se decidan y modelen en función del contenido de la oferta, sino sobre la base de las demandas específicas y potenciales de colaboración entre los grupos emergentes y vulnerables y los gobiernos locales. Pero la superposición territorial y de atribuciones que plantea la creación de las nuevas autonomías regionales e indígenas sobre los actuales niveles jerárquicos ya establecidos pero no consolidados, a nivel de los departamentos y municipios, crea otro problema irresuelto.

Aspectos como dar solución a la actual problemática hídrica en Bolivia y su proyección hacia el logro de una buena gobernanza requieren, a nuestro entender, un reinicio del debate técnico y no político, cuyos resultados se plasmen en una
nueva Ley de Aguas. Es importante clarificar, por ejemplo, ¿quién son los encargados de integrar y quiénes están dispuestos o son capaces de hacerlo?; ¿cuáles son los intereses que deben ser representados en un proceso de integración?; ¿cómo debe ser gestionado el proceso de integración para asegurar que todos los actores y sus intereses se vean representados equitativamente?; ¿cómo y quiénes deberían resolver las disputas en un sistema integrado?; y ¿cuáles temas deben ser coordinados a través de un enfoque sistémico e integral local, regional o nacional?

Bolivia como ‘democracia de alta tensión’ (Rojas Ríos 2007) debido a sus permanentes crisis en torno a la inigualdad, la marginalización social y discriminación de los grupos e individuos indígenas, acarrea un conflicto aún más profundo de cohesión territorial y económica entre una política que plantea la gestión pública de recursos naturales centralizadas en el poder del Estado versus otra que prioriza la descentralización en la gestión de recursos y sus plusvalías, proveniente de la exploración y explotación de hidrocarburos.

Sin duda, los procesos de conflictividad y cambio social a partir del 2005 convierten Bolivia en un caso de ‘reinvención de la democracia’ (Salman 2008) donde los pueblos indígenas y sus líderes en América Latina hasta ahora no han formado parte ni del proyecto nación, 28 ni del discurso ideológico del Estado sino como parte de sociedades imaginadas (Anderson 1993). Ahora los pueblos indígenas se han convertido en protagonistas de la historia y desde y para sus propias comunidades imaginadas utilizan el ‘Estado Padre’ como instrumento de poder para convertir el ‘Estado cotidiano’ por medio de una política partidaria y mayoritaria (el MAS) en una ‘nueva democracia.’ Este proceso de hacer, deshacer y rehacer la democracia institucional (PNUD 2007) cuestiona claramente los principios de una concepción liberal-representativa de la democracia y plantea un modelo de representación, deliberación y participación en todos los niveles institucionales del Estado.

Justo en las cuestiones institucionales se encuentra el tendón de Aquiles de la política de cambio social. ¿Cómo enfrentar las facultades de poder (de decisiones e implementaciones administrativas) entre los niveles centrales-estables, regionales, municipales y comunales, y comunarios?, y ¿cómo implementar una política que garantiza la autonomía respecto al territorio indígenas, por ejemplo, y respecto a la gestión de recursos naturales? El debate entre líderes y políticos de la zona altiplánica y del oriente sobre autonomía y centralismo escasea de una visión realista sobre la composición cultural del país y la necesidad de plantear como conditio sine qua non el ‘nuevo Estado’ como garante para la cohesión social, solidaridad cultural y sustentabilidad ambiental del país.

Si bien la formación de un Ministerio de Agua en el año 2006 resultó de una lucha mancomunada de movimientos sociales por garantizar servicios públicos sustentables y comunitarios de las empresas de abastecimiento de agua potable y saneamiento, estos principios se encuentran hoy lejos de ser aplicados. Los problemas de conservación y protección de recursos naturales, incluyendo la gestión de parques nacionales, su biodiversidad y sus fuentes de agua, son enormes y a la vista.

De la experiencia boliviana es posible concluir que el logro de la gobernanza local del agua comprende un paquete de medidas que van más allá de la aprobación de leyes o la creación de instancias nacionales. Una buena gobernanza hídrica está también condicionada por el ejercicio equitativo de los derechos y deberes sobre
los recursos por parte de todos los actores sociales y la consideración de los diferentes intereses y poderes sectoriales de los usuarios del agua.

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**Notas**

1. En el 2000 se unen en Cochabamba los consumidores urbanos y los regantes de las áreas alrededor de la ciudad, disconformes con la aplicación de políticas neoliberales anteriores tendientes a la privatización de los servicios públicos y la modificación de la Ley de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado Sanitario. Mayores detalles en el capítulo ‘construcción social de políticas hídricas: historia y realidad’.
2. De aquí en adelante denominaremos GIRH a la gestión integrada de recursos hídricos.
3. Dicho trabajo pretendió detallar los aportes técnicos de la cooperación técnica alemana en determinados municipios del Chaco tarijeño y los valles cruzeños con el fin de proponer áreas de trabajo y
perfiles de puestos de trabajo de cooperantes. Los principales objetivos y resultados de la evaluación ex ante, se enmarcan en el cumplimiento de los siguientes objetivos específicos: i) establecer sinergia entre programas y proyectos de cooperación internacional en el ámbito de la GIRH, específicamente entre acciones y enfoques de las entidades de la Cooperación Alemana (DED, GTZ y KFW principalmente); e ii) apoyar iniciativas y dinámicas locales vigentes, con perspectivas de consolidación a futuro, orientadas a generar procesos propios en los Municipios identificados en el desarrollo de políticas sostenibles de GIRH (véase Gentes y Ruiz 2007).

4. En Bolivia se podría sostener que gran parte de la información generada en los últimos dos decenios se efectuó mediante consultorías encargadas y financiadas por los diferentes programas de las cooperaciones internacionales presentes en el país. No siempre está dada el traspaso fluido de los resultados producidos entre las cooperaciones, las instituciones públicas y organizaciones sociales.

5. La amplitud – y vaguedad – del concepto se ilustra en la siguiente cita de Tegegnework Gettu, Director Ejecutivo Oficina del Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD) 31 agosto 2006: La gobernanza es un concepto que comprende mecanismos complejos, procesos, relaciones e instituciones a través del cual los ciudadanos y grupos articulados por sus intereses, ejercen sus derechos y obligaciones, y median sus diferencias. El buen gobierno dirige la gestión de la asignación de recursos para responder a los problemas colectivos; se caracteriza por los principios de participación, transparencia, responsabilidad, reglamentos de ley, efectividad, equidad y visión estratégica. Es un concepto universal importante y aún complejo.


8. Por ejemplo, en los denominados ‘territorios comunitarios de origen’ (TCO), concedidos a las comunidades indígenas por ley agraria, a menudo las negociaciones sobre el uso del agua y redes de riego suelen involucrar no solo intereses indígenas, sino que implican las relaciones e intereses de otros grupos de usuarios regidos por diferentes usos o reglas con fines comerciales y no necesariamente colectivos (Boelens y otros 2007; Orellana 2007).

9. Esta ratificación es absolutamente distinta que se presenta en el país vecino Chile, donde en el Código de Aguas de 1981 – y su última regulación del 2005 – se reconoce claramente los principios neoliberales promovidos en relación al agua: asignación libre y transacción y uso de los derechos de agua, en el marco de mercados de agua institucionalizados y centralizados, donde los agentes interactúan y transan sus derechos. La Constitución Política de Chile de 1981 protege a su vez los derechos de aprovechamiento del agua adquiridos como propiedad privada. Sus creadores buscaban establecer así un marco regulatorio que brindara absoluta seguridad a la propiedad hídrica privada e impulsara a los sectores demandantes a un mayor crecimiento y a un desarrollo hacia fuera, sostenido en un modelo de gestión liberal de los recursos hídricos (para mayor detalles véase Gentes 2006).

10. El gobierno Sánchez de Losada promulgó en noviembre de 1999 la Ley Nº 2099 de Prestación de Servicios de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado Sanitario, que planteaba concesiones de 40 años para titulares de derechos de agua, así como una nueva categoría de derecho de agua, denominada ‘licencia’, para todos los demás servicios de agua. La Guerra por el Agua del 2000 logró revocar 36 de los 76 artículos de la referida Ley mediante la promulgación de la Ley Nº 2066, que fija dos puntos esenciales: primero, crea la categoría de Registro de Agua, facultando a los pueblos indígenas y comunidades campesinas a prestar servicio de agua de uso doméstico y poblacional a los usuarios definidos como tales a tiempo indefinido; segundo, se elimina el derecho de exclusividad que la anterior Ley de Prestación de Servicios del año 1999 otorgaba a las empresas concesionarias (Bustamante 2005; Hendriks 2006).

11. En realidad, se trata de un decreto reglamentario promulgado en el año 1879, en que se consideraba que el agua formaba parte de la propiedad privada en forma de concesión o autorización, mientras que el Estado seguía manteniendo el dominio originario sobre el recurso (Hendriks 2006).

12. Mientras que el manejo de cuencas se refiere en gran parte de la literatura a las técnicas y organi-
zación asociada del aprovechamiento del agua en relación a los otros recursos naturales (suelo, agua, bosque), la gestión del agua requiere lograr la integración de los diferentes niveles (administrativo e institucional), intereses divergentes, aspectos socio-ambientales y económicos para garantizar una legitimidad, sostenibilidad y gobernanza en el aprovechamiento del agua.

13. En la nueva Constitución Política del Estado propuesta (2008), se incluye además la elección del concejo departamental por el pueblo.

14. Esta situación podría ser el resultado, entre otros aspectos, de la carencia de una ley marco actualizada de aguas. Las principales normas aprobadas en el sector hídrico incluyen la Ley de Servicios Básicos, que carece de reglamentación y es objeto de revisión, y la Ley de Promoción y Apoyo al Riego.

15. Entre sus contenidos más relevantes están: la eliminación de los mercados de aguas y la prohibición de comercializar los derechos (registros y autorizaciones); el otorgamiento de registros colectivos y familiares a productores campesinos e indígenas con carácter permanente (no en términos de propiedad, sino de derecho de uso oponible a terceros); y la creación de un marco institucional regulatorio con participación social y estatal.

16. Alrededor del 86 por ciento del consumo consuntivo total de agua.

17. Entrevista a Carlos Crespo, Director de la Comisión Gestión Integral de Agua en Bolivia, CGIAB, Universidad de San Simón, Cochabamba, noviembre de 2007; entrevista a la abogada Rocío Bustamante, Investigadora del Centro Agua, Universidad San Simón, Cochabamba 25 de octubre 2007.

18. Una EPSA se conforma de manera voluntaria con la participación de dos o más municipios; de uno o más municipios en asociación con una o más EPSA; o por la asociación de varias EPSA (Ley 3602, art. 3, parr. 1). En su dirección deben ser incluidos representantes de la población beneficiaria (Ley 3602, art. 3, parr. 5). Un aspecto nuevo en esta ley se relaciona con el patrimonio de la empresa, que no está conformado por accionistas sino por cooperativistas. Se ha denegado explícitamente la posibilidad de administrar la EPSA como una empresa de derecho privado con la totalidad de capital público cuyo máximo instancia es la Junta de Accionarios, o sea como una empresa societaria, sea privada o público-privada, cuyas decisiones se rigen en función de quienes ostentan mayor propiedad sobre la empresa, pero donde el derecho a oposición o veto de los socios minoritarios tenga al menos 25 por ciento del capital social de la empresa, modelo frecuente en Perú, Holanda o Alemania (Rojas Ortuste y otros 2007).

19. En el Chaco boliviano, por ejemplo, dada las condiciones secas de la región durante gran parte del año, en los últimos años ha aumentado la presión hacia las fuentes del agua para uso urbano y agrícola, originándose conflictos entre la empresa prestadora de servicios de agua potable y alcantarillado sanitario (EPSA-SAM) Manchaco, las comunidades rurales y los grupos de conservación local.

20. Un panorama conflictivo en el sector de riego a nivel nacional y su intensidad y heterogeneidad de actores, causas y efectos se encuentran en forma resumida en PROAGRO-COMPONENTE RIEGO (Ed.) 2007.

21. Es poco probable que en el actual gobierno se apruebe la Ley de Aguas. La aprobación de la Constitución Política constituye la prioridad gubernamental, y los avances en la creación del Ministerio de Agua y la aprobación de la Ley de Riego en el 2004 (durante el gobierno de Carlos Mesa) se consideran suficientes dentro de la cúpula masista. Bajo las actuales circunstancias, mayores discusiones sobre el contenido de la Ley, no sólo podrían acentuar la actual división nacional, sino también debilitar aún más la gestión del Presidente Morales.

22. Este es el caso del ex Viceministro de Agua Potable y Saneamiento, R. Orellana, fundador de la ONG ‘Agua Sustentable’, que fue acusado en 2007 por el entonces Ministro del Agua, A. Mamani, de la adjudicación ilegal de proyectos de desarrollo para la ONG. No solo Orellana tuvo que abandonar su cargo, sino también fueron alejados paulatinamente sus subalternos, que actualmente se encuentran bastante distantes de sus antiguas cercanías ideológicas al presidente Evo Morales. A. Mamani, líder de los movimientos sociales contra la privatización de las empresas de agua potable en el Alto a su vez tuvo que renunciar a su cargo en diciembre de 2007, en medio de denuncias por


24. A fines de 2007, el Ejecutivo decidió recortar los recursos de las regiones por concepto del impuesto de hidrocarburos para financiar la ‘Renta Dignidad’ a todas las personas mayores de 60 años. Esta situación ha tenido enfrentados al gobierno y a siete de las nueve prefecturas (las otras dos son gobernadas por el partido oficialista) y acentuado aún más la crisis política (véase http://www.la-razon.com/versiones/20080203%5F006171/nota_247_543100.htm).

25. Una de las primeras medidas del Presidente Morales fue la reducción de salarios a los funcionarios públicos que, en el mejor de los casos, reciben 800 dólares americanos mensuales (Decreto Nº 28609 de 2007 sobre salarios de funcionarios públicos). De igual manera, decretó que los ex funcionarios públicos no pueden trabajar en agencias de desarrollo internacional por dos años consecutivos una vez que renuncien a su cargo público. Esto causó aún más fluctuaciones en la administración pública nacional y el alejamiento de funcionarios capacitados, muchos de ellos ahora contratados como técnicos de planta por los gobiernos departamentales ‘separatistas’ de Santa Cruz, Cochabamba o Tarija.

26. Si bien nuestro análisis se concentra en presentar los problemas de coordinación institucional al interior del sector hídrico, no se puede ignorar que la raíz de muchos de ellos se encuentra en los conflictos de poder que ejerce el gobierno central con los gobiernos locales. De allí que un análisis más profundo de las tensiones entre Ministerio y prefecturas o municipios necesariamente debe considerar los intereses representados por los grupos elitistas regionales, resistentes al cambio y por los responsables de la nueva ideología partidaria del gobierno de Morales.


28. El término ‘nación’ alude a un grupo humano unido por vínculos especiales de homogeneidad cultural, histórica, política, económica y lingüística que comparten un territorio y están regidos por un mismo gobierno, y una jurisdicción territorial de un país. La construcción de la nación en los países latinoamericanos, como un proyecto de la comunidad política de modernidad, fue un proyecto de la elite (europea) que, a partir de la territorialización del poder como discurso ideológico de integración, y como parámetro para la organización de la educación y de la cultura, se generalizó en el Estado-nación como forma jurídica.

29. Este ‘Estado’ se caracteriza, según Max Weber, por operar como una sociedad política y jurídicamente organizada que se expresa por medio de las instituciones públicas y el monopolio de aplicar la violencia para imponer y hacer respetar sus reglas y normas.

30. ‘...to state in the regional-autonomy-debate that Bolivia’s riches should benefit all Bolivians, and in the indigenous-territories-debate that the originarios could have a veto on exploitation. Moreover, due to migration process over the centuries, which have intensified in recent decades, no demographically “uncontaminated” regions or territories exist in Bolivia today’ (Salman 2008, 98).

31. Un ejemplo característico es el Parque Nacional Aquaragüe situado en el Chaco húmedo boliviano que no cuenta con los recursos financieros necesarios para establecer una gestión pública de sus recursos naturales ni tampoco dispone de un plan oficial de manejo. Si bien se han elaborado trabajos en gabinete hacia la elaboración de un plan de conservación por algunas ONG (véase Ruiz y Cortez 2002) y existen intenciones y grandes expectativas de crear un modelo nuevo de co-gestión, en el marco de las nuevas tendencias de inclusión de los pueblos indígenas en las políticas públicas entre el Servicio Nacional de Áreas Protegidas (SEPNAP) y la Asamblea del Pueblo Guaraní (Consejo de Capitanes Guaranies de Tarija como parte de la APG), hasta el momento (marzo 2008) estos anuncios no se han traducido en acciones concretas. Dicha situación posiciona al área protegida como ‘tierra de nadie’, y no debe extrañar que incluso el mismo gobierno departamental ha diseñ-
do estudios de pre-factibilidad para el aprovechamiento de los recursos (agua, bosque e hidrocarbu-
ros) en el Área de Manejo Integrado del Parque, sin que hayan sido concertadas con los actores lo-

32. La notoria falta de capacidades de planificación y de operatividad de la gestión de las cabeceras de cuencas se demuestra en los gobiernos locales (corregimiento mayor y gobierno municipal) que continúan convocando a licitaciones públicas que duplican los trabajos realizados en el pasado, como muestra el caso de Villa Montes (Chaco). Característico para esta situación son los Planes de Ordenamiento Territorial (PLOT) que por lo general sirven para favorecer los intereses de empresas consultoras locales o para argumentar el gasto de importantes ingresos públicos provenientes de las regalías de petróleo. Ninguna actividad local denominada en estos Planes está dirigida a establecer equipos técnicos interdisciplinarios que contengan la inminente deforestación, talón ilegal de la madera o contaminación de las fuentes de agua.

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mental Policy Research Centre.


Farmers, Markets and Contracts: Chain Integration of Smallholder Producers in Costa Rica

Ruerd Ruben and Fernando Sáenz

The agrarian production structure of Costa Rica is characterized by a high diversity of farm types, with a predominance of family-based enterprises. This historical inheritance makes the country significantly different from its Central American neighbours (Hall 1985, Seligson 1980). Large capital-intensive plantations that produce for the international markets coexist with extensive livestock haciendas and small and medium-sized, owner-operated farms. Within the latter category of family farms, two types of producers can be distinguished: (1) a traditional peasant sector, comprised of low-income farmers living in former agrarian frontier zones and in rural settlements created by the Agrarian Development Institute (IDA), and (2) an important group of semi-commercial farmers that produce both traditional crops (such as coffee, bananas, sugar cane) and non-traditional crops (for example, tropical fruits, vegetables and ornamental plants) usually reaching competitive production performance. Both groups differ with respect to typical farm-household characteristics (age, education, family size, and dependency rate), production scale, resource endowments, spatial location (access to infrastructure) and market characteristics (access to inputs and information). Rural development policies in Costa Rica thus require rather differentiated incentive regimes to address the needs of the wide range of production units operating under different market and institutional conditions.

During the period 1950-1980, a large number of state-funded programmes – with subsidized credits, price guarantees for staple crops, input subsidies, and public research and extension activities – supported the agricultural sector in general and the traditional peasant sector in particular. After 1980, agrarian policies in Costa Rica suddenly changed their former import substitution orientation towards the progressive incorporation of the agricultural sector into an open-market economy with limited state interventions (SEPSA 1999, Pomareda 1996). In fact, the share of non-traditional agricultural production in the agricultural gross product increased from 10 per cent in 1980, to 19 per cent in 1990, 30.8 per cent in 2001, and 57 per cent in 2006 (Umaña 2002, SEPSA 2007).

The change from import-substitution schemes to a more open market-oriented model brought both opportunities and threats to the agricultural sector of Costa Rica. Whereas the competitiveness of many new activities certainly increased, at the same time a lack of coordination between the government and the private sector became apparent, inhibiting many peasant producers from taking advantage of the new challenges (SEPSA 1999, Doryan-Garron 1990). Consequently, within the smallholder sector, both winners and losers are found. The former moved into agro-export activities, using new production technologies and achieving vertical integration, capital accumulation and economic diversification, while the latter
remained with their traditional activities, using low-input technologies and competing on spot markets (Pomareda 2000). The new agrarian policies in Costa Rica could not prevent the former group from remaining vulnerable to poverty, given the constraints forthcoming from their limited access to new technologies, institutional innovations, input and output markets, and market information (Gonzalez Mejía 1998, Proyecto Estado de La Nación 1998). Hence, the envisaged rapid integration of different types of farmers into the agro-export sector did not work out as expected and high transaction costs and other market failures particularly affected the least-prepared producers.

To address these problems, stronger relationships amongst the different actors involved in the commodity supply chains are required, linking producers with agro-processing firms and consumer outlets. Contract farming is frequently mentioned as a possible way to overcome – or at least considerably reduce – problems occasioned by market and information failures and to provide a better institutional environment for integrating primary producers into the market. The potential role of contract farming is sometimes considered attractive as a mechanism for incorporating small and low-income farmers into the open-market economy (Glover 1984, Key and Runsten 1999). In addition, contracts are usually considered as a device for reducing risk and as a strategy for guaranteeing continuous supply (Glover 1987, Grosh 1994). This is particularly important during the initial phase of non-traditional agro-export production, when contracts provide farmers with the security for enabling the necessary investments. In practice, however, a wide variety of contractual arrangements is likely to coexist, and local farmers may be able to bargain different delivery conditions that serve their particular interests (Key and Runsten 1999).

The literature on contract farming presents two opposite views regarding the potential of this alternative market institution as a bridge between smallholders and agro-processing firms. While some authors warn against the downside of contracting arrangements due to the exclusion of smallholders and their unequal bargaining opportunities (Gwynne 2003, Murray 1997, Rickson and Burch 1996), other researchers argue that contracts offer a mechanism for integrating smallholders into dynamic markets by reducing market failures in credit, insurance and information (Singh 2002, Key and Runsten 1999, Grosh 1994).

In this article, we provide new evidence regarding the importance of contracts for the integration of smallholders into profitable specialized niche markets. We analyse the rationale and effectiveness of different types of contractual regimes in small-scale production and trade of pepper and chayote in Costa Rica. Both commodities have strongly increased their importance as a non-traditional crop since the 1990’s, both for the local market and for export. These crops are very suitable for small-scale farmers, since production requires frequent attention and detailed care throughout the cropping cycle. This gives family farms a competitive advantage compared to large commercial plantations. In addition, pepper and chayote are attractive diversification crops that do not require complex technologies or machinery and can reach high and fairly stable yields per hectare. A major drawback for small farmers are the entry costs during the start-up phase, caused by initial investments for crop establishment and the maturation time before the first harvest takes place. Contracts may therefore be helpful as a strategy for overcoming these
constraints and enable market access while controlling uncertainty (Dorward 2001).

In the Costa Rican non-traditional sector we distinguish between different market configurations ranging from competitive markets to a local monopsony. The latter situation frequently occurs when markets are thin and processing is controlled by a limited number of firms. Regarding delivery conditions, three types of contractual arrangements coexist, based on product deliveries without any contracts, or through verbal or written commitments. Producers may be simultaneously involved in different networks. Attention is focused on the implications of different market situations and contractual arrangements for farmers’ resource use decisions and their investment and management strategies. When farmers depend on a single trader-processor, investments are likely to be more risky. Local competition may therefore be required as an incentive for enhancing farmers’ willingness to improve input use in non-traditional production.

Particular emphasis is laid on the changing nature of the contracts during the household life cycle. Farmers need formal contracts in early phases of the crop establishment process to safeguard their initial investments, but in subsequent phases and when more competitive market conditions arise, they can rely more on verbal commitments (Lutz and van Tilburg 1998). The latter are far more difficult to enforce and could easily lead to disloyal behaviour. Contracts can thus serve as a vehicle for overcoming transaction and information costs, but lose their function when farmers become further integrated into the market.

This study draws on field surveys amongst (a) 50 pepper producers (representing 65 per cent of all pepper producers) living in peasant settlements in the northern region of Costa Rica (Huetar Norte region) and (b) 120 chayote farmers (representing almost a quarter of all national chayote producers) located in Ujarrás in the southern Central Valley. All farmers in the survey belong to the peasant smallholder sector (with farm areas up to 15 ha and cultivated area of export crops of 2-4 ha). Information was collected regarding farm characteristics (farm size, soil quality as perceived by the farmers, access to credit), household characteristics (family size, age, gender, education, farming experience measured as the number of years involved in crop production; risk attitudes), production systems (land use, input applications, yields), exchange regimes (prices, volumes, quality grades) and contractual conditions (payment procedures, cost-sharing arrangements). The analysis relies on an institutional economics approach, using statistical procedures for identifying the determinants of contract choice and the implications for farmers’ production, marketing and investment decisions (Saenz and Ruben 2004, Ruben et al. 2001). We provide here the conceptual and generic conclusions regarding the feasibility of contract farming for different types of rural households under specific market and institutional regimes.

**Contract farming**

The widespread existence of market failures in developing countries limits the ability of smallholders to become involved in new commercial activities that require high initial investments and specialized inputs (Cook and Chaddad 2000). Imperfect markets and high transaction costs are typically caused by poor market infrastructure and farmers’ limited access to information on market opportunities and
While these causes are largely exogenous, other dimensions of market failure tend to be household-specific. Farmers have different resource endowments and often perceive multiple objectives that reflect their behaviour regarding risk and uncertainty (Ellis 1988, Ruben et al. 1994). Most small and medium-size farms are family enterprises with interlinked decision-making regarding production, consumption and investment goals (Ellis 1988, Sadoulet and de Janvry 1995). Even where markets do exist, they may selectively fail for particular categories of farmers, rendering commercial production less feasible (de Janvry et al. 1991). If markets are thin for specific goods or for particular inputs, prices are no longer determined by supply and demand, but institutionally defined. These market failures thus directly affect farmers’ allocative decisions regarding land use, labour intensity and investments.

New institutional economics approaches claim that market failures lead either to the emergence of a surrogate institution for allowing transactions to take place, or to a failure of exchange to occur (Stiglitz 1989). Local institutions emerge as a response to missing markets in an environment of pervasive risks, incomplete markets and information asymmetry (Key and Runsten 1999, Harriss-White 1999).

New exchange arrangements that appear for dealing with market and information failures often perform several market functions simultaneously (Lutz 1994). Such arrangements are frequently based on vertical and/or horizontal market integration.

Contract farming can be regarded as an institutional response to imperfections in markets for credit, insurance, information, factors of production and output, as well as a device for reducing transaction costs associated with search, screening, exchange, bargaining and enforcement (Key and Runsten 1999, Dorward 2001). Contracts can be characterized as ‘agreements between farmers and firms – either verbal or written – specifying one or more conditions of production and marketing of the farmer’s crop’ (Glover 1984). For different types of market failures, contract farming may be a welfare-improving governance device (Schejtmam 1994, Grosh 1994, Key and Runsten 1999). Though contract farming is often claimed to contribute significantly to economic development, results of case studies regarding the implications of contract farming for smallholders’ welfare are less conclusive (Glover 1990, Porter and Phillips-Howard 1997). Benefits of contracting schemes seem to depend much on the specific contractual terms, the technical characteristics of the crop, the market environment and the socio-political context.

Recent contributions to contract choice literature suggest that the nature of contractual arrangements is likely to vary substantially for (a) different types of producers and (b) different market conditions (Dorward 2001). Formal contracts are likely to be preferred by less-endowed and risk-averse farm households. Smallholders with scarce productive assets (land, family labour, farming experience) or with limited access to market outlets possess few alternative options and may therefore be willing to engage in contractual arrangements. Such farmers generally face low opportunity costs of labour, are less able to obtain credit through formal lending institutions and thus possess scarce options for self-insurance. Consequently, given their restricted bargaining power and limited exit options, such farmers are considered an attractive party to enter into a contract with a trader or processing firm (Key and Runsten 1999). Otherwise, farmers with more resources
and a longer experience may be able to deliver their products on the spot market and can bargain better delivery conditions with processing firms.

Prevailing local market conditions also influence farmers’ production and exchange decisions. While contract farming generally emerges in a situation of monopsony markets for non-traditional crops (Glover and Kusterer 1990, Grosh 1994, Key and Runsten 1999), it can also provide an important contribution to further market development. In new areas of production, buyers can stimulate supply by offering input delivery and cost-sharing contracts to growers. Once production has started, the buyer enforces the contracts through its monopsony power. This also implies that production losses (due to weather, pest or diseases) and quality problems can easily be transferred downwards to the farmer.

However, if other firms enter into the same region, or when farmers become more experienced and organized to supply each other with information and assistance, buyers can no longer exercise full market power and profitability of contracts will decrease. In a more competitive market environment, growers gain the ability to choose among various contract suppliers and the latter must thus compete (Key and Runsten 1999, Escobal et al. 2000). This may lead to free-rider behaviour by new buyers, taking advantage from services provided by the first-mover firm. Hence, contracts can be expected to become less profitable once market conditions become more competitive. Furthermore, the possibility of default increases in a more competitive environment, increasing the suppliers’ contract enforcement costs (Glover and Kusterer 1990). When producers start organizing themselves, this increases their bargaining power and offers possibilities to disseminate information from contract farmers to non-contract farmers. From a farmers’ perspective, contracts will become less attractive in an established and stable market with buyers competing on prices (Key and Runsten 1999). The utility of abiding by the contract must be greater than what could be received at alternative outlets. But even when buyers cannot enforce contracts, farmers still might respect such arrangement as a kind of safety net that can be needed under adverse market conditions.

The diversity between farmers and local differences in market conditions give rise to a wide variety in contractual arrangements. Farmers with a formal contract enjoy considerably more security compared to farmers with a verbal agreement. The former are, therefore, expected to attain a higher degree of specialization and can be less engaged in off-farm activities. Moreover, farmers with contracts that include technical assistance are expected to invest more in fertilisers and pesticides use. Higher input applications and more technical assistance will lead to better yields and higher farm-household revenues.

Contract farming can also be considered as a suitable strategy for promoting improved resource management. Contracts provide information on appropriate soil conservation techniques (through technical assistance) and might enhance farmers’ willingness to adopt these practices. Increased use of soil conservation measures will not only occur as a device for reducing farming risks but also because farmers have an economic interest to comply with the contracting terms. Another link between contract farming and resource use decisions relates to more rational applications of inputs, like fertilisers and pesticides. The buyer may recommend and even deliver a package of inputs leading to optimal crop performance and quality. Especially for perennial crops, the buyer has an economic interest in avoiding soil de-
pletion and will therefore try to enforce effective use of chemical and organic fertilisers. For export crops that are subject to strict quality surveillance, control on the amounts and types of pesticides used is equally important.

Non-traditional crops in Costa Rica

Contractual systems are frequently used for the development of non-traditional crops. We compare the supply chains for the pepper and chayote, focusing on differences in (a) the characteristics of the commodities and (b) the types of farm households, (c) market outlet orientation and (d) contract choice (see Table 1). This comparison provides insights in the endogenous character of the selected contractual arrangements (Escobal et al. 2000) and permits to draw conclusions regarding the efficiency and equity effects of supply chain cooperation.

Commodity characteristics

Both pepper and chayote are non-traditional crops that are highly labour intensive with an almost continuous harvest throughout the year, which make them particularly suitable for small-scale production.\(^4\) Production technologies and cropping systems are fairly homogenous and simple. Timely and frequent harvesting determines quality to a large extent, and labour is thus a critical factor for delivery compliance. In both supply chains, commodities are delivered in a fresh state from producers to the processor. Options for improving crop quality also depend on soil conditions (pepper) and chemicals use (chayote). The supply chains differ, however, in the destination that the commodities follow in the chain downstream. Pepper is basically processed (dried) and transformed according to requirements of the domestic food-industry market, whereas fresh chayote continues with little added-value to retailers and consumers, since options for storage or industrialization of chayote are absent.

An important source of differentiation between both supply chains is related to the technical characteristics of the crop, influencing the farmers’ level of asset specificity and uncertainty. The chayote product cycle lasts fourteen months, and the crop becomes productive after the fifth month. The infrastructure is certainly expensive, representing roughly a third of total production costs. It can eventually be used for other cash crops or left unused for a period of time. These characteristics allow producers to adjust their production plans and easily quit the activity. On the contrary, the pepper production cycle ranges between twelve to fifteen years and the plantation starts to deliver production only after its third year. These characteristics already bind producers to the activity, since the establishment of the crop represents a high level of invested effort. Consequently, pepper producers can only start up cultivation if a certain relationship with a helpful partner exists (a resource-providing processor that commits to purchase pepper) and/or when they can be sure that there are enough processors willing to buy the fresh pepper.
Table 1. Comparison of markets and contracts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Pepper (Piper nigrum L.)</th>
<th>Chayote (Sechium edule Sw.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commodities</td>
<td>Perennial tree crop (12-15 years); traded in fresh bunches; quality depends on maturity at harvest. Visual quality inspection. Value added in processing (white pepper requires higher quality)</td>
<td>Semi-perennial vegetable crop (14 months), susceptible to plant diseases and quality degradation. Appearance inspection focused on uniformity. Trade with little added-value (only washing, grading and packaging).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>Small number of farmers (75), spatially located in traditional communities and peasant settlements</td>
<td>Large number of farmers (500) with different farm size and experience. Two distinct segments: traditional producers and newcomers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market outlets</td>
<td>Domestic niche market; domestic food processing and exports. Two distinct market segments, with local monopsony and elsewhere more competitive conditions</td>
<td>Competitive (and growing) market, with domestic and international outlets. No dominant operator; open competition between fourteen independent processors; eight processors are linked to international brokers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Market segments</td>
<td>Monopsony market</td>
<td>Competitive market</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Young farmers</td>
<td>Older farmers</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Small plots</td>
<td>Larger farms</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Better land quality</td>
<td>Degraded land</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Young plantations</td>
<td>Mature plants</td>
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<td>Specialized</td>
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<td>Low labour use</td>
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<td>Low yields</td>
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<td>Organized</td>
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<td>Traditional producers</td>
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<td>Low quality</td>
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<td>Own capital</td>
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<td>Internal inputs</td>
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Type of contracts

|                                  | Resource-providing (written) contracts where prices are adjusted with inflation. Farmers commit to deliver in a long term relationship. Promissory note as guarantee against contract breach. Verbal resource-providing contracts with seedling supply and technical assistance. Open market exchange (with flexible arrangements) in competitive market segments. | Delivery contracts (mainly verbal) to guarantee access to market outlet. Interlinked contracts (with technical assistance, credit and input provision) Farmers’ commitments to deliver enforced by processor. Mostly newcomer farmers rely on contracts to start-up their business. |

Producers’ characteristics

In both supply chains, farm households with different socio-economic and production system characteristics are involved. Pepper producers are located in small settlements, spatially dispersed throughout the northern region of Costa Rica. Depending on their location, they operate under monopsony or competitive market conditions. Farmers in the monopsony market segment are usually younger than those in the competitive segment, show higher degrees of specialization in pepper, while their pepper plantations are more recently established. Since their plantations
are in the early stages, income derived from pepper is lower than in the competitive segment, and most farmers need alternative income sources. Therefore, they can devote less working hours to their pepper plots. The use of contracts is more frequent in the monopsony segment, where farmers are also more likely to receive credit and technical assistance. The mean price for delivered fresh pepper is lower, thus indicating the depressing effect of the monopsony market. Farmers’ organizations are more active in the latter region as a device for compensating the monopsony power of the processor. Since the payback time for the initial investment in the plantation is two to three years, farmers are highly dependent during the risky start-up phase of their plantation.

Conversely, farmers involved in the competitive market segment usually operate larger but more degraded plots. They have mature plantations that are more productive but also demand more labour. This category of farmer is less dependent on contractual relations with processors and requires less technical assistance and credit. Since they obtain a better price than in the monopsony segment, their prospects for expanding pepper production are significantly larger. Farmers expect to reach higher returns for land and labour under the conditions of open competition. These farmers can be characterized as self-confident producers that have already passed the risky initial establishment phase of the crop. In addition to the competitive market environment and the prospects for further market expansion, the fact that their plantations are already in the productive stage provides them with opportunities to develop bargaining power vis-à-vis the processors.

Producers in the chayote sector are spatially concentrated in a single valley. According to their socio-economic characteristics, these farmers can be classified in two categories: (a) traditional producers and (b) newly established producers. Income diversification is very limited amongst both groups of farmers (only some horticultural production was found providing additional income during the non-productive period of chayote) and therefore the availability of either family or hired labour determines feasible cultivated areas. Traditional producers have a long history of chayote production and established family roots in the area. These farmers possess more working capital of their own and have larger plots, for which they hire wage labour especially for the harvest (labour input use represents 70 per cent of total production costs). The second category of ‘newcomers’ comprises farms established in peasant settlements, and organized by the governmental rural development institute (IDA). These producers usually possess less capital and are therefore more dependent on credit provision, input supply and technical assistance. Notwithstanding their limited experience, these smallholders still enjoy advantages compared to larger outgrowers, since there are limited options for mechanization of production and the crop requires large amounts of labour. Therefore, smallholders can use their family labour and thus enjoy the advantage of lower search and supervision costs. In addition, the soil quality conditions in the settlements (higher fertility and better drainage) are more appropriate for chayote cultivation, and the newly established farmers can rely on more advanced production technologies.
Market organization

Both supply chains exhibit a different market organization in terms of outlets and agents. The pepper supply chain is characterized as a closed niche market, whereas the chayote chain operates in a more competitive market environment. There are no spot markets in the pepper supply chain, and only a limited number of producers that have to deal with few processors. After the year 2000, only one unique pepper processor remained, making the supply chain even shorter and more uniform, shifting definitely towards a monopsony situation. In the context of a rather stagnant market, producer organization for reinforcing bargaining power becomes increasingly relevant.

Conversely, the chayote supply chain involves more producers (500) and processors (14), operating in a rather competitive environment, with two well-defined outlets, namely the international and the domestic market. However, only eight processors have made deals with at least five international brokers, implying that a limited number of agents are in fact related to international market outlets. Given the large volume of the domestic (and growing regional) market, chayote trade is likely to expand in the near future, and more producers might be willing to enter the market.

Contract choice

Processors active in both supply chains operate at different scales of production and rely on a wide variety of sourcing mechanisms. Different degrees of vertical integration with primary producers are effective, depending on the level of trust between supply chain partners. Contract choice is strongly dependent on bargaining power relations and expected mutual advantages in sourcing strategies by offering different types of contractual arrangements.

In the monopsony market segment for pepper, the largest and most enterprise-oriented processing firm fully specialized in the production of white pepper originally declined any backward integration with the primary production. The company only sells white pepper to one large industrial plant in San José, for which quality of fresh pepper turned out to be a key issue. In this segment, both written contracts and verbal agreements are used to guarantee timely delivery and full capacity utilization. On the contrary, in the competitive market segment, three companies are competing only using verbal agreements with producers. Two of them are specialized in the processing of black pepper that requires less stringent quality standards. The latter companies show, however, a lower scale of operations compared to their competitor that operates at the higher quality segment and maintains strong backward integration with primary production.

Enforcement of contracts was little effective for processors, especially in the competitive market segment. In fact, the proportion of defaults on contracts turned out to be high: forty per cent of the interviewed farmers operating under a delivery agreement proved to be disloyal. This is in line with other findings from the literature (see Glover and Kusterer 1990, Grosh 1994, Key and Runsten 1999), since farmers are tempted to default on their contracts in markets with a sudden increase in competition and prices. It also confirms certain weaknesses for processors to
enforce contracts and points to the importance of maintaining a high degree of confidence with farmers, thus reinforcing mutual dependence between producers and agro-processors to guarantee deliveries on future occasions.

The essential difference between the contracts provided by the companies refers to product and processing specifications, the type of guarantees used for enforcing delivery, the procedures for price determination, and whether immediate or delayed payments are used. Written contracts provided by the pepper firms are defined as resource-providing arrangements that include input deliveries (seedlings) and technical assistance. These contracts closely resemble quasi-vertical integration based on long-term co-investment activities (Hobbs 1996) and offer farmers a cheap and low risk way to acquire inputs and technical assistance. However, the associated risk for farmers with written contracts is being locked-in by the processing firm into a long term arrangement, with the consequent loss of bargaining power. Moreover, farmers have to sign a promissory note for the value of supplied seedlings that has to be paid when they default on the contract. Verbal agreements offered by the companies operating in the competitive market segment can also be defined as resource-providing contracts that include input provision and free technical assistance. For the company, resource provision is part of a strategy of backward integration to guarantee raw material deliveries to the processing plant. On the other hand, verbal agreements provided by both companies are strictly market-specification contracts that are limited to provisions regarding price, delivery time and quantity. The latter types of arrangements refrain from any involvement in the production process and are limited to simple product delivery specifications. In practice, we found producers selling their pepper to any of the buyers without previous delivery agreement. Farmers’ decision to choose for a specific agreement mainly depends on their individual needs and preferences.

Most of the chayote processors are family-owned companies that reside in the area. Some processors also operate their own plots producing fresh chayote, but this production is not enough for fully occupying the installed capacity and therefore they purchase additional amounts of chayote from nearby producers. Processors perform several tasks to match international brokers’ parameters, taking care of the transport from the plot to the processing plant, product selection, washing of the fruit, waxing and bagging individual chayote, packing in boxes, and transporting the boxes to the harbour in refrigerated and sealed containers.

Almost all chayote processors only offered verbal agreements to farmers, which can be defined as strictly market-specification contracts. In general, farmers with these verbal agreements obtain access to information, input supply, credit and even technical assistance, with positive effects on product quality and loyalty. Given the shorter production cycle and the relative homogeneity of the produce, such contracts suffice for linking producers into the supply chain.

**Roles of contracts for smallholder development**

Contractual systems with a traders or processors have been used for the marketing of pepper and chayote for a number of consecutive years, given the investment requirements for crop establishment and the features of an emerging market. The analysis on farmers’ contract choice in both supply chains permits to identify three
major functions of contracts, namely (1) insurance device, (2) provision of incentives, and (3) provision of information (see Table 2). These functions have a decisive effect on the farmers’ decisions regarding resource allocation and supply chain integration. We discuss the implications of contracts for guaranteeing smallholder access (equity), production efficiency, and long-term sustainability of supply chain cooperation.

**Drivers: insurance, incentives and information**

Contracts provide an insurance device to enable farmers to engage in new production activities and to gain access to specialized markets. In the pepper case, insurance mechanisms like the commitment to purchase the crop by the processor throughout the productive cycle, the guarantee that farmers receive a fixed price for their produce, and the protection against inflation by adjusting purchasing prices enable resource-constrained farmers to participate in the production of non-traditional crops, despite market and price uncertainties. In the chayote case, farmers enjoy the certainty of a higher purchase price when delivering the produce to the export market. Moreover, a back payment system is in force that gives farmers with more frequent deliveries access to a continuous flow of income. These mechanisms reduce search costs, since chayote producers can obtain a better price without investing much time in identifying markets outlets.

Contracts also provide incentives for investment and thus increase the asset-specificity on the farmer’s side. In the pepper case, resource-providing contracts offer an incentive that encourages farmers to use more fertilizers and pesticides. This advantage can become even larger when transport costs to the firm are covered by the processor. In addition, resource-providing contracts are effective to encourage farmers towards investments in soil maintenance and conservation activities. These measures are usually costly and time-consuming, and farmers will

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<th>Table 2. Functions of contracts</th>
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Note: (P) refers to pepper case and (Ch) refers to chayote case.
only devote labour time to these activities if compensated by a better output price and more transactions. This supports the literature regarding the importance of resource-providing contracts and vertical integration for enhancing sustainable agricultural intensification (Kuyvenhoven and Ruben 2002, Key and Runsten 1999). In the chayote case, there are no resource-providing contracts but simple market-specification contracts in the form of verbal agreements. However, this contractual form functions as collateral for accessing inputs from input stores. Since frequently delivering farmers obtain their back payments every week, they can easily access credit for input supply when store owners are aware of these contract terms. Hence, the incentives provided by the contract guarantees flexible and timely access to credit, instead of the expensive and time-lagging formal credit procedures.7

Finally, contracts function as a mechanism to provide farmers with information about the structure of the market they operate in. This is very important to prevent false expectations and adverse selection problems. In the pepper case, contracts include private technical assistance for informing farmers not only about the structure and opportunities of the market, but also about production techniques and quality requirements of the produce. In the chayote case, technical assistance services are provided by the *Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería* (MAG). This public extension agency focuses in particular on inexperienced farmers in peasant settlements that started to produce chayote under a verbal agreement with a processor, thus providing an indirect mechanism to inform these farmers about the production and market requirements. As private extension tends to be more costly compared to public provision, they can easily pay off in terms of higher yields and/or less rejection.

Outcomes: equity, efficiency and sustainability

The implications of contractual exchange for income distribution, efficiency in resource allocation and long-term supply chain relationships are outlined in Table 3. Contracts can be a mechanism for enhancing equity by incorporating certain types of producers into specialized (inter)national markets. Comparing farm households’ characteristics in relation to different types of contracts in the pepper case, we concluded that contracts are mainly suitable for certain categories of farm households, but certainly not for all. We found different types of farmers choosing between the three available contractual forms, namely written contracts, verbal contracts, or no agreement at all. In a monopsony market, poorer but better educated farmers with small acreages and limited farming experience strongly prefer written or verbal contracts. They operate small areas of non-productive (recently established) pepper and meet initial investment constraints, making them reliant on non-agricultural income. On the other hand, larger and more experienced farmers that maintain high-yielding pepper plantations are far less dependent on single agricultural activities and are therefore more likely to rely on spot market exchange as part of their risk diversification strategy. Pepper prices are slightly higher in the competitive market, where better endowed farmers without a contract were able to negotiate a more attractive price.
Table 3. Implications of contracts

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<th>Effects</th>
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<td>Equity (access)</td>
<td>Selection of farmers with high labour availability</td>
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<td>Selection of farmers with budget constraints</td>
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<td>Selection of farmers with more fertile plots</td>
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<td>Co-investment/credit targeted to smallholders</td>
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<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Technical recommendations and technical supervision.</td>
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<td>Higher and better input use</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Quality up-grading</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Frequent deliveries</td>
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<td>Sustained quality of produce leads to frequency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>Frequency of successful transactions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Loyalty-enforcement</td>
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<td>Building up reputation</td>
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<td>Preference of frequent and loyal suppliers</td>
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The income level and composition have a clear effect on farmer’s contract choice and their bargaining power. Income diversification under farmers’ control (for example, access to alternative household income sources, such as other cash crops and livestock activities) enables farmers to increase their asset-specificity in pepper crops, even without the insurance provided by contracts. Since these types of farmers are able to refrain from long-term contractual ties, they tend to be less reliable partners for contractual arrangements with processors.

In the chayote case, we found farmers exclusively delivering produce to either the export market or the domestic market, whereas an intermediate group engaged in both market segments. Several farm household characteristics are positively related to the export market, such as scale of production and farmers’ experience. However, we also find newcomer farmers in peasant settlements oriented towards the export market. These producers rely more on family labour and have more high-quality land, which allows them to develop small-scale, intensive cultivation. Hence, not only traditional farmers are able to participate in the export market, but also newcomers making use of their comparative advantages. Moreover, farmers that were able to establish agreements with processors are more likely to become involved in export delivery. This is plausible since contracts are initially a useful device for providing security against market uncertainties. Producers deliver a larger share to the export market when more intensive production systems are established and thus a higher quality of produce can be reached. In other words, richer producers use their orientation to export markets as a twofold mechanism: for gaining bargaining power vis-à-vis the processor, and as an additional source of income.

The analysis of contract choice in chayote revealed that scale of production is positively related to engagement in verbal agreements with a processor, whereas experience is negatively related. This is similar to the outcome in the pepper case, where young and less-experienced farmers are more likely to become involved in contractual arrangements, since contracts provide a certain level of security against market and price uncertainties. Moreover, farmers with previous delivery arrangements receive a higher average price compared to farmers selling only in the do-
mestic market. Hence, the delivery agreement is convenient as a risk-reducing device for less-experienced farmers.

In terms of the efficiency, a contractual relationship between farmers and processors has a positive effect for resource allocation and product quality. Non-price factors involved in the contracts, such as input supply, technical assistance and information, induce better input use, improvement of production systems and quality upgrading, which favours more frequent and successful transactions. These facilities also tend to reduce risk exposure and enable farmers to adopt improved production technologies. However, these advantages may be challenged when opportunistic behaviour arises or market conditions change, rendering contract enforcement less effective.

The analysis of market channel choice indicates that small-scale farmers particularly need contracts during the early phase of the establishment of perennial crops, as a guarantee for their investment efforts. In subsequent phases and when more competitive market conditions arise, producers prefer verbal commitments to written contracts. Consequently, contracts fulfil rather different roles during the farm household life cycle and are shaped differently under various market conditions. In the absence of penalties, pepper farmers with delivery commitments may become disloyal to their buyer in markets with more competition. Many farmers sell the major share of their harvest to the fixed buyer but also deliver small volumes to competitors.

Regarding sustainability, contracts play an important role to intensify farmers’ production systems by enhancing better land use and involving more labour in crop management and post-harvest handing. Pepper farmers with formal contracts applied 40 to 70 per cent more soil conservation practices compared to other producers without any delivery contract. This has positive implications for crop yields, generates local employment and possibly also leads to better product quality, which enhances mutual confidence and reduces the risk of product denial. These effects are mainly accomplished by focussing on specific types of farmers (notably less-experienced farmers with large family labour availability, and farmers that rely on the crop as their main income source).

Frequent and successful transactions require the accomplishment of quality criteria defined by processors and depend on the continuous flow of information between the contracting parties. We noticed that opportunistic behaviour (selling produce to other buyers when a better price is offered) can be effectively controlled by the engagement in resource-providing delivery contracts, since farmers prefer stable relations with their buyers in order to safeguard their investments. This outcome is in line with the literature indicating that successful and continuous transactions are based upon reputation between the contracting parties (Hobbs 1996). Non-price stipulations in contracts, such as technical assistance, collection frequency, and regular payments thus reinforce long-term supply chain cooperation.

Policy implications

In this article we analysed the structure and performance of contracting schemes for non-traditional crops in the Costa Rica to identify the effects of different types of contracts and market configurations on farmers’ resource use and investment
decisions. Special attention is given to the incentive implications of contracts for the adjustment of production systems and livelihood strategies. Some main conclusions can be summarized as follows.

First, the analysis of market channel choice indicates that farmers need contracts particularly during the early phase of the establishment process of perennial crops, as a guarantee for their investment efforts. In subsequent phases and under more competitive market conditions, producers prefer verbal commitments to written contracts. Furthermore, in the absence of sanctions, around 40 per cent of pepper farmers with a delivery commitment became disloyal to their buyer in markets with increasing competition. Most farmers deliver the major share of the harvest to their fixed buyer but sell to competitors as well. Consequently, contracts fulfil rather different roles during the farm household life cycle and are re-shaped differently under modified market conditions.

Second, the study confirms that high risk-exposure of farmers leads to a preference for written contracts instead of verbal commitments. This is particularly the case for newcomers in the chayote sector and younger farmers entering pepper production. More experienced farmers are able to rely on a more risky strategy when they possess other income-generating alternatives that make them less dependent on non-traditional crops.

Third, the comparison of different market situations indicates that a local monopsony might generate incentives for realizing fixed investments in non-traditional crop plantations. The transition towards more capital-intensive production systems is favoured when contractual regimes offer (temporarily) lower input costs. This illustrates that close complementarities exist between technology choice and market organization.

Fourth, the analysis demonstrates that contracts provide an important incentive for more intensive input use, but that they also tend to induce a shift towards hiring wage labour to replace family labour. Thus, family labour can be allocated to other profitable non-agricultural activities (such as services, construction, and tourism), which can further stabilize household income. This partly confirms the hypothesis that contracts can enhance the required certainty for small-scale producers and hence increase their willingness to invest. The fact that mainly less-endowed farmers engage in contract farming confirms this conclusion. In addition, contracts improve access to market information, thus reducing a key market failure. Consequently, agrarian contracts might complement policy incentives aiming at more efficient and sustainable land use systems.

**Public and Private Roles**

While contracts are essentially private arrangements, there still remains important room for public action to safeguard supply chain cooperation and contract enforcement. Most important in this respect is public support for the development of grades and standards for supply chain upgrading. The implementation of public grades and standards (G&S) is of key importance for supply chain compliance. Most current quality standards only specify basic physical parameters (colour, shape, size, external damages). Even when most producers are aware of the usage restrictions for chemicals on produce oriented towards the export market, rejection
of full containers still frequently occurs. Since producers can easily sell sub-standard produce on the domestic market, chemical residues represent a serious public health risk. Quality defaults are mostly punished via price discounts rather than by exclusion from the market. Even while refusal rates vary according to demand on major target markets, product denial and refusal due to contractual breach tend to reinforce the distrust between producers and processors.

Clear rules defined by a recognized authority and a well-defined system of classification could improve chain coordination and reduce distrust between contracting parties. In both case studies, quality of produce was determined only by simple visual inspection. These ‘rules’ are informally transmitted to producers by technicians and other experienced producers, and disputes on rejection rates are frequent. Due to the absence of formal G&S, contractual arrangements still have no significant impact on quality performance.

In the supply chains of pepper and chayote, small and medium-scale processors are dealing with smallholder producers. None of these actors possess the capital and human capacity to create and implement private G&S without the support of governmental agencies or third party certification agents (Reardon et al. 2001). The government should thus play an important role in defining minimum G&S, providing information regarding new market opportunities, and promoting consensus on generally accepted quality regimes, and guaranteeing the enforcement of effective control procedures for quality assessment.

The latter issues are particular important in the chayote case, where only a few exporters have limited control over quality supervision in the main target market in Miami. In the pepper chain, private G&S are already applied to the processing company and its main buyer, but not to the domestic retail sector with strong competition among brands. The combination of contractual terms with properly defined (public or private) G&S may become an important inclusive strategy aiming to promote sustainable production. This calls for private-public alliances around agreements regarding generally recognized product and process standards and related to reward and enforcement mechanisms.

Finally, upgrading is another important strategy for enhancing value-added generation by small and medium-scale enterprises operating in global markets. Further processing is a desirable strategy for firms in developing countries, but little is known on the contractual conditions that favour this upgrading process. Product innovation (better cultivars with more product resistance or better flavour) requires in-depth investments in research and development. Long-term agency cooperation within chains is key to establishing successful governance regimes towards upgrading (Giulani et al. 2005, Doryan-Garron 1990). Market competition easily leads to opportunistically behaviour that may delay investments in product innovation. Quality upgrading can only be expected through coordinated action, dovetailing the interests of a capital-investing processor and an organized group of producers. Upgrading in supply chains of perishable commodities thus strongly depends on collective action (Giulani et al. 2005). This points to another important role for the government (and voluntary agencies alike), which is to foster horizontal and vertical agency coordination as part of an integrated strategy towards supply chain upgrading and integrated rural development.
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### Notes

1. The entrance of Costa Rica in the world coffee market in the early 1820s took place in the absence of coercive state institutions and enabled smallholder producers to widely engage into commercial production, thus triggering a process labelled as ‘rural democratization’ based on a strong rural middle class (see Seligson 1980). In other neighbouring Central-American countries, a more dualistic agrarian structure prevailed with far less opportunities for land lease and sharecropping arrangements. Plantation-like regimes using permanent and temporary wage labour in the other Central American countries relied more strongly on political and economic coercion mechanisms and paved the way for their authoritarian regimes.

2. This traditional peasant sector produces mostly maize and other basic grains mainly for local exchange and consumption, livestock, and some cash crops (coffee and sugar cane). They rely on low-input production technologies, maintain simple post-harvest management practices, and family
labour may be partly involved in off-farm activities.

3. A monopsony market refers to a situation where there is only one buyer who meets the supply of various producers and will therefore be able to set the purchasing conditions.

4. Chayote (or vegetable pear) is an indigenous vegetable crop that is grown in mid-altitude areas with a high degree of humidity. Production is highly labour-intensive, but also requires some investments in wooden posts and steel wires. Chayote is part of the local popular diet, but increasingly also exported to the USA to satisfy demands from immigrant communities.

5. See Sáenz-Segura (2006) for additional details on the statistical and econometric analysis for both case studies.

6. This function is intimately related to the insurance role of contracts, since farmers would only invest on their plantations, and thereby increase their asset-specificity, if they have the certainty regarding market outlet and price.

7. Leakage (deviation of input use to other crops) was not a major issue in this study, since most inputs only have a specific use. Re-sales to other farmers could occur, however, at the expense of lower quality compliance.

8. In the pepper case the maturity of bunches is assessed by sight (one or two red grains per bunch), whereas in the chayote case quality mostly refers to product uniformity (basically size, shape and colour).

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The Rise and Fall of Mexico’s Green Movement

Jordi Díez

During the 1970s and 1980s, Latin America experienced several waves of social mobilization and popular protests as most countries in the region transitioned away from military dictatorships. As authoritarian regimes weakened and gave way to civilian rule, social movements became active social and political actors in the region’s democratization processes. It has in effect been argued that social movements in Latin America played ‘the crucial role of pushing the transition further than it would have otherwise have gone’ (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 56). Not surprisingly, social movements have attracted great scholarly attention, as exemplified by the voluminous literature devoted their study (Eckstein 1989, Mainwaring 1986, Mainwaring and Viola 1984, Slater 1985, Garretón-Merino 1996, Urrutia et al 1985, Calderón and Jelin 1987, Hellman 1994, Latin American Perspectives 1994). Social mobilization in Latin America has also included citizens demanding better environmental protection. As the environmental consequences of Green Revolutions and post-war industrialization became apparent by the early 1980s, an increasing number of Latin Americans organized and mobilized to demand that governments pay more attention to the protection of the region’s natural environment (Carruthers 2001, Hochsteler and Keck 2007, Hochsteler and Mumme 1998, Auer 2001, Díez 2006, 2008, Robert and Thanos 2003, Wright 2008). By the time electoral democracy had been restored in the early 1990s, most countries in the region counted with some form of environmental movement. While their size and strength varied across the region, environmental activism in Latin America has resulted in the unprecedented establishment of national environmental agencies and the writing of general environmental laws (Hochsteler 2007).

Environmental mobilization has also taken place in Mexico. During the 1980s, the environmental repercussions of Mexico’s post-war development became apparent and, taking advantage of the new opportunities the country’s political opening offered, citizens began to organize and mobilize to demand better environmental protection. Mexico thus witnessed the emergence of an environmental movement which grew in size and strength and that, by the mid 1990s, had gained national visibility. More importantly, during a series of environmental reforms implemented during the 1990s, Mexican environmentalists were successful in influencing national environmental policy and achieved a series of significant policy triumphs (Díez 2006). In a relatively short period of time, then, Mexico’s green movement emerged and became an important political actor.

However, since the defeat of Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in the general elections of 2000, which brought about the end to seventy-one years of interrupted rule, Mexico’s environmentalists have been intriguingly much less visible in national politics and have been less influential in environmental policymaking. What appears to have occurred is a general weakening of the movement in a rela-
tively short period of time. What accounts for this phenomenon? Scholarly work on social mobilization has advanced several possible explanations. One holds that a country’s transition into electoral democracy generally leads to the demobilization of its civil society. Because members of social movements do not have a single identifiable threat after authoritarian rule, it is argued, they are no longer united with large segments of society (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 55-56). Others suggest that demobilization should be expected as the advent of democratic politics brings other channels of representation such as unions and political parties (Oxhorn 1999) and that democratic politics tends to fragment interests, thereby dividing individuals within movements (Törnquist 1999). However, most of this work has primarily concentrated on cases in which transitions away from authoritarian rule occurred in a swifter manner and in which there was a clear break into electoral democracy. Mexico’s transition into democratic rule, on the other hand, has been rather protracted and social movements have experienced cycles of mobilization and demobilization during this process (Williams 2001). Indeed, as the 2006 presidential elections demonstrated, Mexico’s transition into democratic politics continues to unfold and the country is still experiencing strong mass mobilizations.

Another explanation regards the institutionalization of movements. Research on social mobilization in Latin America suggests that the institutionalization of social movements leads to their demobilization. One of the most common ways in which social movements become institutionalized is through the formation of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Accordingly, it is argued that NGOs have a depoliticizing and ‘deradicalizing’ effect on movement politics (Petras 1997, Ferguson 1994, Lang 1997, Pisano 1996). This perspective holds that, as members of social movements decide to institutionalize and professionalized their activities through the formation of NGOs, they tend to become less confrontational and attempt to influence politics and policy through state and non-state institutions, rather than through protests. The institutionalization of social movements, which has been referred to as their ‘NGOization’ (Álvarez 1999), has indeed occurred in Latin America; during the 1990s, the region witnessed the proliferation of numerous NGOs working on various issues as new funds from national and international donors, both public and private, became more available and as governments increasingly relied on NGOs to deliver social services which were previously under state control (Álvarez et al. 1998, 1).

This NGOization process has certainly affected environmental mobilization in Latin America as, similar to other social movements, environmentalism underwent a process of NGOization in the 1990s. While the return to democracy allowed societal groups to advance demands through the electoral arena, it has not been particularly beneficial in advancing environmental concerns given that the region’s green parties and candidacies have generally been weak. Environmentalists have therefore found organizing through autonomous organizations, such as NGOs, as the most reliable way through which to bring issues to the political agenda. As a result, many countries of the region witnessed an unprecedented proliferation of Environmental NGOs (ENGOs) (Hochsteler 2007).

In the case of Mexico, the professionalization of the movement did not completely depoliticize it during the 1990s as it was able to mount several well-organized environmental campaigns, some of which resulted in significant gov-
Government policy reversals. While the movement did become more ‘NGOized,’ it was able to maintain what Sonia Álvarez refers to as a ‘double identity’ (1999). That is, professional environmentalists, mostly well-educated, middle-class individuals, became the directors of ENGOs, but they managed to maintain linkages with the larger environmental movement. It is precisely because of these linkages that the movement kept a certain degree of politization and was able to organize several successful campaigns during the 1990s. The institutionalization of the movement did not therefore result in the weakening it underwent at the beginning of the century. Rather, as this article argues, such weakening is more directly related to the manner in which its leadership interacted with the state following the defeat of the PRI in 2000, than to its NGOization in the previous decade. The NGOization of the movement during the 1990s did not completely depoliticize it, but it facilitated the integration of its leadership into the new government. It is this phenomenon, this article attempts to show, that contributed to the movement’s weakening. The change of regime prompted by the election of Vicente Fox Quesada (2000-06) as president of Mexico allowed for the incorporation of a variety of sectoral leaders into the new government as he attempted to mark a departure from the country’s authoritarian past, and this included the environmental movement’s leadership. Because the movement was highly professionalized at the moment of transition and many of its leaders decided not only to forge a close relationship with the new regime, but in many cases became part of it, it created a ‘leadership vacuum,’ a process that weakened the movement.

Structural causes tend to prevail in work on the emergence and evolution of social mobilization (McAdam et al 1996, Della Porta and Diani 2006). Whether it is the political opportunities provided by regimes or the ability of activists to forge alliances with international organizations and actors, most studies on social movements tend to look at the structural causes that explain the rise and decline of social mobilization. This article attempts to make a contribution to growing literature that breaks away from structural factors and which looks at leadership dynamics in explaining social mobilization (Ganz 2000, 2008, Nepstad and Bob 2006). It also attempts to make a contribution to recent political science scholarship on Latin America that specifically looks at the interaction between the leadership of social movements and the state in general, and the effects such relationships have on the movements in particular (Foweraker 2001, Franceschet and Macdonald 2003, Franceschet 2004). Consequently, the analysis presented here specifically focuses on the impact the relationship the movement’s leadership forged with the Fox administration had on the strength of the movement. While it argues that the weakening of the movement is a result of this relationship, it does not argue that it is the sole cause.

This article is structured as follows. The first section traces the emergence of Mexico’s contemporary environmental movement since the 1980s. A subsequent section details the institutionalization of the movement and the impact it had on the formation of the country’s environmental policy regime. The last section presents an analysis of the reasons behind the weakening of Mexico’s environmental movement since 2000.
The rise of Mexican environmentalism

The economic reform and crises that Mexico underwent during the 1980s were accompanied by social mobilization. Unlike previous economic crises, the deterioration of socio-economic conditions of the 1980s affected severely various sectors of society, from the urban and rural poor to the middle classes. This unleashed general social discontent that contributed to the emergence of significant social mobilization as new social groups began to bypass the corporatist structures that characterized the country’s political system in an attempt to place demands directly upon the state. The process accelerated when a powerful earthquake (7.6 in the Richter scale) hit Mexico City on 13 September 1985 and claimed the lives of approximately 20,000 residents. The Mexican government proved highly inadequate in providing relief and assistance to the hundreds of thousands of victims and homeless people. Due to delayed government action and sheer incompetence, residents of Mexico City began to organize swiftly and in large numbers to provide food, water, shelter and medical supplies to the victims. Such social mobilization witnessed the formation of a significant number of social organizations, a phenomenon that is regarded as a catalyst in the crystallization of large-scale social movements in contemporary Mexico (Foweraker 1990). Vikram Chand has referred to this ‘strengthening’ of Mexican civil society as the country’s contemporary ‘political awakening’ (2001).

It is against this backdrop of increased social mobilization during the 1980s that several catalytic events impelled the emergence of Mexico’s environmental movement. On November 1984, an extremely potent explosion at a gas plant run by the state-owned corporation Mexican Petroleum (PEMEX) in San Juan Ixhuatepec, outside Mexico City, killed over 500 people. The explosion not only caused outrage, but it heightened environmental sensibilities as the environmental damage it caused became evident through widespread television coverage. The 1985 earthquake also contributed to environmental mobilization; along with various kinds of NGOs that surged following the disaster, ENGOs were created as ‘green brigades’ to support people who, as a result of the earthquake, were living in squatter communities around the ruined homes and in the suburbs of Mexico City (González Martínez 1992). Two months after the earthquake, and in an attempt to coordinate efforts and share information, fourteen civil associations called for the first National Meeting of Ecologists in Mexico City. The meeting was attended by representatives of more than 300 regional groups, civil associations and scout groups, which discussed a wide variety of themes. At this meeting participants created Mexico’s first network of ENGOs, the Pact of Ecologist Groups (PGE). The PGE brought together 50 organizations and established ten working commissions that dealt with issues that ranged from pollution in the Valley of Mexico to deforestation. The PGE subsequently played a pivotal role in organizing and amalgamating opposition to the government’s nuclear-energy programme shortly after the network was formed, thereby contributing further to the strengthening of the environmental movement in Mexico. The PGE’s opposition began to the brew in September of 1986, eight months after the nuclear disaster of Chernobyl, when President de la Madrid announced that the project to build a nuclear-power plant in Laguna Verde, in the Gulf state of Veracruz, was to go ahead. Although he eventually de-
cided to build the plant in 1988, the anti-nuclear campaign was successful in bringing together a large number of environmental groups, in raising awareness further and, ultimately, in opposing and defying the government through actions such as highway blockades. In effect, the Laguna-Verde mobilization is considered to be one of the watershed events of Mexico’s environmental movement (Berlin 1988, Payá Porres 1994, García-Gorena 1999).

Two events at the beginning of the 1990s added further impetus to the movement: the preparatory discussions for the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (the Rio Summit); and the joint declaration by Presidents Carlos Salinas and George Bush Sr. (1988-1992), on June 1990, that their respective administrations planned to undertake discussions to draft a free-trade agreement. Environmental activism before the Rio Summit was mostly spurred by the fact that Mexican NGOs did not believe they had sufficient discussion space during the official preparatory meetings (Umlas 1996, 97-9). Twelve NGOs and networks called thus a meeting – entitled First National Forum of Civil and Social Associations of Environment and Development – seeking to open discussions on alternative development models and to promote interest in participating at a parallel summit, the Global Forum. The meeting resulted in the formation of the Mexican Civil Society Forum for Rio 92 (FOROMEX), which, at one point, incorporated 103 organizations.

The prospects of signing a free-trade agreement with the United States, and eventually with Canada, also strengthened the environmental movement and increased ENGO activity. Public opinion galvanized in Mexico around the benefits of free trade. Media coverage of the national debate increased considerably, with some sectors of society strongly supporting the agreement. Opposition to the agreement came mostly from Mexican environmentalists, who were opposed mainly because it ignored sustainable development and environmental protection. There was a concern that free trade would further degrade Mexico’s national resources and increase pollution levels (Peña 1993, 124). Environmentalists saw thus the need to organize and collaborate in order to oppose the agreement, and various networks, working groups and associations were created, such as the Mexican Action Network on Free Trade (RMALC). These networks encouraged the creation and registration of NGOs (Hogenboom 1998, Ávila 1997). Importantly, given that the Bush-Salinas declaration was unprecedented, there was little information on the effects that free trade would have on the environment. Consequently, national and international collaboration among environmentalists increased due to the necessity to share information. Mexico’s environmental movement benefited significantly from the increased interaction between Mexican environmentalists and their international counterparts. During the NAFTA negotiations, there was an unprecedented increase in funding for Mexican ENGOs from international organizations. Organizations, such as the National Audubon Society, the Natural Defence Council, the National Wildlife Federation, the Word Wildlife Fund, and the Action Canada Network, made funds available to Mexican ENGOs (Hogenboom 1998). Moreover, several U.S. conservation organizations, such as the World Wildlife Fund and Conservation International, received substantial financial aid from the US government to promote the park approach to biodiversity conservation in Mexico, and they collaborated with their Mexican counterparts to channel donations
from the Global Environment Facility to manage Natural Protected Areas (ANPs) (Fox 2003, 363). Access to financial resources from international organizations greatly fueled the formation of Mexican ENGOs as well as to the establishment of offices in Mexico of some of these international organizations (Hogenboom 1998; Gallardo 1997, 1999; Torres 1997; Gilbreath 2003). These factors contributed to the emergence and strengthening of Mexico’s green movement and, by the 1990s, it gained national visibility.

The institutionalization and growing influence of the movement

The increased and sustained interaction members of the movement established during the 1990s with their international counterparts resulted in the institutionalization, or NGOization, of Mexican environmentalism. The integration of Mexico into the North American economic market was central to this phenomenon. The debate over the effects of NAFTA created an opportunity to encourage the interaction between national and international ENGOs. But that interaction was sustained once the agreement came into force and contributed to the proliferation and strengthening of Mexican ENGOs. Indeed, during the 1990s Mexico experienced an unprecedented increase in the number of ENGOs; whereas in 1985 there were no more than 30 registered ENGOs, their number had increased to approximately 500 by 1997. By the late 1990s, moreover, approximately 5 per cent of Mexicans belonged to an ENGO. Most of the ENGOs in Mexico received most, and in certain cases all, of their funding from international NGOs, especially from the US, and they benefited from the transfer of knowledge and expertise. Such transfer has greatly contributed to the professionalization of ENGO members and to the institutionalization of the activities, which helped them significantly in their activities and interaction with the government.

The growing institutionalization of Mexican environmentalism did not render Mexican ENGOs completely depoliticized, however. The most active and visible ENGOs became staffed with prominent Mexican environmentalists, most of whom are middle-class, highly qualified individuals, usually with advanced degrees in the natural sciences. These individuals gradually became the representatives of the newly formed ENGOs and the primary interlocutors through which most environmentalists interacted with the government. But, even as they became leaders of these highly professionalized organizations, most of them retained links with broader movements and they relied upon these links to forge alliances with the broader environmental movement. In effect, it is because of their continued contact and interaction with other environmentalists in the country – some of whom worked at the grassroots level – that they contributed to the organization of several successful environmental mobilizations campaigns to stop a number of projects that would have had important environmental repercussions in the 1990s.

Three particular environmental mobilization campaigns stand out. In 1995 a coalition of local activists and the most prominent national ENGOs mobilized to halt the construction of a 478 million-dollar project to build a development complex consisting of a golf course, a hotel and 880 houses in the city of Tepoztlán, south of Mexico City (Stolle-McAllister 2005, 143-4; Diéz 2006, 83-4). The project was also supported by strong business interests and the State Governor, Jorge
Carrillo Olea. The decision to shut down construction followed a period of intense popular mobilization against the project that was sparked on August 22, 1995, when the mayor of the city, Alejandro Morales Barragán, announced that he had agreed to allow the construction to go ahead. Local residents, organized under the organization Committee for the Unity of Tepoztlán (CUT), took control of the City Hall on 25 August 1995, took hostage city officials, and declared the city to be in a state of siege (La Jornada, 25 August 1995). CUT also erected barricades, blocked highways and elected a provisional government and eventually forced the mayor to resign from his post on 5 September 1995. The project was cancelled shortly thereafter (Rosas 1997). In the same year, another coalition formed by ENGOs, local residents and municipal councillors successfully stopped the establishment of a toxic-waste treatment in the northern city of Guadalcazar by the California-based Metclad Corporation. The project was personally supported by the president and federal environmental authorities, but strong environmental mobilization was successful in convincing the municipal government to deny the issuance of the permit to allow construction (Ugalde Saldaña 2001, Borja Tamayo 2001). Another, and perhaps most notable, successful campaign relates to the cancellation of a project to build the world’s largest salt mine in the state of Baja California Sur. On 2 March 2000, President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) made the unexpected announcement that his government had decided to cancel the project to expand the operations of a company in the San Juan Lagoon, a lagoon that serves as a sanctuary for whales that migrate from Alaska and British Columbia in the winter. The cancellation of the project represented the culmination of a very successful five-year long campaign waged by a coalition of Mexican and international ENGOs and was a definite triumph for Mexico’s environmental movement. A characteristic of these campaigns is that they were led by coalitions of NGOs, whose efforts were coordinated by umbrella organizations, and that included a variety of national and regional ENGOs. Importantly, the most important and visible national ENGOs in Mexico, such as the Mexican Environmental Law Centre (CEMDA), the Union of Environmentalist Groups (UGAM) and the Pact of Ecologist Groups (PGE), were directly involved in the campaigns and highly active. The campaigns brought the leaders and members of these organizations in close contact, as they organized and launched them, and contributed to the maintenance of relationships. As a result, even though during the 1990s the movement had become highly institutionalized, in the form of NGOs, it continued to maintain a degree of politicization, as these campaigns demonstrate.

The strengthening of Mexico’s environmentalism was also evidenced by the success ENGOs had in influencing environmental policymaking during a series of reforms that were implemented in the 1990s. In 1996 and 1997, the Environment Minister launched a reform of the Environmental Protection Law and the Forestry Law. These reforms were significant as they introduced numerous legal mechanisms intended to reduce environmental degradation. The reform of the Environmental Protection Law, for example, increased the number of activities for which Environmental Impact Assessments are required, decentralized environmental responsibilities to sub-national levels of governments, increased environmental penalties and enhanced the notion of ‘environmental responsibility’ whereby every party that contaminates is legally liable and must repair the damage. The reform of
the Forestry Law was also important. During the early 1990s, and within the over-
all context of economic liberalization, the forestry sector had been liberalized
through a dismantling of the regulatory system established in the 1980s. The 1997
reform of the law introduced a new regulatory framework intended to reduce de-
forestation levels. Central to this effort was the introduction of the requirement to
prove that timber transported or stored be accompanied with documentation estab-
lishing that it comes from areas in which logging has been allowed, making it a
crime not to comply. Moreover, in early 2000, the ministry also enacted Mexico’s
first Law on Wildlife. The new legislation established a Council of Wildlife (Na-
tional Technical Council on Wildlife) with the responsibility to develop and man-
age the National List of Endangered Species and oversee the various policies im-
plemented for their protection. Moreover, it instituted the National Commission for
Protected Areas with the mandate to administered the country’s National Protected
Areas (ANPs), whose number increased dramatically during her administration: by
2000, the Zedillo administration had established 30 new ANPs, brining the total
number of hectares from over 10 million to close to 16 million (an increase of ap-
proximately 60 per cent) (INE 2000).
ENGOs not only applied strong pressure on the Environment Minister to under-
take these reforms, but they were very active participants in the reform processes,
having in fact had significant input. Indeed, one of the most distinctive characteris-
tics of environmental reform during the Zedillo administration was the significant
and rather unprecedented influence ENGOs had on environmental policymaking
and the participatory nature of the process. The 1996 reform of the Environmental
Protection Law, for example, was a very open process that lasted 19 months to
complete and in which representatives of more than 108 ENGOs participated. Most
of these ENGOs declared, at the end of the reform process, that they were highly
satisfied with the final bill, which was unanimously passed through Congress (Díez
2006). Such participatory process was to a great extent due to the opening created
by a reformist Environment Minister who believed strongly in the inclusion of civil
society groups in the formulation of environmental policy. But it was also the re-
sult of international factors; environmental reform in Latin American is considered
part of what has been termed ‘second-generation reforms’ (Pastor and Wise 1999,
Naim 1994). These reforms followed the structural adjustment programmes of the
1980s and were more inclusive that previous economic reform programmes intro-
duced in the region. International organizations, such as the World Bank and the
Inter-American Development Bank, began to call for the inclusion of civil-society
actors in the formulation, implementation and delivery of government policies and
services by the mid 1990s. ENGO influence was also largely due to the level of
organization and expertise many of these organizations possessed. The transfer of
resources, both technical and financial, and expertise from international actors al-
lowed them to present well-crafted proposals during the reform process. This was
especially the case with those ENGOs which pursue issues relating to conservation
and bio-diversity. By the late 1990s, then, the environmental movement had not
only become highly visible in Mexico, but it could claim several important victories.
The weakening of Mexico’s environmental movement

Mexico’s green movement has been notably less visible in the country’s national social and political stage since the defeat of the PRI in 2000. Whereas in the 1990s they held several national campaigns and held numerous protests and demonstrations, they have not been as active after Fox came into power in 2000. This phenomenon is best illustrated by the absence of mass environmental mobilizations in the 2000s. Unlike the previous decade, Mexico has not experienced any major national environmental campaigns to stop projects, and demonstrations have been limited to activities held during World Earth Day. Environmentalists did join the campaign to halt plans to build a second national airport in Atenco, outside Mexico City, in the early part of the Fox administration. However, as John Stolle-McAllister details, such campaign was framed as a struggle for land rights and ENGOs performed a subsidiary, supporting role to its leadership, not a leading one (2005). In effect, during the first three years of Fox’s administration, not a single demonstration was held outside Mexico’s Environment Ministry, a common occurrence since the ministry was first established in 1994. According to all participants interviewed for this study, Mexican environmentalists lost vitality and strength since Fox came to power. Indeed, in the words of a renowned Mexican environmentalist: ‘there is no question that we are less visible and weaker than we were five years ago, and it is very disheartening (desolador). It seems that we have gone into a state of dormancy and we are not as militant and politicized (grilleros) as we were before.’ Fox’s first Environment Minister, Víctor Lichtinger Waisman, stated that Mexico’s Green Movement had suffered a notable weakening after the 1990s. Lichtinger declared that the weakening of the movement came as a disadvantage to him since he would have liked to have seen a more vociferous movement as it would have given him more leverage vis-à-vis cabinet and the president to press harder to advance his policy objectives.

Mexican environmentalists have also been less influential in environmental policymaking. As mentioned, ENGOs were active participants in the passing of several environmental laws during the 1990s. However, the extent to which they were able to have a real impact on policy during the Fox administration was minimal. The only policy in which they appear to have had some influence relates to the establishment of the Pollution Release and Transfer Registry (Registro de Emisiones y Transferencia de Contaminantes, RETC) in 2002. The RETC, similar to the U.S. Toxics Release Inventory, requires firms to submit information to a registry on the type, location and quantity of pollutants released on site and transferred off-site by industrial facilities. Fierce opposition from industry had previously resulted in a limited version whereby industry agreed to release information of pollutants on a voluntary basis. The RETC makes this obligatory, and it is accessible by the public. The establishment of the registry had been long overdue given the international commitments Mexico had made, but it was heavily influenced by pressure exerted by ENGOs (Pacheco-Vega 2005). However, this policy change was the only significant policy achievement of ENGOs since 2000. All the interviewees, including the Environment Minister, conceded that environmentalists have been less successful in having an influence on policy, a phenomenon that is directly related to the movement’s overall weakening.
The weakening of Mexico’s Green movement has been due to two main factors. First, there has been a considerable decrease in funding from international donors. In certain cases this decrease has led to operational crises within ENGOs. Some ENGO members attribute this to the fact that, after 2000, international funding sources considered that, since Mexico had become a stable democracy, they could shift their attention to other regions and countries. More importantly, however, the movement’s weakening is largely due to the manner in which Mexico’s environmental leaders decided to engage the new administration during the transition away from PRI rule. Fox campaigned under the banner of ‘change,’ arguing that his election would bring about the end of authoritarianism in the country. Once elected, he began fulfilling his promise by appointing a cabinet whose composition was unlike those of any his predecessors. Reflecting his professional development in the private sector, and arguing that increased accountability required a managerial style of politics, he recruited a significant number of individuals from the private sector: two-thirds of his newly appointed ministers had pursued careers in the private sector in the past and nearly half of them owned a private firm or held a high-level management post at the time of their appointment. The recruitment of a cabinet with experience in the private sector was in stark contrast with appointments in previous administrations under PRI rule, in which all of the cabinet ministers emanated from the public sector or academia. Fox also diversified the recruitment process by selecting individuals from different career backgrounds and political persuasions, some of whom were in fact selected by professional headhunters. His cabinet – to which he referred as a gabinetazo, or top-flight cabinet – reflected thus more heterogeneity than previous ones.

In regard to the environment portfolio, Fox appointed Víctor Lichtinger Waisman as his Minister of the Environment. Lichtinger was a respected environmentalist, not only in Mexico but internationally; he earned the respect of environmentalists in North America through his performance as the first Executive Director of the North American Commission for Environmental Co-operation (NACEC) (1994-1998), when he agreed to take on controversial cases and challenge governments. Of particular importance was the Cozumel case, in which he proceeded to issue a factual report stating that environmental regulations had not been respected by the Mexican authorities in the authorization of the construction of a port for cruise ships.

Lichtinger was not only a respected environmentalist, but, prior to his appointment, he belonged to a group made up of the most renowned environmentalists in the country: the Grupo de Reflexión 25 (G-25). Created in November of 1999, the G-25 was a political coalition of 25 professional environmentalists who worked on a series of reform proposals prior to the 2000 election, proposals that they expected the new government to adopt. Importantly, the majority of G-25 members had been part of the country’s green movement since its emergence in the mid 1980s and became the leaders of the most prominent ENGOs during the 1990s, when they were formed. They included Regina Barba, founder of UGAM (referred to above), Marta Delgado, president of UGAM, and Gustavo Alanís, director of CEMDA (referred to above). The group published a document before the election, in which they advanced criticisms of the environmental positions of the main political contenders and outlined their policy reform proposals (see Grupo de Reflexión 2000).
Even though the group was formed primarily to advance policy proposals for the new government, numerous of its members decided to collaborate with it during the transition. Once elected (2 July 2000), and until he was invested as president (1 December 2000), Fox formed a transition team to formulate his government policies. This team was composed of his close advisers, established figures from his own party and individuals with expertise in various policy areas. In regard to environmental policy, he invited several members of the G-25 to work on his environmental policy agenda, including Lichtinger. It was while working on the new policy agenda that Fox asked Lichtinger to become his Environment Minister.

When Lichtinger took up the post, he in turn appointed individuals with environmental expertise, most of whom belonged to the G-25, to key positions within his ministry. These include Rodolfo Lacy as his Chief of Staff, Francisco Székely as Under-Minister of Planning, Cassio Luisselli as Under-Minister of Regulation, Ignacio Campillo as head of the Environmental Protection Office, Rayo Angulo as Director General of the Strategy and Financing Unit; Olga Ojeda as Director of International Affairs Co-ordination Unit; Fernando Ortiz Monasterio as Executive Secretary of the Inter-Ministerial Commission for Biosecurity and Genetically Modified Organism, Tiahoga Ruge as Co-ordinator of the Centre of Education and Training for Sustainable Development, Sergio Sánchez as Director General of the Unit for Air Quality Management; and Regina Baraba as Director of the Unit for Social Participation and Transparency. In interviews, several of these individuals stated that their decision to accept these positions within the new administration was due to the fact that it represented a new opportunity to advance their policy objectives given that the Fox’s election marked a clear break from the past. Importantly, many of these individuals positioned themselves on the left of the political spectrum, but decided to join a right-of-centre government because they believed they would be able to contribute to a new phase in Mexican politics in which environmental concerns figured prominently; Fox was the first presidential candidate in Mexico to include environmental concerns as a main component of his campaign, having formed a coalition with the Green Party (PVEM). For many of these individuals, the election of Fox represented a true change of political regime and a clear break from the past.

Their decision to accept the invitation to form part of the new government by accepting important positions within the Environment Minister marked a very significant change of relations between the Mexico’s Green Movement and the state. While another prominent environmentalist was appointed as Environment Minister in 1994 under the Zedillo administration, she only recruited a couple of environmentalist into her Ministry and the leaders of the movement at large retained a combative relation with the state from the outside, as the various mobilization campaigns showed. In 2000, however, some of the most prominent leaders of the movement decided to cross the state-society divide and became part of the new national government. This phenomenon in turn weakened the movement as ENGOs suffered a weakening in their leadership, or what the minister himself referred to as a ‘leadership vacuum.’ One interviewee referred to the ‘beheading’ of the movement. All of the interviewees stated that the incorporation of important environmentalists had a negative effect on the movement’s vitality. Lichtinger stated that, in hindsight, this was a grave mistake as it reduced the vibrancy of ENGOs.
This does not mean that all the leaders of the most prominent ENGOs joined the environment ministry. Indeed, several did not, such as Gustavo Alanís, director of the renowned ENGO CEMDA. However, because the Environment Minister had been a participant in the movement, he was considered an ally within the administration adopting several of the proposals advanced by the G-25, and, hence, there was no need to take a confrontational approach. During the first three years of the Fox administration, then, the relationship between Mexico’s Green movement and government was characterized by very close contact, as the movement’s leaders formed part of government, and a non-confrontational approach.

The weakening of the movement, through the incorporation of its leaders into government, became evident throughout the Fox administration as environmental issues dropped in importance and environmentalists were unable to mobilize. Despite the declarations Fox made during his campaign regarding the importance of environmental issues, it became clear that the environment was not atop his agenda. In an interview with the author, Lichtinger stated: ‘Fox became upset when I spoke about the environment at cabinet meetings. He argued that economic growth and environmental protection were not compatible. At first I thought that I could educate him, well, ‘de-educate’ him, but it soon became apparent that it was not the case. He had a personal prejudice against the environment.’ Another cabinet minister in turn commented ‘the environment is certainly not important for Fox. He relied heavily on focus groups to make decisions, with his idea of running government like a business and being accountable to clients. Because environmental issues were not among the five most important issues with the Mexican population, he simply dropped the environmental portfolio to the bottom of the agenda.’

Because the environmental portfolio was not an important one for the Fox administration, the environment minister was weak within cabinet and unable to advance his policy objectives. Paradoxically, and as mentioned, the environment minister in fact stated that he would have liked to have seen a more vociferous movement as it would have given him more leverage vis-à-vis cabinet and the president to accomplish more of his policy objectives. Such ministerial weakness, combined with the decline of the environment as a national priority, meant that, despite the inclusion of environmentalists into the new government, ENGOs were unable to influence policy to the same degree that they had done in the 1990s. In fact, with the exception of one interviewee, all others stated that the environment dropped in level of priority from the previous administration and they believe that there had been a retroceso (a step backward) in environmental policy.

Lichtinger’s position of weakness vis-à-vis the president culminated with the ‘dirty beaches’ controversy, which would ultimately result in his dismissal. On 10 February 2003, the Environmental Protection Office released the results of academic studies revealing very high levels of pollution in beaches around the country, 16 of which had shown levels that posed a serious threat to human health (Reforma, 11 February 2003). The following day, the Minister declared the need to inform tourists of the high levels of pollution, and said that a detailed official report would be released in the forthcoming days along with a ‘clean beaches’ programme. The Minister’s declaration prompted strong reactions from hoteliers and governors of states that depended heavily on tourism. Miguel Torruco, President of the National Hotel Chamber (Asociación Mexicana de Hoteles y Moteles), and the
governors of the states of Guerrero, Nayarit and Quinta Roo urged the Environment Minister not to release the report (Reforma, La Jornada, 11 April 2003). Lichtinger decided nonetheless to release the results and, on 9 April, he announced the launch of a monitoring programme to supervise pollution in the beaches as part of a clean beach programme, declaring seven beaches to be on a red-flag pollution alert. Lichtinger’s decision to launch the monitoring programme despite strong opposition from the National Hotel Chamber, the Ministry of Tourism, and several state governors angered Fox and, on 2 September, Lichtinger learned from media reports that the president had asked him for his resignation. Lichtinger left his position on the following day with almost everyone of his team.

If the environmental agenda dropped in its level of priority after 2000, it took a precipitous dive after Lichtinger’s resignation in 2003. With the resignation of the Environment Minister on 2 September 2003, Lichtinger’s team, who had environmental expertise, was replaced with políticos from the PAN and close to the president. On his first day on the job, the new environment minister hosted a breakfast at the official presidential residence, Los Pinos, with the 40 most prominent national and international tourism investors. At the event, Fox promised that in the new phase of the ministry, investors would be treated ‘with a sense of urgency’ as they sought to overcome ‘bureaucratic hurdles’ (Reforma, 4 September 2003). Adolfo Fastlicht, president of the Association of Developers (Asociación de Desarrolladores), declared after the breakfast: ‘the President has given us the assurance that in the second half of his sexenio there will be an environmental policy that promotes investment’ (Reforma, 4 September 2003). On the second day on the job, the minister accepted the resignations of the environmentalists who had worked under Lichtinger and appointed mostly either panistas or business people to senior positions. Environmentalists naturally opposed these changes, declaring that they represented the most severe step backward on environmental policy in 15 years. However, environmentalists reacted to this chain of events with declarations made at news conferences and not mobilization.

According to several NGO members interviewed, the dismissal of the Lichtinger and his team meant that criticism of Fox’s actions by environmentalists came from individuals who had lost their jobs, and their declarations could not be seen as solely based on environmental concerns by the general public. Importantly, the dismissal of environmentalists from the Ministry meant that it made it very difficult for the movement to re-organize itself and present a common front against the government as the environmentalists who worked under Lichtinger were not automatically re-integrated. In many cases, some of these individuals decided to take up positions in academic institutions both in Mexico and abroad, abandoning environmental militancy. In others, having been part of government did not make reintegration easy as some positions of leadership had already been taken up by others. Moreover, to some militants, having worked for the government meant a loss of legitimacy as they were seen as having been co-opted by the government, thereby creating tensions and frictions within the movement. As a result, the Green Movement lacked the leadership necessary to organize and apply pressure on the government during the remaining years of the Fox administration and the beginning of Felipe Calderón’s (2006-). However, because Mexico’s green movement has become highly institutionalized, the weakening of its leadership does not nec-
cessarily mean that the movement has become completely dispersed. Several EN- 
GOs in Mexico still count with access to funding, expertise and connections with 
their international counterparts. As a result, it is certainly possible that the move-
ment can experience an upsurge in mobilization should its leadership regenerate 
over time. Environmentalism has certainly experienced cycles of waves in other 
Latin American countries.17

Conclusion

As the environmental consequences of Mexico’s post-war development became 
apparent by the mid 1980s, and within the broader context of general social mobi-
ization, Mexicans began to organize and mobilize to demand better environmental 
protection from the regime. Propelled by a series of catalytic events during the mid 
1980s, Mexico’s green movement thus emerged and strengthened. By the mid 
1990s, the movement had gained visibility in national politics. Importantly, beyond 
their visibility, Mexico’s environmentalists were able to advance successfully de-
mands and include them into environmental policy during a series of reforms that 
were implemented during the 1990s.

The strengthening of Mexico’s green movement during the 1990s unfolded 
concurrently with its institutionalization. The interaction Mexican environmental-
ists had with their North American counterparts through discussions held during 
the advent of NAFTA and the availability of international funds directed for envi-
ronmental protection encouraged the NGOization of Mexico’s green movement 
during the decade. As a result, the country witnessed an unprecedented prolifera-
tion in NGOs devoted to environmental protection. However, as this article has 
attempted to demonstrate, such institutionalization of the movement did not lead to 
its depolitization as environmentalists managed to organize, mobilize and mount a 
series of important campaigns which subsequently resulted in significant policy 
triumphs.

Nevertheless, this process of NGOization facilitated the incorporation of the 
movement’s leadership into the government as the country transitioned into a new 
regime. As this article has shown, this process had an effect on the strength of the 
movement as it created a leadership vacuum. Such process subsequently made it 
very difficult for Mexican environmentalists to apply pressure on the new govern-
ment once it became evident that environmental issues did not figure high among 
the administration’s priorities.

The case of Mexico’s Green Movement therefore suggests that neither the de-
 democratization of a country nor the institutionalization of a movement, through its 
‘NGOization’, necessarily results in a movement’s depolitization. A movement can 
gain a certain degree of institutionalization and remain politicized. However, as 
this case also shows, the degree of politicization is largely dependent upon the links 
that are established between a movement’s leadership and the broader constitu-
ency. This analysis also suggests that the degree of politicization, vibrancy and mili-
tancy of a movement can be affected by the relationship it establishes with the 
state. While the incorporation of members of a movement into the state does not 
automatically lead to a movement’s weakening, such as the case of Brazil’s green 
movement (Keck and Hochstetler 2007), it appears that the incorporation of an
important number of a movement’s leadership into government can result in a loss of leadership within the movement, outside the state, which can in turn weaken the movement as a whole. The research presented here conforms to findings of scholarship on social movements in post-transition societies which demonstrate that the integration of movement leaders into the state generally results in demobilization (Oxhorn 1994a, 1994b, 1999; de la Masa 1999; Hipsher 1996, 1998). This work then suggests that the demobilization of social movements can generally be expected to occur in consolidating democracies when they lose autonomy.

* * *

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**Notes**

1. This paper draws from data collected during interviews conducted with 36 individuals during the summers of 2004 and 2005. These participants include members of ENGOs and government officials. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2007 annual meetings of the Canadian Political Science Association in Saskatoon. The author would like to thank Candace Johnson, Lisa Kowalchuk and the anonymous referees for their comments on previous drafts of the article. All errors of analysis or interpretation are solely my own.

2. While Mexico’s green movement strengthened considerably during the 1980s, as this section details, it does not mean that environmentalism did not exist before. Indeed, Mexican environmentalism can be traced back to the establishment of the Mexican Forestry Association by Miguel Ángel de Quevedo (usually referred to as the father of Mexican environmentalism) in 1924 and of the Mexican Society of Natural History by Enrique Beltrán in 1934. The first Mexican ENGO is perhaps the Mexican Institute for Non-Renewable Resources, founded in 1952 by businessman Manuel Arango. It was not, however, a political organization and served primarily as a repository of bibliographical material on environmental issues.

3. The donations have been administered by a newly-crated organization, the Mexican National Conservation Fund.

4. The actual number of ENGOs depends upon the source, but 500 would be an approximate number. According to the Ministry of the Environment, the number was 461 by 1994 (Ávila 1997, 231). Flavia Rodríguez places the number, in 1997, at ‘more than 500 in all the country’ (1997, 6B). The OECD, in its 1998 report on Mexico’s environmental performance, states that the number was 400 by 1994 (1998, 145). Finally, according to a Mexican Environmental Directory (*Directorio Mexicano de la Conservación*) published by the *Fondo Mexicano de la Conservación de la Naturaleza*.
the number was, in 1998, 1260.
5. This number is based on a poll conducted by the Mexican newspaper Reforma (15 July 1996).
6. For a more in depth analysis of these mobilizations, see Díez 2006, pp. 83-9.
7. Interview with Marta Delgado, President of the ENGO UGAM, and Minister of the Environment for Mexico City 2006-, Mexico City, 12 June 2004.
9. As a signatory of North American Agreement of Environmental Cooperation, Mexico agreed to resolution 97-04, which encourages the three countries toward the adoption of comparable registries. Also, as a member of the OECD, Mexico agreed to harmonize its registry with all member states. The establishment of the registry is also in line with commitments made to Agenda 21, whose principle 10 stipulates that states should facilitate and encourage the dissemination of information.
10. This does not mean that the introduction of the RETC was the only important policy change during the Fox administration. In effect, several noteworthy reforms were introduced during this time, such as a reorganization of the Environment Ministry in 2001, a partial reform of the Forestry Law in 2003, the establishment of the Programme of Payments for Environmental Services in 2003, and minor reforms to the Penal Code in 2001 and to the Law on Wildlife in 2003. However, as admitted by several government officials interviewed (including the minister himself and Mauricio Limón, head of the Ministry’s Legal Department), there was no significant input from civil society actors in these policy changes.
11. Fox joined Coca-Cola of Mexico soon after he finished his studies in 1965 and left the company in 1979 as the CEO. He then managed his frozen foods export firm, Grupo Fox, until he decided to run for political office in 1988, when he was elected as Member of Congress and, eventually, governor of the state of Guanajuato. Fox can be considered an ‘outsider’ to Mexican politics. Not only was he the first president since 1929 to have emerged from the private sector, but he did not have a strong relationship with the PAN; he joined the party in 1987, only 13 years before becoming president.
12. Fox declared publicly that he would apply to politics the various skills he had acquired as CEO of Coca-Cola Mexico.
13. These included individuals from the international institutional community, such as Julio Frenk, who worked for the World Health Organization and became Health Minister; Jorge Castañeda, who had been a cofounder of the Mexican Socialist Party and very influential in the 1994 campaign of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and was appointed Foreign Affairs Minister; and the intellectual and former independent Senator Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, who became the co-ordinator of Fox’s security cabinet.
16. See the report in Reforma of 3 September 2003 ‘Reprueban ONG relevo en la Semarnat’.
17. This has certainly been the case in Brazil (Hochstetler and Keck 2007).

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Troublesome Construction: The Rationale and Risks of IIRSA

Pitou van Dijck

Roads play a key role in economic development, yet are among the major driving forces behind the destruction of ecosystems. Among the most ambitious infrastructure programmes initiated in recent times is the continental wide Iniciativa para la Integración de la Infraestructura Regional Suramericana / Initiative for Regional Infrastructure Integration in South America (IIRSA), launched by the governments of South America in 2000. In Central America and Mexico, Plan Puebla Panamá (PPP) envisages similar objectives.

IIRSA is concentrated on ten so-called development hubs, ejes de desarrollo or ejes de integración y desarrollo, presented in Map 1. Most of the IIRSA hubs involve road infrastructure programmes linking the countries in the region with each other as well as world markets, but some hubs involve the improvement of the navigability of waterways, the construction of international telecommunication systems and energy links. All together, over three quarters of the overall amount of investments as budgeted in the IIRSA Consensus Agenda 2005-2010 are related to road infrastructure.

In view of the sheer size of the Initiative, IIRSA’s potential impact on the region’s economic geography may be significant through its stimulus to investment, production and trade. The Initiative may even induce the rise of new centres of economic gravity in the region. As the impact of such long-distance hubs may extend over large territories, the ecological effects of IIRSA may be profound as well, contributing to large-scale land-use conversion, the fragmentation of forests and the ultimate destruction of ecosystems and the public goods they deliver to the local, regional and global community, including their function as a habitat for indigenous peoples, animals, and plant species.

The concept of development hubs is critical to the understanding of the objective and the potential impact of IIRSA road infrastructure. As put by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB),

[...]the concept of the hub is novel in that it attempts to fully address the economic, social and environmental dimensions of physical integration and their interplay in the project development process...IIRSA’s comprehensive approach to projects places a priority on environmental protection and is responsive to a growing awareness of its importance by the people of the region. Organized society and elected governments are increasingly attuned to this reality. The IIRSA approach of applying the concept of hubs helps address environmental issues in a structured way and offers planners and other stakeholders a vision of development opportunities, alternatives and needs to ensure effective and balanced regional integration (IDB October 2006, 17).
To stimulate the potential welfare-enhancing effects of IIRSA and reduce its negative side effects on the environment and human welfare, appropriate frameworks are required to assess \textit{ex ante} the impact of infrastructure on adjacent regions and territories and to integrate in an effective and efficient manner economic instruments in an IIRSA related Plan of Action. So far only a few ‘strategic assessment studies’ (SEA) have been made related to corridors in the IIRSA agenda, and only little systemic knowledge and know-how has been developed related to the appropriate methodology for studies of such large-scale corridors.

This article focuses on the aims and methodology of SEA or IIRSA-related road infrastructure projects. It should be clear, however, that every IIRSA hub brings about its own specific potentials and risks and requires a specific approach to assess its potential impact. As traditional costs-benefit analyses are not appropriate to assess potential long-term conversion in a wide area, tools such as the environmental impact assessment (EIA) and subsequently SEAs have been developed in recent years to include environmental and social dimension of impact in combination with the assessment of economic change induced by infrastructure projects. Moreover, SEAs are a compulsory tool in case of co-financing of IIRSA road infrastructure by the IDB, which plays a key role in the Initiative. Financing by the Andean Development Corporation (CAF) as well requires an investigation of some sort of the potential environmental impact.

**IIRSA: the plan**

IIRSA is unique in its size and concept as a region-wide plan for integrated infrastructure in Latin America (IIRSA, 2004 and 2005). The initiative was taken on
Map 2. **IIRSA - IMPLEMENTATION AGENDA BASED ON CONSENSUS 2005-2010**

31st August-1st September 2000 in Brasilia by the heads of state of 12 South American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela. The Initiative aims at contributing to the integration of infrastructure in the region in support of the region-wide strategy of so-called open regionalism, and to strengthen a comprehensive insertion of South America in world markets. It focuses particularly on improving the interconnections among the national road networks in the countries in the region, improvement of strategic waterways and railways, border-crossing facilities, ports and airports, telecommunications and energy facilities.

The overall structure of IIRSA involves three regional development banks: the IDB, CAF and the Financial Fund for the Development of the Rio de la Plata Basin (FONPLATA). All this does not exclude that at a later stage other official and private financial institutions will be involved. Clearly, co-financing arrangements are actively pursued and so are public-private partnership arrangements. As of now, the IIRSA Strategic Vision 2020 distinguishes ten hubs:

- Mercosur-Chile hub
- Andean hub
- Central Interocianic hub
- Central Amazon hub
- Guyana Shield hub
- Peru-Brazil-Bolivia hub
- Capricorn hub

**Source:** IIRSA 2005a
Table 1. List of projects in the IIRSA Implementation Agenda Based on Consensus 2005-10, in millions of US dollars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Projects</th>
<th>Hub</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Duplication of Route 14</td>
<td>Mercosur-Chile</td>
<td>370 AR (BR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Remodelling of the Rio Branco-Montevideo-Colonia-Nueva Palmira Corridor</td>
<td>Mercosur-Chile</td>
<td>177 UY (AR-BR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Building of the Jaguarão-Rio Branco International Bridge</td>
<td>Mercosur-Chile</td>
<td>12 BR-UY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Duplication of the Palhoça-Osorio Leg (Rodovia Mercosur)</td>
<td>Mercosur-Chile</td>
<td>1,200 BR (AR-UY)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Los Andes-Mendoza Railway Project</td>
<td>Mercosur-Chile</td>
<td>251 AR-CH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 International Route 60-CH (Valparaíso-Los Andes Leg)</td>
<td>Mercosur-Chile</td>
<td>286 CH (AR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Northeast Argentina Gas Pipeline</td>
<td>Mercosur-Chile</td>
<td>1,000 AR (BO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Building of the Salvador Mazza-Yacuiba Binational Bridge</td>
<td>Capricorn</td>
<td>10 AR-BO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Presidente Franco-Porto Meira New Bridge and Border Centre</td>
<td>Capricorn</td>
<td>55 PY-BR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Building of the Pailón-San José-Puerto Suárez Road</td>
<td>Central Interoceanic</td>
<td>445 BO (BR-CH-PE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 São Paulo Railway Ring (North and South Legs)</td>
<td>Central Interoceanic</td>
<td>400 BR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Infante Rivarola-Cañada Oruro Border Crossing</td>
<td>Central Interoceanic</td>
<td>1.2 BO-PY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Building of the Cañada Oruro-Villamontes-Tarija-Estación Abaroa Road (first stage)</td>
<td>Central Interoceanic</td>
<td>60 BO (PY)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Toledo-Pisiga Road</td>
<td>Central Interoceanic</td>
<td>93 BO (CH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Rehabilitation of the Iquique-Colchane Road</td>
<td>Central Interoceanic</td>
<td>37 CH (BO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Rehabilitation of the El Sillar Leg</td>
<td>Central Interoceanic</td>
<td>2.5 BO (BR-CH-PE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Desaguadero Border Centre</td>
<td>Andean</td>
<td>7.5 BO-PE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Cúcuta-San Antonio del Táchira Border Crossing</td>
<td>Andean</td>
<td>2.0 CO-VE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Recovering of Meta River Navigability</td>
<td>Andean</td>
<td>108 CO-VE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Pasto-Mocoa Road</td>
<td>Amazon</td>
<td>183 CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Paita-Tarapoto-Yurimaguas Road, Ports and Logistic Centres</td>
<td>Amazon</td>
<td>338 PE (BR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Lima-Tingo María-Pucallpa Road, Ports and Logistic Centres</td>
<td>Amazon</td>
<td>589 PE (BR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Francisco de Orellana Port</td>
<td>Amazon</td>
<td>105 EC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Paving of the Iñapari-Puerto Maldonado-Inambari, Inambari-Juliaca / Inambari-Cusco Leg</td>
<td>Amazon</td>
<td>Peru-Brazil-Bolivia 1,055 PE (BR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Bridge over the Acre River</td>
<td>Peru-Brazil-Bolivia</td>
<td>12 BR-PE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Boa Vista-Bonfim-Lethem-Georgetown highway (first stage: studies)</td>
<td>Escudo Guayanés</td>
<td>3.3 GY-BR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Description</th>
<th>Hub</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bridge over the Takutu River</td>
<td>Escudo Guayanés</td>
<td>GY-BR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Georgetown)-Suriname (Paramaribo) Road (first stage)</td>
<td>Guayanese Shield</td>
<td>VE-GY-SU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvements in Nieuw Nickerie-Paramaribo-Albina Leg and International Bridge over the Marowijne River</td>
<td>Guayanese Shield</td>
<td>SU-GY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports through Postal Services for SMEs</td>
<td>ITCs</td>
<td>All countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of a Roaming Agreement in South America</td>
<td>ITCs</td>
<td>All countries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total**: 6,921

*Source: IIRSA 2005a and www.iirsa.org.*

- Southern hub
- Paraguay-Paraná waterway hub
- Southern Andean hub

In the period 2003-04 an indicative planning process started in which all countries listed projects. By October 2006 the IIRSA portfolio included 348 projects, among which 31 priority projects (IDB 2006, 5). Map 2 shows the 31 priority projects included in the Consensus Agenda of IIRSA, and Table 1 lists these projects. Table 2 shows a list of approved projects with estimated investment as laid down in the consensus agenda for the period 2005-2010. The list is permanently adjusted and updated. (For updates see www.iirsa.org.)

The actual state of the trajectories as well as their envisaged future functioning differs widely among the hubs. The same holds for their impact on adjacent territories. Many parts of the trajectories already exist as unpaved or paved roads, but need improvement, reconstruction, or additional infrastructural works, such as bridges, border crossings, and international connections. Although the envisaged hubs link existing infrastructure, the precise trajectories are in most cases not yet determined but are being investigated or negotiated among interested parties. In many cases, IIRSA’s contribution is particularly in making or improving the cross-border linkages between already existing national road systems. Hence, significant efficiency gains may be realized with relatively small investment.

Apart from IIRSA, other transnational road projects are under construction that may or may not link up with IIRSA trajectories. Cases in point are the Brazilian plans for infrastructure development: *Avança Brasil*, the *Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento* (PAC) 2007-2010 and the so-called *Arco Norte* project. More recently the Brazilian government introduced the *Plano Amazônia Sustentável* (PAS), which includes projects as well as financial mechanisms to develop transport infrastructure. These recent infrastructural plans build upon initiatives taken in earlier decades, many of which were implemented only partially for fiscal reasons. In Central America and Mexico, the PPP was launched in 2001 as a programmatic regional framework for the promotion of regional sustainable development to
Table 2. Approved projects with estimated investment as laid down in the consensus agenda for the period 2005-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hubs</th>
<th>No. of groups</th>
<th>No. of projects</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Estimated investment (millions of US$)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amazonas</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>3,975</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andino</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>6,097</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capricornio</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>5,953</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Del Sur</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>2,530</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escudo Guyanés</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5,847</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hidrovía Paraguay - Paraná</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>2,829</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interoceánico Central</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>4,651</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercosur - Chile</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>19,467</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru - Brazil - Bolivia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>17,559</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>47</strong></td>
<td><strong>507</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>68,908</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

improve regional road infrastructure, water management and energy distribution. IIRSA and PPP could physically be connected if a road were to be constructed between Panamá and Colombia through the Darién.

The rationale of IIRSA

Infrastructure, defined broadly, plays a key role in stimulating economic growth by facilitating production and trade, thus generating income and employment. Without efficient transportation and communication infrastructure, economic agents face high transaction costs that hamper production, trade, and consumption, and consequently reduce welfare. Particularly, countries that pursue export-orientated development policies may suffer greatly from a lack of efficient (transport) infrastructure (Rozas and Sánchez 2004, Sánchez and Echeverría 2003). Transportation costs may be expressed in terms of their import tariff equivalents, and their impact on welfare may be considered in similar ways.

IIRSA is part of a comprehensive set of policy initiatives to strengthen the position of South America in the global economy. The new insertion of the region in world markets was initiated by a process of unilaterally implemented trade liberalization, strengthened by group-wise initiatives to improve market access, and locked in at the multilateral level. Stabilization and restructuring policies, aiming at the liberalization of trade and capital movement, privatization, and regional integration, have made the region’s prospects to improve the standard of living more dependent on the capability of domestic producers to compete in domestic and foreign markets and to supply worldwide the required quantities and qualities in time. To support domestic producers to meet this challenge, a broad array of measures is required to facilitate trade and enhance trade-related capacity.

The renewed insertion of the South American countries in world markets coin-
cides and is partly induced by the emergence of new centres of gravity in the world economy, offering new trade opportunities and challenges. This holds especially for the growing significance of East Asia, and particularly for China as an importer of South American commodities. The rise of Asia, however, not only contributes to Latin America’s export potential but may also jeopardize its aspirations of becoming a platform for manufacturing production and assembly for the international market. Indeed, IIRSA and PPP plans for the construction of several transcontinental roads, linking the Atlantic side of the region with the Pacific, the so-called bi-oceánicas, not only facilitate Latin America’s export drive but may also contribute to competition in the regional market by Asia’s industry.

In support of an enhanced insertion in international markets, measures are required that complement the traditional agenda of shallow liberalization, focusing on the abolishment of barriers to trade and integration at the borders (Lawrence 1996). In contrast with shallow integration, deeper integration may be conceived of as a form of integration that moves beyond the removal of trade obstacles in the following ways: improvement of customs procedures and other forms of trade facilitation; regulations pertaining to trade-related technical, sanitary and phytosanitary standards; and trade-related physical infrastructure. Such measures may enhance the capability of countries to exploit trade opportunities in regional or global markets.

With declining rates of import tariffs, the role of transportation costs – expressed in terms of their tariff equivalent – in international competition has increased. Tedious customs clearance, high port charges and freight costs, and slow handling add costs to traders and consequently impede trade. Transportation costs worldwide account on an average for 5.3 per cent of the value of merchandise imports, but are 8.3 per cent in Latin America, excluding Mexico. In several countries in the region, the tariff equivalent of transportation costs exceeds the level of import tariff rates (IDB 2006, 30). International comparisons show port clearance in Latin America to require more time than in any other region in the world except for Africa. At the same time clearance times differ widely among ports in Latin America, with harbours in Chile, Mexico and Panama among the most efficient, and harbours in Venezuela and Brazil among the least efficient (IDB 2002, 134, Figures 6.3 and 6.4).

Trade Facilitation, including the improvement of trade-related infrastructure in support of deeper integration of countries in the regional or world economy, has been added to the agenda of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as one of four so-called Singapore Issues during the WTO Ministerial of Singapore in 1997. The issue of Trade Facilitation includes a wide array of mechanisms and instruments to reduce trade-related transaction costs. Worldwide, the issue of trade-related infrastructural improvement is becoming a priority (Van Dijck and Faber 2006).

The spatial impact of roads

The impact of the construction of a new road or the improvement of an existing road on adjacent territories, the área de influencia del corredor, may involve economic, social and environmental dimensions. The spatial extent of the impact depends on a large number of factors that differ among hubs and specific locations
along these hubs. Hence, meaningful generalizations on the impact of roads on their environment – defined broadly and including economic, social, physical, ecological and institutional dimensions – are not warranted. Put differently, generalized claims regarding the potentials of infrastructure in support of sustainable development will be hard to substantiate, and the same holds for allegations pertaining to the negative effects of these infrastructure programmes. Notwithstanding the wide variety in impact that roads may have on adjacent territories, some regularities and patterns may be inferred from statistical studies on land use conversion and deforestation effects of road building and improvement as summarized below.

Statistical studies show a high concentration of deforestation in Amazonia along the expanding road network. In the period 1991-95, 33 per cent of deforestation was concentrated in an area within 50 kilometres of the eastern road network, 24 per cent within 50 kilometres of the central road network, and 17 per cent within 50 kilometres of the western road network. All together, 74 per cent of deforestation was concentrated within 50 kilometres of the main roads, creating long corridors through the forest. Most new clearing takes place in areas adjacent to areas already cleared, on a moving agricultural frontier, often according to a so-called fish-bone pattern (Alves 2002; Andersen et al. 2002, 55; Pfaff et al. 2007).

On the basis of a composite map, Nepstad et al. (2000, 2001, 2002)) found that 28 to 58 per cent of the forest had been cleared in the 20 years following road paving within a zone of 50 kilometres on either side of the road. Studies along the BR 010, PA 150 and BR 364 show that the impact varies widely with distance, with higher rates of deforestation nearby roads. On the basis of analyses regarding the impact of paved roads during the past 15 to 25 years, Laurance et al. (2001) find a forest loss of 30 per cent in the 0-10 kilometre zone, 20 per cent forest loss in the 11-25 kilometre zone, and 15 per cent loss in the 26-50 kilometre zone.

Regression analyses by Kaimowitz et al. (2002, 43-45) indicate that deforestation is supported by better access to markets (availability of a paved road and inverse of distance); the size of a market in terms of purchasing power; ecological conditions favouring agricultural production including cattle (soil quality, precipitation, probable slope and distance to rivers as well); the inverse of input prices (labour, land and intermediate inputs); output prices of agricultural products; the use of policy instruments such as subsidy; inverse of distance to already deforested areas; inverse of degree of protection of land areas. Such studies allow for an estimation of the impact of policy variables on different stretches of roads.

The effects of new roads on adjacent territories cannot simply be considered as negative externalities to be avoided or compensated by the application of policy instruments. In this context it should be noted that the concept of development hubs, as considered by the IDB, refers to the mechanism of so-called crowding-in effects of roads: government investment in such public goods induce private investment that benefit from improved market access and communication options. Hence, land use conversion related to roads is among the very objectives of the IIRSA programme. To what extend the objective of land use conversion is realized ultimately depends on aggregate decisions and interventions by individual persons, households and firms. The general hypothesis about their behaviour is that the decision to deforest or convert land use is the outcome of the net present value from non-forest land use, for example, agricultural land and pasture; the net present
value of the use of forested land; and the costs of land use conversion net of obtaining timber value (Stavins and Jaffe 1990, Pfaff et al. 2007).

Not unusually, private investment decisions concerning land use are analysed in the context of so-called livelihood strategies of individuals or households that undertake economic activities along a road trajectory. At the same time similar decisions are made by private firms behaving according to a standard profit maximization function. The two categories of economic actors, small farmers and private firms, differ in economic behaviour for several reasons related to the access to land and capital and the costs thereof; their different capabilities to reduce risks; differences in the costs of using inputs like pesticides and fertilizers; and options to market their output.

Nutrient mining, conceived of as the unsustainable extraction of nutrients from the forest soil through cropping, ranching and logging, is both an incentive and market response to road building, and among the main causes of deforestation (Schneider 1995, 15). The rain forest in central and northern Amazonia may increasingly come under pressure for the following reasons related to the expansion of nutrient mining activities. First, with the depletion of worldwide stocks of timber, higher prices will stimulate exploitation. To different degrees, this may also hold for some other natural resources, be it that the impact of pit mining activity on the integrity of the forest may be more locally confined than large-scale timber exploitation is. Second, increased worldwide demand and higher prices for specific agricultural products and biofuels such as soya and sugar stimulates production and contributes to the expansion of productively used land area in forested areas and savannahs. Third, infrastructural investment embedded in new governmental projects to develop Amazonia, particularly in new roads, will enhance the likelihood of deeper penetration into the forest (Gascon et al. 2001, 25).

Moving the frontier by building new roads, particularly in pristine forests, may have a lowering impact on land prices by making new land available, hence stimulates colonization and land-extensive forms of production, while, on the contrary, improvement of existing roads may increase land prices by stimulating intensification of land use along the paved road. There is evidence to suggest that investment in network expansion may result in more deforestation than investment in network improvement (Andersen et al. 2002, 145-147).

Studies on the potential or expected impact of newly paved roads on adjacent territories suggest that the spatial impact may be substantial. The comprehensive investigation into the possible impact of the Corredor Norte in northern Bolivia by DHV (2006) indicates directly and indirectly that the projected road of 1,386 kilometres between La Paz, Guayaramerín and Cobija may affect 25 per cent of the Bolivian landmass, as illustrated in Map 3. According to the Brazilian Ministry of the Environment (2005) the impact area of the BR 163 highway of 1,756 kilometres linking Cuiabá with Santarém may equal 15 per cent of the Brazilian landmass, as illustrated in Map 4.

The available evidence suggests that the potential direct and indirect impact area of corridors may be substantial in spatial terms and that a number of variables, in combination with road construction or improvement, has a statistically significant positive (+) or negative (-) impact on land use conversion, including distance
Map 3. Impact area: Corredor Norte

to markets (-), connection with other infrastructure (+), the quality of soils (+), as well as some policy-related variables like the level of protection of land areas (-). The role of these variables should be assessed in terms of their impact on the net present value of forest products and the produce of alternative land use, in combination with the net costs of land use conversion.
Assessing the impact of infrastructure: a methodological introduction

The construction of new roads in the context of IIRSA and other programmes and involving financing by multilateral or regional development banks, requires a SEA. Additional studies may be required for assessing different types of impacts the road may have, focusing on specific economic, social or environmental impacts at the national, regional or local level. The methodology required to make such assessments may vary as shown in the brief overview below.

As discussed earlier in this study, the rationale of IIRSA is related to enhancing the insertion of countries in regional and world markets, allowing them to enjoy the maximum gains from trade. However, the overall impact of new roads on development is hard to assess ex ante. At the macro- and regional-economic level, the contribution of road infrastructure to openness may result not only in improved allocation of factors of production – capital, labour and land – in the domestic economy, but also to adjustment problems and related loss of traditional opportunities, as well as unfair international competition by means of foreign dumping prac-
tics. Although openness and increased competition may generally contribute to welfare through increased consumer surplus and improved allocation of available factors of production, the impact of openness on longer-term growth is more difficult to establish by means of trade models and regression analyses and has been contested in the literature. The impact of opening up the economy is traditionally studied in computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. For example, CGE models generated in the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) are applied to assess the sectoral and nation-wide economic effects of concessions to liberalize economies in the context of negotiations in the WTO (Van Dijck and Faber 2006). However, for a number of reasons it will be difficult to model the impact of trade-related capacity building through infrastructural development on the economy.

First, to include infrastructure improvement in the model, the so-called tariff equivalent of transport costs (reduction) needs to be incorporated into the model at the sectoral level. Second, the model only allows for assessing the impact of transport costs reduction on export and import flows and related income flows, and not for assessing the economic costs and benefits of the investment in infrastructure, let alone the inclusion of environmental costs of such investment. Third, notwithstanding ambitions and claims, GTAP models essentially are static by nature and do not provide insight into longer-term effects and crowding in effects of investment in trade-related road infrastructure. Clearly, investment in infrastructure is a long-term programme with trade and income effects to be generated only in the longer term. Fourth, the models cannot cope adequately with the economic adjustment problems during the transitional stage in which liberalization measures or trade-related investment programmes are being implemented. These economic adjustment problems may contribute to economic and social disruption at the regional and local level, to be addressed in plans of action, that are among the most critical components of the required SEA studies. These adjustment problems may involve relatively large sections of communities in the case of labour-intensive (agricultural) sectors employing relatively low-skilled and low-income workers. Intensification of trade-related traffic and improved access to relatively inaccessible regions may create additional social disruption.

We may conclude at this stage that the types of CGE models referred to above may be useful to assess the direction of trade and income effects of increased openness at the macro-economic level, be it that the models tend to generate once-and-for-all effects rather than the effects of intensified economic liberalization over the course of time. However, the models are not capable of assessing the impact of trade-related infrastructural programmes in adjacent territories.

SEAs are being designed and applied to assess ex ante several types of impacts in areas directly or indirectly affected by roads and other types of (trade-related) infrastructure. The concept of SEA is relatively new and follows upon earlier methodologies to assess infrastructure impacts such as costs-benefit analysis (CBA) and environmental impact assessment (EIA). The methodology and content requirements of SEAs are not yet standardized, at least not in the context of IIRSA, and the methodologies applied so far may be considered experimental, are contested and are in the process of being redesigned. The comprehensive DHV study on the Corredor Norte in Bolivia, commissioned by the IDB, is a case in point as discussed below. A SEA is conceived by The World Bank as 'an umbrella term for
the integration of environmental and social concerns in the process of developing policies, plans or programs [...]. SEA has great potential in meeting real and growing needs in many developing countries and can assist in clarifying economic, social and environmental tradeoffs at aggregate levels of policy and planning, and in developing balanced responses. The key shortcoming of SEA at this stage is its lack of methodological definition and robustness’. SEA needs to support decision makers ‘with a holistic understanding of the environmental and social implications of policy proposals’ (The World Bank 2002, 2, 3, 7). The SEA provides information about the characteristics of a specific infrastructure project. It helps to determine who will benefit from, for example, and who will be negatively affected. It provides information about the (regional) distributional effects of new infrastructure facilities, about the effects on the economy as a whole and about the effects on the environment (SATCRA 1999, 40-65; Venables and Gasiorek 1998). This helps to determine whether a specific road should be considered a public or a private good. In case a certain road can be classified as a private good, a user charge can be applied. The entirely public provision of such a road would not be reasonable from a welfare-economic point of view.

Ultimately, the aim of a SEA is not to approve or disapprove of a certain infrastructure product, but to inform policy-makers and the general public about all effects of infrastructure investments. As such, a SEA contributes to higher quality public management and policies, since it provides politicians and policy-makers with first-rate information about the possible consequences of their decisions, and adds to the transparency of public governance (Netherlands Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management 2000, Part I, 1-50). In addition to the environmental impact analysis of the EIA, a SEA consists of a ‘systematic and comprehensive evaluation of the environmental and social effects of policies, plans or programmes and their alternatives, resulting in a report that facilitates publicly accountable decision-making’ (Ahmed et al. 2005, 1-4).

By using the SEA, a more comprehensive and inclusive approach to large infrastructure and regional development projects is possible. This is particularly important in the case of border-crossing projects and public-private-partnership constructions, since the design of the project and its payment system should be related to the distribution of positive and negative welfare effects generated by the project.

Towards a comprehensive SEA

In view of the sheer size and scope of the road projects, an assessment of its probable economic and non-economic impacts exceeds by far the traditional framework for project assessments and evaluations, as provided by a CBA. There are at least three good reasons why a SEA for IIRSA road infrastructure must be comprehensive by nature. First, the impact of newly paved roads on the environment in adjacent territories may be widely dispersed. Second, the impact may be long-term and even irreversible. Third, the change is multidimensional involving economic, environmental, social and political dimensions.

A truly comprehensive and robust SEA needs to address some critical methodological problems that are briefly referred to below. Ideally, a comprehensive ex-ante assessment would include a regional CGE model allowing for simulation runs.
However, the capability to simulate the real-world dynamics of such a major investment programme in selected regions is limited. Moreover, the time span of such essentially economic models does not allow for inclusion of long-term environmental effects and their (second round) economic repercussions.

Next, a comprehensive assessment of the welfare effects of a road requires that all costs and benefits are fully included. To assess the true value of a region and the consequences of intervention by means of infrastructure, a comprehensive inventory of the many different functions of the forest need to be made including the array of direct and indirect use values as well as optional and existence values of the forest. The forest is truly multifunctional in the sense that it provides simultaneously direct and indirect use values, the latter of which become available as public goods. Exploitation of some or more of the direct use value capabilities of the forest may result in ecological degradation and limit the capability of the forest to provide some of its indirect use values.

Moreover, an economic assessment of the consequences of changes in land use requires an economic valuation of environmental services. Such valuations are hampered by imperfect functioning of many of the markets involved and by the absence of markets for several eco services provided by the forest at the local, regional and global level. This holds particularly for the economic valuation of biodiversity and carbon sequestration. Moreover, longer-term forecasting of variations in direct and indirect use values, resulting from future patterns of demand and supply of natural resources and ecological services, are hard to make (Trindade de Almeida and Uhl 1999, Van Beukering and van Heeren 2003). These complications must be tackled in order to make a comprehensive valuation of the forest to enable comparison of alternative options for its exploitation.

So far, experience with the application of the new methodology by multilateral financial institutions in developing countries is limited (The World Bank 2002). In Latin America, Brazil is probably the country with the earliest and most extensive experience with impact assessment studies related to the development of road infrastructure. As shown elsewhere, the ex ante assessment studies undertaken in preparation of the pavement of the 1,756 kilometres long BR 163, linking Cuiabá with Santarém, show important methodological shortcomings and the decision-making process based upon the studies show serious flaws (Van Dijck and Den Haak 2006).

Pedro Bara Neto (2007) gives an overview of six case studies related to road corridors presented in Table 3. These studies were not commissioned per se in the context of IIRSA but were made fairly recently and relate to substantial road infrastructure projects. The studies have in common: land use planning, improvement of basic public services, support of productive activities, and institutional strengthening. They do not have in common: public consultation, and implementation strategies.

The DHV (2006) Corredor Norte study, commissioned by the IDB, was exceptionally comprehensive and detailed, and was undertaken in the period 2004-2006. The study involved an impact area of 234,000 square kilometres along the 1,386 kilometres-long trajectory, the equivalent of 25 per cent of Bolivia’s landmass. Three sub regions were distinguished in the assessment: (1) Yungas and Subandino (cordillera); (2) Piedemonte and Llanuras (lowlands and wetlands); (3) Norte Amazónico (tropical Amazon forest region in the very north of Bolivia).
Table 3. Six analyses of SEAs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE STUDIES</th>
<th>Initiative / Responsible</th>
<th>Public Consultation</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Products / Outcomes</th>
<th>Final report</th>
<th>Main driver</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz – Puerto Suarez, Bolivia</td>
<td>IDB WB</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>Land tenure, Protected areas, support to indigenous people and institutional strengthening ($20 millions, management problems)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Financial sustainability of PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Corridor, Peru</td>
<td>CAF FF&amp;L SPDA</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>3 months</td>
<td>Strategic management plan ($10 millions credit from CAF, management problems)</td>
<td>33 pages</td>
<td>Financing opportunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Corridor, Peru</td>
<td>DID CHEMONICAB EGBA</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>Strategic management plan ($3.4 millions)</td>
<td>420 pages</td>
<td>“Tuning” of existing programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Corridor, Bolivia</td>
<td>DID + DHV</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td>Strategic action plan (financing?)</td>
<td>510 pages</td>
<td>Integral analysis/ expectations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BR-165, Brazil</td>
<td>IPAM MOORE Goverment</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>Regional development plan CONDESBA 200,000 km² of new PA or S/UA</td>
<td>150 pages</td>
<td>Local governance enhancement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madeira Complex, Brazil</td>
<td>FURNAS ODEBRECHT TETRAPLAN</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td>Agenda for local agreements</td>
<td>180 pages</td>
<td>Negotiating agenda</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The terms of reference of the SEA include the following issues:

- A diagnosis of the existing situation in the potential impact area by means of a description of the physical, biotical, socio-cultural, economic and institutional environment;
- Development and implementation of a policy of participation of civil society, consulta pública; in order to stimulate dialogue and interaction in the process of developing the SEA and plan of action, the so called plan de acción estratégico;
- Assessment of possible alternatives for the proposed infrastructural (road) plan, particularly from the economic and ecological perspectives;
- Identification of scenarios and strategies for sustainable development;
- Identification of gains and losses and winners and losers;
- Development of a plan of action;
- An investigation into the institutional capacities of several layers of governance to implement the plan of action adequately, and the development of a related plan for implementation and monitoring of the plan of action.

The process required three rounds of public consultations over a period of two years between August 2004 and June 2006, involving about 1,200 persons during 50 meetings with civil society, and 35 meetings with relevant sectors in the region. The aims of the meetings were to collect required information, develop strategies and implement a plan of action including a plan for implementation of the proposed policies and actions.

The plan of action should focus on mitigation or elimination of negative social and ecological affects and to strengthen positive impacts. The following dimensions (programmes) of sustainable development of the impact area were distinguished:
Concluding observations

There is a real risk that SEA studies to be commissioned in the future will not be that comprehensive, as pressure is building up from the side of governments and financial institutions to limit time and resources to be spent on SEAs. It has been proposed to limit the time available to undertake a SEA to six months and to limit the available budget to US$ 300,000 (approximately € 200,000). One may question the rationale of this recent approach for at least three reasons. First, earlier experience with road construction in Amazonia shows that unexpected spatially widespread negative environmental and economic developments with an irreversible character have occurred in cases characterized by inadequate *ex ante* assessment. The developments related to the Polonoroeste (BR 364) in Rondônia that ultimately contributed to the withdrawal of multilateral financial institutions such as IDB and The World Bank from financing large-scale road infrastructure programmes in South America for a long period of time, are a case in point. Moreover, there is no need to postpone investment in the proposed hub entirely during the period in which a comprehensive SEA is being executed as specific projects along the trajectory can be started that do not depend on the outcomes of the overall assessment and on final decisions concerning the development of the integrated hub. Finally, in view of the overall budgeted expenses of the IIRSA hubs as shown in Table 2, the expenses on a comprehensive SEA are modest.

Assume now that cuts in spending on resources and time are required. As we indicated earlier the concept of SEA is relatively new and no standardized method or model exists from which a reduced form can be developed to match the new budget constraints. Figure 1 illustrates the problem in general terms. It is assumed that the total marginal costs of acquiring and processing information is upward sloping with marginal costs of acquiring information increasing relatively strongly as compared to costs of processing. Marginal benefits of information show a negative slope, with costs and benefits balancing at $\bar{O}$, which would require a budget covering total costs at this point. If the budget does not allow for such expenses, it is pertinent to cut expenses by means of efficiency measures or, alternatively, by reducing areas of information acquisition.

Important variables affecting spending on information acquisition are in all likelihood the size of the impact area, and the number of variables expressing economic activity and environmental diversity. The DHV study is illustrative of the point: three subregions within the impact area have been distinguished with a large number of specific environmental and economic characteristics or dimensions.
The first problem to be faced here is that it is hard to generate information required to delineate the impact area *ex ante*. We came across this phenomenon earlier in our brief discussion of the limitations of CGE models. Figure 2 illustrates the interaction of some crucial variables in a land use conversion model. On the horizontal axis, $F$ depicts the maximum-forested area. The upward sloping $NN$ or $N'N'$ curve reflects the marginal net value of non-forest products such as cattle, agricultural produce including ethanol and soya that are produced after deforestation. This can be considered the opportunity costs of forest conservation. The higher international prices for agricultural produce and revenues from land use conversion, the higher opportunity costs of keeping the area forested once the forested area is connected with international markets by means of a road. The $DD$ curve reflects the marginal value of conserved forest area to the country itself, and the $D'W$ curve reflects the value of forests and forest services to the world as a whole. Clearly, the less forest still available, the higher its marginal value will be. With high prices for agricultural produce and low rewards for environmental services provided by forests, we move rapidly towards the origin of the figure. Put differently: the impact area expands as measured by registered land use conversion. The point here is that none of these critical variables is known over the longer term, and that hardly any of these variables can be influenced by the country concerned. Consequently, the plan of action cannot be formulated as one package from the start of the implementation period of the infrastructure programme, but needs permanent adjustment.

The second problem concerning the acquisition of information relates to the public consultation. As indicated earlier, the public consultation is a critical...
Figure 2. Costs and benefits of deforestation: the long-run unknowns


component of SEA-type investigations and generates information required as an input for the plan of action. Two points may be distinguished here that create biases in the outcomes and limit their robustness. First, the interviews reflect priorities of insiders only, not of persons not yet located in the area. Second, the preferences and expectations concerning the road as expressed by the interviewed persons are based on partial information and on a type of extrapolation of the actual situation with respect to variables that are involved other than the road itself. Hence, these expectations cannot be considered so-called rational expectations.

From the above it follows that the acquisition of information on future developments in the impact area is hampered by poor capabilities to forecast markets, and by biases in the results of the public consultation. Faced with these methodological problems, and excluding the options of efficiency improvement or budget expansion to acquire information, three steps may be considered. First, make intertemporal adjustments in the plan of action, with the plan focusing on a sequence of shorter periods. Second, in case of a lack of reliable information, apply the precautionary principle, particularly when faced with irreversible potential impacts. Three, improve governability to enhance law enforcement and the use of (existing) economic instruments such as taxes and subsidies, and of non-economic instruments such as protected areas and reserves.

SEAs are a vital mechanism to stimulate the potential welfare enhancing impact of road infrastructure and mitigate potential negative effects on human welfare, animal and plant life and the environment. Cutting time and budgets available for making SEAs in the context of large infrastructure programmes like IIRSA with potentially large and irreversible effects is probably unsound from the perspective of rational decision-making and human welfare. Moreover, it may undermine political and popular support for the infrastructure programme itself, at the local, national and international level.
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Review Essay/Ensayo de Reseña

Searching for Work, Striving for Justice: New Perspectives on Latin American Migrations to the United States

Robert V. Kemper


Impacts of Border Enforcement on Mexican Migration: The View from Sending Communities, edited by Wayne A. Cornelius and Jessa M. Lewis. La Jolla, SD: Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, University of California, 2007.


From the earliest social science works concerned with the northward migration of Mexican citizens and other Latin Americans to the United States (Gamio 1930, 1931; McWilliams 1942; Taylor 1928, 1933), questions have been posed about who migrates, where do they come from and where do they go, what are their characteristics compared to those who stay behind, what successes do they enjoy and what failures do they endure (Durand, Massey, and Zenteno 2001). Over the decades, the number of persons involved in this population flow has grown dramatically, so that now virtually every community in Mexico – and many in Central America – can count its fathers and wives, its sons and daughters among the Hispanic-origin population spreading throughout the United States. It is no surprise that as new ideas, theories, and paradigms emerged they have been put to the empirical test in the domain of migration. In the 1930s and 1940s, an ‘acculturation’ framework was popularized and widely contested; in the 1950s and 1960s, many scholars used a ‘modernization’ model, then in the 1970s and 1980s others employed ‘dependency theories’ and ‘historical-structural’ approaches (Kemper 1979, 1995). By the 1990s, and continuing to the present, many scholars have focused on specific issues, such as gender, health, ethnicity, and even religion, often within a ‘transnational’ project in which individual agency is set against governmental and corporate power.

Whatever approach is adopted, whatever level of analysis is pursued, we still
struggle to comprehend the impact of migration upon individuals, their families, and their households, as well as its effects on the political economies of sending and receiving regions. Social scientists also have striven to appreciate the complicated relationships among individual decisions about migration, local and regional conditions, and national and international governmental policies. Recently, a number of scholars and social critics have recast the phenomenon of migration from Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America as a human rights and social justice matter.

With a social science literature already numbering in the tens of thousands of articles, book chapters, monographs, theses, and dissertations, what more can be written about the northward migration to the United States? Is there anything to inspire new research and new policy directions? If the five volumes under review here are any measure of current research, then the answer is a resounding ‘yes’. Each volume offers a distinctive perspective and adds an important voice to the current debate about the impacts of this massive population transfer from south to north and the reciprocal flow of remittances from north to south.

Migration history

First, consider Corridors of Migration: The Odyssey of Mexican Laborers, 1600-1933. This splendid history of labour migration is the magnum opus of Professor Rodolfo F. Acuña, founder of the Chicano Studies Department at California State University, Northridge, and author of many works on Mexican-Americans in the United States, including six editions of Occupied America: A History of Chicanos, first published in 1972. A research project that began in 1973 with a focus on the 1933 San Joaquin Valley Cotton Strike eventually turned into a 2,000 page manuscript. In the hands of the skilful editors at the University of Arizona Press, this massive product of Acuña’s personal odyssey has been transformed into a handsome book, with a text of 285 pages accompanied by 38 maps and historical photographs, nearly 80 pages of notes, and more than 40 pages of sources cited.

How did a project focused on a 1933 labour strike become a history of Mexican migration from the beginning of the seventeenth century to the first third of the twentieth century? The author began his odyssey with just one randomly selected individual in mind: Pedro Subia, who was murdered on a picket line near Arvin, California, on 10 October 1933. Not content to write a historical biography, Acuña instead sought to know more about the experiences of Subia and his cohort of immigrants from Mexico. Using the metaphor of a ‘corridor’, Acuña asked ‘What corridors had they forged on their way to the San Joaquin Valley?’ (p. x). Eventually, Acuña’s research revealed four important corridors – the Camino Real Corridor, stretching from Mexico City through Durango to Chihuahua to El Paso and New Mexico; the Sonoran Corridor, heading northward from Hermosillo to southern Arizona; the Mesilla Corridor, running across southern New Mexico and Arizona; and the Cotton Corridor, connecting southern Arizona to Los Angeles and onward to the region of central California. These four corridors provide the major metaphor that connects the lives of individual migrants to the broader issues and structures of their times. In short, this volume tells the story of Pedro Subia and others like him who travelled from Mexico to the United States southwest and eventually settled in the agricultural heartland of the California Central Valley –
and, we may add, whose children and grandchildren have moved on to live and work in cities in California, Oregon, Washington, and other western states.

Rather than focusing on the twentieth century, Acuña takes us back to the arrival of the Europeans in the vast region that the Spaniards came to call Nueva España. Chapter 1 tells of the bitter fruits of conquest, stressing the resistance of the native peoples to the imposition of Spanish rule, especially in the north-central region that became Zacatecas and Chihuahua. Despite a series of violent revolts, the Spaniards consolidated their colonial institutions and gained control over the land, the water, and the people. In Chapter 2, Acuña describes the continuing transformations of Chihuahua during the first century of Mexican independence from Spain. The conflicts between conservatives and liberals for power at the highest levels of government did little to bring freedom or prosperity to ordinary people in Chihuahua. As the author points out, ‘Four major developments accelerated the state’s economic and political transformation: the defeat of the Apaches, the monopolization of land and water, the arrival of the Mexican Central Railroad, and the massive influx of foreign capital’ (p. 36). These developments enriched the few and impoverished many among the middle class and the peasants, setting the stage for the violent reaction to the worst features of the long rule of Porfirio Díaz.

The difficult conditions in Chihuahua led many workers to migrate northward into what had become the southern stretches of New Mexico and Arizona, an area that was becoming very profitable for powerful companies invested in gold, silver, and copper mining. Acuña relates the increasing difficulties of Mexican workers and their families in the mining camps and company towns in southern Arizona and northern Mexico. Wage cuts, increased hours, and problems with Euro-Americans who were given the better paying jobs resulted in numerous labour confrontations, including the Clifton-Morenci Strike of 1902 and the Cananea Strike of 1906.

The migration of Mexican workers and their families continued along the Cotton corridor toward California. The decline in the mining industry, and the violence associated with the union struggles there, brought tens of thousands of Mexicans to Los Angeles and thence to the Central Valley agricultural region. The arrival of the Depression in 1929 brought increasingly hostile attitudes to Mexicans, not only in the workplace but in schools and other public accommodations. In the early 1930s, repatriation programmes encouraged thousands of Mexicans to return to their homeland, but ultimately a lack of support from an impoverished Mexican government meant failure for such efforts. These events set the stage for the San Joaquin Valley Cotton Strike of 1933 and its aftermath. Noting that, ‘Although Los Angeles was not in the San Joaquin Valley, it controlled it’ (p. 242), Acuña points out that forces far beyond those of the Mexican labour migrants were at work to ensure that their New Deal-supported unionizing efforts would not succeed. Matters reached a frenzied pitch in the fall of 1933, when the cotton crop was ready for harvest. On 10 October, Pedro Subia, age 57, was killed during a confrontation between striking labourers and growers. His was not the only death in that moment, but it became a symbol for the manner in which the powerful growers (and the banks who owned their contracts) dealt with Mexican migrant labourers in California. Soon thereafter, a Commission was created to assess the situation. In its report, the Commission concluded that ‘the civil rights of the strikers have been violated’ (p. 261-262).
In the volume’s final chapter, the author concludes that ‘What this monograph clearly shows is that significant social change does not come about without opposition to the established order’ (p. 280). In this light, we might add that migration per se is a challenge to the ‘established order’, especially when it occurs on the scale that has existed between Mexico and the United States for the past 100 years. In this superb and well-documented monograph, Acuña accomplishes his goal: to show how a particular event – the murder of Pedro Subia in 1933 – was not an isolated incident determined only by the decisions of individuals present at the scene, but also was the outcome of more than two hundred years of structural changes in Mexican and U.S. societies.

**Sending communities**

Following on Acuña’s work, we have not one but three volumes co-edited by Prof. Wayne Cornelius, Director of the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies (CCIS) at the University of California, San Diego, and founder of the unique Mexican Migration and Field Research Program (MMFRP), in which undergraduate and graduate students conduct fieldwork in Mexican communities of high emigration and in U.S. receiving communities.²

The Introduction considers the major issues behind the question, ‘Does border enforcement deter unauthorized immigration?’ Cornelius convincingly shows that past and current U.S. border policies not only have failed to accomplish their stated deterrence goals but have had the unintended consequences of separating families across the border and causing untold thousands of persons to remain north of the border rather than returning to their homes south of the border. In brief, ‘Our findings suggest that current U.S. immigration control policy is fundamentally flawed’ (p. 12). In addition to this summary of the selected findings of the field project, Cornelius describes the research design and methodology employed in the two agricultural communities – Tlacuitapa, Jalisco and Las Ánimas, Zacatecas. Chapter 2 offers basic profiles of these two sending communities as of the 2005 fieldwork period, noting important similarities and differences. Next, Chapter 3 takes up the problem of the contemporary migration process by examining the demographic and occupational profiles of ‘experienced’ migrants and non-migrants. After discussing why some community members stay in town, the authors take up the case of the migrants, emphasizing the importance of family and social networks. Through a logistic regression analysis, the authors suggest that a significant predictor of an ‘intent to migrate’ is an individual’s sense of relative deprivation, which leads them to conclude that migration from the two communities ‘is driven principally by economic considerations’ (p. 51). Chapter 4 examines the impacts of U.S. immigration policies on migration behaviour. The authors effectively combine the personal stories (and tragedies) of previous migrants with a statistical analysis of survey responses. Two findings are striking: first, ‘we could find no evidence that Border patrol efforts actually deter undocumented migration’, and ‘interviewees who knew someone who died while crossing the border are significantly more likely to risk a crossing themselves, indicating that even awareness of the risk does not deter entry’ (p. 59).

The following chapters analyse several other important elements. The problem
of ‘emptying-out’ the sending communities and the settlement of the migrants in the United States are discussed in chapter 5. After considering the failure of employer sanctions to mitigate migration flows, the authors examine the successful use of family and social networks in the settlement process. The authors of Chapter 6 on gender differences note that female out-migration is increasing in both communities, although women often migrate not from economic necessity but in order to reunite with husbands and other family members. Chapter 7 examines the generational dimensions of the migration tradition. The four generations of emigrants are grouped into four categories: bracero programme-era (prior to 1964); post-bracero programme era (1965-1985); Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) era (1986-1992); and new border enforcement era (1993-present). With respect to their border crossing experiences, the post-1993 migrants reported less difficulty than earlier migrants. The linkages between migration and the actual and perceived levels of economic development in the sending communities are considered in Chapter 8. The opening of a shoe factory in the region has brought jobs to some, but hardly will stem the tide northward. Nor have the impacts of NAFTA been as positive as promised. The major linkage between migration and development is the substantial flow of remittances from the north, most of which feeds and maintains family members in the sending communities. Finally, Chapter 9 brings the text to a close by looking at political involvement among migrants, first in terms of their voting behaviour in Mexican elections and second in terms of their desires to become U.S. citizens. The results of the survey show that a majority of the migrants ‘expressed a desire to become U.S. citizens’ (p. 160).

The follow-up volume on Tlacuitapa, Jalisco, provides additional data and more theoretical insights into the experience of this sending community in west central Mexico. *Four Generations of Norteños: New Research from the Cradle of Mexican Migration* is a major contribution to the literature precisely because it provides a long-term perspective on migration from a community whose history and current circumstances are well-documented. Using the standard bi-national research model as in the other CCIS-MMFRP studies, this 2007 project generated nearly 1,000 survey and life history interviews with returned migrants and non-migrants in Tlacuitapa, as well as their U.S.-based relatives in Oklahoma City, the San Francisco Bay area, and other U.S. receiving communities.

After the editors present an introduction to the evolution of Tlacuitapa as a town of ‘norteños’, the student authors offer models of migrant decision-making in light of a three-level framework: macro- (state), meso- (community), and micro-level (individual) forces. In general terms, the state level involved the development of the bracero programme during World War II, the creation of NAFTA in 1994, and the several economic crises endured by Mexico and by the United States since the Depression of the 1930s. The community level involves the social networks that have come into existence since the 1940s, the cumulative effects of migration upon the community, and the development of a culture of emigration toward the north. The individual level reflects the characteristics (education, income) of particular persons as well as their perceptions of expected wage differentials between work available at home and to be obtained in the United States. After examining the decision-making processes and characteristics of Tlacuitapa emigrants, the authors conclude that settlement in the United States is rarely the original intent but is
an unintended consequence of longer stays, often encouraged by increased border enforcement or year-round U.S. employment.

Chapter 3 focuses on the post-1993 militarization of the U.S. border with Mexico and the ways in which the people of Tlacuitapa have responded. The unintended consequence of heightened border enforcement is that emigrants stay longer in the north and minimize the number of return trips to Mexico, even if this means missing the birth of one’s child, a mother’s funeral, or a sister’s marriage. Current U.S. policies also encourage men to bring their wives and children to the north, which also increases the length of their stays. Nearly half of those surveyed held well-founded concerns about the dangers of crossing through the desert or mountains, especially in Arizona – which now has the highest proportion of illegal crossings along the border. In recent years, dehydration, heat stroke, and hypothermia have been become daily companions of the unauthorized migrants in their treks across the border wilderness. Trailng far behind (at 15 per cent) was a concern with Mexican bandits, notorious for ambushing their compatriots, beating, robbing, and raping them at gunpoint. The grim result of U.S. border enforcement policies has been to force many potential migrants into dangerous crossing zones – since the mid-1990s more than 4,000 persons from Mexico and other Latin American countries have lost their lives along the border. Among the toll of dead are several members of the Tlacuitapa community.

The coyote industry is studied in Chapter 4. The ethnography describes the structure of the business – from the highest levels of patrones (bosses), to the coyotes themselves to their assistants. Below the level of assistants are the chequeadores and chequeadores pa’riba who signal when it is safe to cross the border and pass through checkpoints beyond the border. At the bottom of the hierarchy are cuidanderos (caretakers), usually young teenagers who distract Border Patrol agents, remove tire spikes along preferred routes, and provide information on local conditions. Nearly all migrants from Tlacuitapa, often through the assistance of family and friends with prior experiences, arrange to hire coyotes before reaching the border. Payment – ranging from a few hundred to several thousand dollars, depending on the type of migrant and the distance involved – is usually made by family members who receive the new arrivals. In effect, another unintended consequence of current U.S. border policies has been to stimulate a larger and more efficient coyote industry.

The following chapters focus on visas, remittances, cultural cleavages and gender. Whereas most earlier migrants were able to obtain their ‘papeles’ to permit their legal stays in the United States, burdens of paperwork, high fees, and long delays have forced more recent migrants to enter without legal authorization. The important role of remittances in local development is linked to the fact that many small-scale producers have suffered from Mexico’s entry into the GATT in 1986 and into NAFTA in 1994. As a result, migrant remittances have become not only a form of insurance but a vital component of the local economy. The authors estimate that the annual remittances to Tlacuitapa are more than $1.5 million dollars yearly, which yields a per capita flow of over $2,700 dollars. Most remittances are spent on household maintenance, health care, and other basic expenses rather than on capital investments (such as starting a business). Regarding cultural cleavages emerging among migrants and non-migrants, the authors report that migrants often
are labelled ‘norteños’ (northerners) when they return home to Jalisco. This ‘norteño’ label defines migrants as outsiders in their own community. Younger migrants find themselves caught between two worlds, urban America and rural Mexico, with their sense of identity challenged in both places. The impact of migration on gender relations ranges from dating to marriage to family arrangements. While men often migrate prior to being married, women are more likely to migrate after marriage. Many residents endure bi-national family situations, with the husband in the north while the wife and children remain at home. Such separations take a toll on families and local social organization. Migration also influences the household economy. In the United States, more women work outside of the home than is the case in Tlacuitapa. This often leads men to take on more household chores and child care duties in the United States than they would have done back home.

Bringing the volume to a close, Chapter 9 examines the so-called ‘migrant health paradox’ (see also Mayan Journeys reviewed below) as manifested among the Tlacuitapeños. The authors offer three findings: (1) the migrants in the sample are healthier than their non-migrant counterparts; (2) migrants with more exposure to the United States are not likely to report an increased number of infirmities, suggesting that longer stays in the United States do not necessarily lead to a decline in health; and (3) the obstacles to migration constitute a filtering effect, and only healthier Tlacuitapeños decide to make the journey north. Going beyond primary health conditions, the authors also examine job-related injuries among migrants in the United States. Because many male migrants work in construction and other hazardous trades, accidents are common and deaths are not unknown. Negotiating the U.S. health care system is a challenge for migrants, especially those without insurance or with insufficient coverage.

Taken together, these two volumes do a splendid job of describing and analysing migration decision-making and behaviour in two significant sending communities and their respective receiving areas in the United States. The 18 chapters and more than 450 pages of text, principally authored by more than fifty undergraduate and graduate students, have been admirably assembled and edited by Cornelius and his colleagues, Jessa M. Lewis, David Fitzgerald, and Scott Borger. The result of their collective work is clear and unburdened by excessive jargon. We can only hope that policy-makers in Mexico and the United States will heed the recommendations offered here so that a more just approach to the needs of people, communities, and nations can be implemented in the near future.

Mayan migration

The third volume co-edited by Cornelius et al., Mayan Journeys: The New Migration from Yucatán to the United States, intentionally focuses attention on a community (Tunkás, Yucatán) with a recent pattern of emigration to the United States. Following the model of the MMFRP, more than 30 students from UCSD and the Mexican partner institution (Centro INAH Yucatán) participated in the field research and writing of this monograph. Chapter 1 considers Yucatán as an emerging migrant-sending region. After discussing the four major regions (Traditional, North, Central, and South-southeast) from which Mexican migrants travel north-
ward to the United States, the author (and co-editor) Pedro Lewis Fischer tackles the problem of the Yucatán peninsula as a regional migration system. Unlike the earlier CCIS-MMFRP volume on Jalisco and Zacatecas, here attention is paid to internal population movements, especially to the growing touristic centres in the so-called ‘Mundo Maya’ in and around Cancún, in Quintana Roo. The remittances from these regional migrants have sustained rural Mayan communities for several decades and continue to be important revenue sources. Unfortunately, economic crises and tropical storms have combined to force residents to contemplate other options, including emigration to the United States. Next, Chapter 2 provides the reader with an introduction to the community of Tunkás, which means ‘ugly rocks’ in Mayan, a town of just under 3,000 inhabitants. The pioneering generation is being replaced by younger emigrants, most of whom follow their social networks to communities in southern California, especially in Anaheim, Santa Ana, and Inglewood.

The contemporary migration process is the subject of Chapter 3. The authors consider migrants’ demographic profile and their motives for heading north to the United States. Their model of the migration process emphasizes the role of the U.S. labour market and the importance of social networks. They also observe that women who travel to the United States experience some liberation from the constraints imposed on them in a traditional rural Mayan community. Thus, relative to men who tend to lose prestige and power in the north, women gain a measure of freedom and control. In Chapter 4, the authors consider the linkages between internal and international migration. This chapter shows that the experience of working and living in urban places like Cancún and Mérida can provide a foundation and a stimulus for successful international migration. The case of the Tunkaseños confirms the view that ‘internal migration promotes future international migration’ (p. 86).

Chapter 5 deals with the impacts of U.S. immigration policies on the migration behaviour of the people of Tunkás. The use of coyotes is on the rise as are the prices they charge for safe passage across the border. The research in Tunkás shows that ‘migrants are undeterred by their awareness of physical danger and heightened risk of detection. [The] data also confirm that the increasing costs of circumventing these obstacles are contributing to longer stays by migrants once they reach the United States’ (p. 112). Border crossing often leads to settling out of the migrant stream. In Chapter 6, the authors take on this perennial issue among scholars and policy-makers. They found that those emigrants who settle in the United States are much more likely (83 per cent to 53 per cent) to have some form of documented status. The increasing number of female migrants, many of whom can go north as a result of family unification policies, has contributed to this difference.

While an increasing number of Tunkaseños are participating in internal and international migration flows, some ‘two-thirds of the adult population of Tunkás have never migrated internationally, and approximately 80 per cent of the non-migrant population reported that they have never considered living outside of Tunkás permanently’ (pp. 145-146, Chapter 7). The most important reason for remaining in the community is a sense of family obligations. Moreover, stay-at-homes often have a negative impression of the outside world based on the often culturally inappropriate behaviour of return migrants to the community. Chapter 8
focuses on migration and local development, including the declining agricultural employment opportunities, the limited access to credit due to the absence of a local financial institution, and the increasing role of remittances. The authors offer an interesting case study of apiculture (bee-keeping) to show that this sector has a high potential to provide steady employment and income for those who remain in Tunkás. Ethnicity’s relationship to migration is the subject of chapter 9. The authors examine the way in which Mayan ethnic identity determines migration behaviour, a topic that also is the focus of Foxen’s study of K’iche’ Mayan communities in Guatemala (see below). The survey in Tunkás and among the migrants in southern California reveals that the U.S. migrants, internal migrants, and non-migrants have similar ethnic self-identifications. The largest proportion in each group self-identify as Yucatecan and then secondarily as Mexican. Only 12 per cent to 15 per cent of each group self-identifies primarily as Mayan, and in the case of internal migrants and non-migrants they are more likely to self-identify according to their religious affiliations than as Mayan (Table 9.1, p. 172).

In Chapter 10, the theme of migration and religion is addressed. Noting that recent years have seen an increase in migration to the United States and an increase in non-Catholic religious groups, the authors ponder this correlation for the case of Tunkás. Although there are 77 per cent Catholics and 23 per cent non-Catholics in Tunkás, their demographic, economic, and migratory characteristics are similar. About a third of both groups have migrated to the United States at least once, and about 4 in 5 in both groups already had a family member in the United States before they migrated. Remittances are similar among both groups, with regard to frequency and amounts sent home. Finally, about 25 per cent of each group plans to migrate to the United States in the current year (Table 10.1, p. 197). In sum, the authors conclude that ‘religious differences in Tunkás do not significantly influence migratory behaviour’ (p. 206).

Chapter 11 deals with migration and health, in particular the so-called ‘Latino health paradox’ that the longer Mexican migrants remain in the United States the less healthy they become. The survey of Tunkás residents and emigrants provides interesting data about this paradox. According to the authors, ‘across the entire range of self-reported diseases we surveyed, Tunkaseño migrants are sicker than their non-migrating counterparts. Rates of diabetes, hypertension, and high cholesterol are significantly higher for Tunkaseños with migration experience’ (p. 213). Migrants from Tunkás are more likely than non-migrants to visit traditional medical practitioners, even though they are better educated, are more exposed to modern health-care practices, and are of higher economic status than those who do not migrate (p. 216). On the other hand, migrants are more likely to suffer from alcoholism and depression than are stay-at-homes. The volume concludes with a discussion of migration and political participation. The authors focus on what they call ‘political binationalis’, the segment of migrants who have attachments to both U.S. and Yucatecan political systems. The survey shows that more than half of the migrants are interested in becoming U.S. citizens while only about one-quarter are not interested in naturalizing their status. About one in six have already become citizens. Nearly 92 per cent of Tunkaseño migrants who could speak English expressed interest in acquiring U.S. citizenship (p. 245).

In summary, Mayan Journeys is a thorough, well-written case study of the
sending and receiving sides of a ‘new’ migrant community. It is especially valuable for its emphasis on the linkages between international and internal migration. Perhaps a future research team can follow up with additional studies, in the way that the recent MMFRP studies of Tlacuitapa, Jalisco, and Las Ánimas, Zacatecas, were built on earlier fieldwork. If so, then Tunkás may join nearby Dzitas (cf. Redfield 1941) as one of the iconic communities in the ethnographic literature of Yucatán and Mexico.

The last volume to be reviewed here, In Search of Providence: Transnational Mayan Identities, is the only one not based in Mexico. But this is an accident of colonial and national histories, and the border between Mexico and Guatemala is no more than a virtual dotted line in the forest. As one of the major Mayan Indian populations in Mesoamerica, the K’iche’ Mayan Indians, the focus of Patricia Foxen’s ethnography, can properly be considered together with Mayan Journeys and other works concerned with migration to the United States. Foxen, a research associate in the Women’s Health Programme at the Toronto General Hospital, with a cross-appointment at the University of Toronto Anthropology Department, first became involved with Central American refugees as a volunteer for an NGO during the 1980s. Eventually, through a casual conversation with an immigration lawyer in Boston, she learned about a enclave of 15,000-20,000 Guatemala immigrants in Providence, Rhode Island (or, as they called it, Providencia). She did some sixteen months of fieldwork in El Quiché, Guatemala, and in Rhode Island between 1996 and 1998, with the first half spent in Xinxuc (a pseudonym) and the second half in Providence. Her ethnographic travels back and forth from the Guatemalan highlands to a traditional New England city provide an experience through which Foxen could appreciate that the Mayans found themselves con un pie aquí y otro allá (‘with one foot here and one foot there’).

Chapter 1 tells the story of how the author settled into Xinxuc. Given her prior experiences with an NGO it is not surprising that she found a European NGO (to which she gives the pseudonym PLANTAS) that offered her a place to stay in their headquarters in the town. When she hired the young wife of one of the PLANTAS promoters to work as a translator, Foxen found herself thrust into the midst of the complex social field of families with connections to Providence. Arriving in Providence in spring 1997, Foxen was fortunate to find an apartment in the middle of one of the two inner-city neighbourhoods inhabited by Guatemalan and other immigrant groups. Foxen was able to do interviews in different settings among women and men, and found that her ever-growing photograph collection provided excellent opportunities to learn people’s stories. When she returned to Xinxuc, she was greeted warmly by many, but found distrust among others, especially in the light of larger political events in Guatemala at that time.

In Chapter 2, Foxen provides a sweeping overview of Mayan history since early colonial times, with increasingly detailed accounts of late twentieth-century political developments from la violencia through the 1996 Peace Accords and beyond. In this historical context, the author distinguishes among coastal labour migration, urban migration, and foreign migration and asks how the transnational movements to and from Providence compare to and differ from traditional modes of population mobility among the K’iche’. A historical and ethnographic description of the K’iche’ of Xinxuc is provided in Chapter 3. Foxen notes that absent
family members can be found in diverse settings – from coastal plantations to urban factories to Providence. She observes that, ‘This pursuit of multiple migration strategies and economic alternatives is critical to marginalized people and families for whom any one option is highly susceptible to failure’ (p. 78). Foxen concludes the chapter by noting that, ‘The extreme fear and social disintegration produced by the war in Xinxuc must be taken into account when examining the cultural and psychological impacts of subsequent cross-border movements’ (p. 95)

Foxen lays out the pioneer phase of migration from Xinxuc to La Costa del Norte – Providence, U.S.A – of the mid-1980s, during the period of la violencia, and describes the dangers of the trip through Mexico and the United States to Providence, with two border crossings along the way. These days, with coyotes providing guidance during the trip, a K’iche’ without proper documents might pay from $3,000 to $4,000 to go from home to Providence. Migrants often explain their decision to leave Xinxuc and the success or failure on the trip in terms of suerte (‘luck’). Deciding to go north actually depends on much more than luck. Some leave out of a sense of desperation (pura necesidad), others from a sense of familial duty (pura obligación), and still others from a sense of adventure (aventura).

Once arrived in Providence, most migrants usually settle into one of two enclaves. Unlike many other immigrant populations, they lack formal social and economic organizations (equivalent to the home town associations found among so many Mexican migrants). In spite of this lack of collective spirit – which results in part from the distrust and fear of the time of la violencia – many of the migrants from Xinxuc work hard to maintain their ties with their sending community. Remittances are routinely sent back to their families as part of a tremendous flow of funds that has become Guatemala’s major source of foreign exchange – along with coffee. Those who appear to deny their identity and background are criticized by those who maintain strong ties to Xinxuc. Envy and gossip are used to control those who are more successful than others. As Foxen notes, there is a ‘difficult balance between striving to superar and maintaining a sense of local indigenous identity’ (p. 152).

What identities do the K’iche’ Maya Indians of Xinxuc claim (or reject) as they settle in Providence or move back and forth between the United States and Guatemala? Foxen approaches this question by examining the relevance of the ‘Mayanist project’ to the migrants in Providence. Some of the K’iche’ migrants are openly abusive of the Mayanist movement back home, while others support it. Whatever their stance on this issue, the migrants understand the multiplicity of ways of being indigenous. Next, Foxen moves from migration to memory when she asks ‘How do the different social spaces of Xinxuc and Providence influence the memory processes that enable people to cope with past horror and go on with life?’ (pp. 202-203). Her answer suggests that the people of Xinxuc are trapped in a transnational system of multiple identities. As the author says in her concluding remarks, ‘In the end, this book has provided a detailed snapshot of a group of indigenous people in a small Guatemalan town who move to an American inner city in which they find themselves marginalized within a complex society that is in fact a compendium of such communities. And yet, within this microcosm, [...] we see the dreams and horrors, the promises and the failures, the voices and the silences, of whole worlds’ (p. 250).
These five volumes offer new perspectives on migration, Middle America, and ethnic identity and provide a powerful witness to the hopes and dreams of marginalized people who are searching for work and striving for justice in a world that has come uninvited into their lives. Acuña, Cornelius et al., and Foxen should be required reading for governmental policy makers who know too little about the reality of migration cultures and systems in communities located far from the halls of power in the United States, Mexico, and Guatemala.

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Notes

1. The volumes published by the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies are distributed by Lynne Rienner Publishers.

2. Beyond the three volumes reviewed here, a fourth volume is in preparation, based on field research conducted in 2007-2008 in the community of San Miguel Tlacotepec, located in the remote Mixteca region of Oaxaca, and in a receiving community in the San Diego metropolitan area. The forthcoming monograph, titled Migration from the Mexican Mixteca: A Transnational Community in Oaxaca and California, will be edited by Wayne A. Cornelius, David Fitzgerald, Jorge Hernández Díaz, and Scott Borger.

References


Reseñas/Book Reviews


Written by one of the world’s leading demographers, Conquest focuses on the demographic impact of European arrival in the New World. The extent and causes of the demographic decline have been the subject of considerable scholarly debate in recent years. Livi Bacci starts from the premise that the demographic evidence available for the early conquest period is inadequate to address the question of the extent of demographic decline, but that the mass of contextual materials enables hypotheses to be developed and some insight gained into the nature and causes of the demographic catastrophe. This volume therefore focuses as much on processes as on numerical data, though there is a large measure of this as well. Whereas most studies of the demographic collapse of the Native American population focus on mortality and its causes, a significant strength of the book is that it also examines the role of fertility and the nature of immigration. Overall it aims to show that the demographic impact was not uniform, but rather varied regionally according to the nature of conquest and colonial rule as well as the indigenous societies and their environments they affected.

Chapter 2 examines the extent and causes of demographic decline as described by contemporary witnesses, notably Bartolomé de las Casas and Toribio de Benavente (Motolinia). While much of this material is well known, Livi Bacci manages to reveal the complexity and interaction of the processes involved. Chapters 3 and 4 then examine the twin causes that scholars have generally held to be most significant in explaining the demographic collapse: the impact of Old World diseases to which Native Americans lacked immunity and forced labour and ill treatment to which native peoples and African slaves were subjected. There has been considerable debate over the relative importance of these two factors, which has often been depicted as bitter and polarized. In this context, Livi Bacci’s volume, which examines the interrelationships between them, is to be welcomed.

Chapter 3 focuses on the impact of Old World diseases and especially the impact of smallpox. This focus might be justified on the grounds that smallpox probably had the greatest demographic impact, but there were many other important diseases, not least measles and possibly the tropical fevers. On the grounds of epidemiological probability, Livi Bacci remains unconvinced that there were any major epidemics prior to 1518, as others scholars such as Francisco Guerra have argued. He usefully examines the importance of changes to economic and social conditions on the impact of disease. However, those seeking a more comprehensive account of the chronicle of disease outbreaks in the early colonial period, if not their impact, should turn to N. David Cook’s Born to Die (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

The demographic impact of forced labour particularly in mining is dealt with in Chapter 4. Here Livi Bacci paints a vivid picture of mining conditions, leaving discussions of the labour and tributary system to later chapters. Here he argues that the greatest impact of forced labour was not to raise mortality, harsh though condi-
tions were, but to stimulate migration, which destabilized communities and af-
fected fertility.

In Chapters 5 to 8 Livi Bacci considers the demographic impact of conquest in four regions: Hispaniola, Central Mexico, Peru and Brazil. The first two chapters review the well-known debates over the size of the native population and critically examine the work of Sherburne Cook and Woodrow Borah. The discussion is relatively even-handed, though it is clear that Livi Bacci would include himself among the ‘low counters.’ For Peru he focuses on the impact of civil wars, prolonged conflict and migration. He argues that the impact of conquest was greater and more prolonged in Peru. These processes may have been more significant factors in the Andes, but other studies suggest that demographic decline was lower in the Peruvian highlands, and indeed throughout region, than it was in Mexico. Finally, Livi Bacci examines the demographic impact of the Jesuit missions on the Guarani arguing that they were less affected by Old World diseases and racial mixing and had high fertility. His suggestion of a growth rate of two per cent a year is high for preindustrial societies and is likely to have been derived in part from more effective evangelization. Also, the Jesuit missions in Paraguay were the exception rather than the rule, and the positive picture he paints, which in the conclusion he implies might apply to other mission fields, may not be valid.

For scholars the book covers fairly well-known ground and for them its strength will lie in its exploration of the demographic consequences of economic and social processes and the inclusion of discussions of fertility and migration in the debate. For the popular audience it is a well-illustrated, useful and balanced introduction to the demographic impact of conquest and the debates that surround it. Potential readers should note that despite the title of the book, it does not for the most part consider North America. The text is lively and is full of interesting quotations and demographic data. It is also liberally illustrated with drawings by Guaman Poma de Ayala and extracts from the Florentine and Mendoza codices. Nevertheless, the translation is a bit awkward in parts – Viceregency for Viceroyalty, Paulists for Paulistas – and this reviewer found the term ‘Indios’ really irritating. Why not Indians, Amerindians or Native Americans? There are also quite a lot of misspellings of Spanish words and places names such as Nueva Grenada, instead of Nueva Granada. These editorial shortcomings should not detract from what is an excellent provocative volume which should have wide appeal. It raises as many questions as it answers and ensures that the debate over the impact of colonial rule in Latin America will continue.

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If a new constitution for Ecuador is approved in the referendum scheduled for 28 September 2008, the state will officially become an intercultural and plurinational one. Despite the often rather tense relation between Ecuador’s indigenous movement, divided and debilitated after the experience of the Lucio Gutiérrez govern-
ment (2002-2005), and President Rafael Correa, who strongly opposed the demands of indigenous and other social movements, the indigenous movements will support the new Constitution since in the end it includes some limited gains regarding what they see as their main concerns. In their view, plurinationality is a broad concept that encompasses cultural rights, such as bilingual education and culturally sensitive healthcare, as well as collective economic rights, such as informed consent regarding the exploration or extraction of non-renewable resources in their territories. Although the notion of plurinationality is now included in the proposed constitution, its meaning and implications will continue to be a bone of contention in the years to come.

In any case, the controversies surrounding the new constitution, which is to replace the 1998 constitution, reflect the ongoing changes in relations between Indians and the state in Ecuador or, to put it differently, the changes in citizenship regimes in multicultural or plurinational societies that result from impositions ‘from above’ and resistance or negotiation ‘from below’. The volume under review provides an overview of the push and pull between Indians and the state in Ecuador from the time of its independence in 1830, when it separated from the Gran Colombia imagined by Simón Bolívar, up to 2006 when Rafael Correa was elected. The volume consists of fourteen chapters and a bibliographic essay. An introductory chapter by the editors is followed by nine case studies that focus on the evolving relations between highland Indians and the state. The next four chapters introduce a comparative perspective in addressing the different relations between indigenous peoples of the Ecuadorian Amazon and the state, comparing pathways of indigenous mobilization in Ecuador with those in Mexico, Bolivia and Peru.

As the editors state in their introductory chapter, taking this historical and comparative perspective allows us to see the singularities of state-Indian relations in Ecuador. With an economy principally centred in the hacienda system, rather than in mining, what Guerrero has called ‘ethnic administration’ in Ecuador became mostly an affair of local landholders, while the state remained rather distant. Later, when agrarian reforms occurred in the 1960s and ’70s, peasants organized according to a community model that had been introduced in 1937, in contrast to Peru where state intervention in the organization of cooperatives was much more active. In this way the volume seeks to contribute to the emerging literature on processes of state formation that highlights the active role played by subordinate groups in understanding the historically specific configurations we call ‘state’.

It is beyond the scope of this review to discuss in detail each of the contributions to this volume. They consist of case studies focusing on different parts of the highlands and illustrating the development of Indian-state relations in the course of time. These studies highlight the triangular relations between the indigenous population, local land- and power-holders and the central state, and how shifts in these relations provided opportunities for Indians to engage the state at different points in time. They also show how forms of engaging the state have shifted and how a language of contention, which incorporated elements of state and elite rhetoric regarding citizenship and the place of Indians in Ecuadorian society, took shape at different moments. And they document the process of indigenous organization, initially promoted by the Communist party, and then, after the agrarian reforms of the 1960s and 1970s, take a new turn that resulted in the formation of a national
Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) in 1986. CONAIE and its ‘political arm’ Pachakutik, created in 1996, came to play a central role in Ecuadorian politics through a policy of alliances with other popular sectors.

The last four contributions to the volume seek to place the process of a highland indigenous people’s organization in a comparative perspective and address Ecuador’s distinctiveness in the formation of a unified indigenous movement that spans both the Amazon region and the highlands. A first contribution is concerned with the particular history of state-Indian relations in the Amazon region and the role of regional indigenous organizations in the formation of a national level organization. The following contributions draw comparisons with Mexico, Bolivia and Peru where the trajectories and style of indigenous organization and their relations to the state and the political system have been different.

All in all, by bringing together a series of finely grained and well-contextualized case-studies, this volume provides fascinating insights into what Joseph and Nugent have called ‘everyday forms of state formation’, and as such is an excellent contribution to the emergent scholarly literature on this topic. This type of research seeks to unpack abstract notions of ‘the state’ and ‘the people’ by focusing on the complex politics and negotiations of power involved in state formation and the reconfiguration of citizenship regimes. By focusing on Ecuador and seeking to put the country in a comparative perspective the volume also constitutes a significant contribution to the understanding of indigenous organization and state formation.

While it is a very welcome contribution to the study of Indian-state relations in Ecuador, and elsewhere, I also would like to draw attention to some aspects that would merit further discussion. One aspect is the role of religion. Though the role of the Catholic Church is discussed in relation to the Amazon area, there is no discussion of its role in the emergence of Indian organizations in the highlands. Nonetheless, in the initial stages the help of Catholics inspired by liberation theology was important. Religion also plays some role in the divisions and rivalries among indigenous movements in the country. Also, the interaction between indigenous movements and other civil society organizations (including NGOs) remains somewhat obscure. A second aspect is the turn to participation in electoral politics with the creation of Pachakutik, a process that was quite controversial within the CONAIE in the first place. However, it resulted in the capture of positions within the state administrative structure at various levels (municipal, provincial, etc.) as well as in political representation in the national congress. A discussion of what it means to be involved in municipal politics, both for the indigenous movement and for the process of state formation would have been welcome. This becomes particularly relevant if we take into account that in various Latin American countries indigenous movements have become increasingly involved in electoral politics. That not only poses important dilemmas and creates tensions within these movements but it also raises further questions about state formation. Similarly, the participation of indigenous people in the management of state and multilaterally sponsored development programmes deserves further critical attention. And, thirdly, despite the reluctant support of the indigenous organizations that consider the proposal a ‘mixed bag’, the ongoing constitutional process will reframe Indian-state relations requiring attention that should be studied by taking into account similar or
contemporary processes in other Latin American countries such as Bolivia. The volume under review thus also raises some questions that require future research.

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Notes


It is a promising way of capturing the contemporary political and social turbulences affecting the Andean region: coining it as a conflict between state and society. But at the same time, it triggers an important question the authors must also have anticipated: is there such a thing as a clear-cut split, or even distinction, between the state and society? There is, to begin with, the Marxian assertion that the state is not the expression or institutional regulative system of the whole of ‘free wills’ in society, who collectively decided that some entity should adjudicate, govern and secure each and everyone’s liberties and activities. Additionally, there is the idea that the state should be analysed as a plethora of agents, interests and strife, and that, on the other hand, society should be analysed as co-constituted by – internalized and routinized – legislation, regulation, and legal identities and prerogatives, or, for example, by state presence. Finally, there is the suggestion expressed in Chapter 3 by Ann Mason and Arlene Tickner, that ‘transnational flows and processes slice through national spaces and connect a complex array of civil society actors, religious and ethnic associations, business and finance organizations, local government, and criminal structures’ (p. 76). In their introduction, the editors do not really address this issue of the alleged duality of state and society, but clarify their position by interpreting the state as, first and foremost, the executor of policies (such as a security regime focused on anti-drugs measures, neoliberal reforms, and establishing a political regime of [poorly installed] representative democracies) that often were imposed from abroad, leading to deteriorated relations with society and ‘a failure to incorporate, represent, and respond to vast segments of the population for which the state is increasingly distant, if not alien’ (p. 2).

This, however, leaves the question of the societal sectors inducing and supporting these policies unaccounted for. Additionally, it misses, as one of the contributors, Jo-Marie Burt proposes, ‘a relational perspective on state and society […] providing […] insights about the nature of contestation over the forms and scope of state and citizenship and […] helping to […] illuminate the mechanisms and processes that shape political outcomes’ (p. 223). The issue is symptomatic for a not fully coherent, somewhat conceptually ambivalent compilation of contributions –
contributions which nevertheless are very worthwhile and insightful.

The book consists of 10 chapters, of which the first one is an introduction by
the editors. In it the authors highlight the limited space for manoeuvre Andean
governments had during the last decades due to foreign pressures and influences,
and connect these to the traditionally weak institutions and party systems, the
enduring inequality and exclusion characterizing the continent, and the subsequent
increasing tendency to take semi-authoritarian ways out. They emphasize that the
crises in the Andean countries should not be addressed as individual cases, but
comparatively. Next, they identify the main dimensions of the crises: the lack of a
national project, the absence of a convincing alternative economic model, and,
thirdly, a contemporary ‘trend towards unorthodox modes of participation’ (p. 17),
boosting social movements which, however, remain ‘rather blunt instruments, fre-
quently incapable of representing their constituents to the state in an institutional-
ized and enduring manner’ (p. 19). This brings us to the fourth dimension: ‘[t]he
inadequacy of regular forms of political participation has enflamed the crisis of
governability and of democracy’ (p. 20). They finalize with a caveat on the differ-
ences between the northern and central Andes and with a brief sketch of the crises
in the countries covered in this volume: Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and
Bolivia. One remarkable feature of the analytical contours sketched in the intro-
duction is the apparent aspiration to restore more regimented and ‘calmer’ forms of
political participation. The ‘unmediated forms of participation’ and ‘uncontrolled
popular mobilization’ (17) are, on the one hand, praised for increasing political
participation (p. 17) and for providing creative, necessary and valuable channels
for the expression of discontent (19), but they are on the other hand diagnosed as
having ‘exceed(ed) new forms of institutionalization’ (p. 20). There seems to be a
bit of ambiguity here: the pursuit of a new institutionalization is supported much
stronger than the unavoidable mayhem accompanying such a process. The authors
fear the process might ‘elicit authoritarian outcomes’ (p. 31). Should not the pre-
sent, justified and forceful criticism towards the ‘state’s severely eroded ability to
carry out even its most basic functions’ (p. 22) and the carving out of innovative
mechanisms to partake in decision-making be given a bit more credit – and should
not the ‘creativity’ be given a bit more credence? May ‘the contemporary crisis of
representation [not be …] a necessary condition for the creation of radically new
forms of political representation and participation […]’, as the book’s contributor
Donna Lee Van Cott (p. 183) reminds us?

Due to space limits, not all remaining contributions can be discussed here. Ma-
son and Tickner’s Chapter 3 is a notable one, elaborating how transregional fea-
tures, in particular ‘security’, co-shaped the current crises. Drugs defined as a secu-


Colombia the ‘second-generation-reforms’ in the 1990s were thwarted by popular (political) opposition focuses on the fact that the first generation reforms of opening up to external markets and the liberalization of trade and capital flows had been implemented ‘with comparatively little open dispute’ (p. 137) mainly because of exclusionary policy-making (p. 150), whereas even the most modest second generation reform ‘is likely to prove highly conflictive’ (p. 139). The point is elaborated in a curious way, in which on the one hand the ‘stalemate’ between honouring democracy and having to count with the expanded political space for domestic actors (p. 134) versus the urgent pursuit of these reforms is spelled out, and on the other hand these reforms are presented as considered by policy makers as ‘essential to meet the challenges of globalization’ (p. 135), as an ‘ambitious agenda for re-fashioning the institutions that help to configure relations between state and society’ (p. 137), as ‘carefully designed policies’ (p. 139), and as fostered by ‘technocrats who plead, hardly without reason, for the need to enact painful reform (p. 152). It is, to begin with, disputable whether the outcome of this stalemate can and should be coined a ‘policy paralysis […] which] may well have the unanticipated consequence of further eroding legitimacy’ (p.152. In the second place, have the intentions and possible outcomes of these second generation reforms (‘the dismantling of inherited mechanisms for financing and delivering an array of public goods, ranging from education to healthcare to retirement pensions’, p. 138) really been so imperative, so inoffensive for the poorer Colombians; were the pains fairly distributed, and was the resistance to them in Colombia really so mistaken?

Finally, Deborah Yashar’s article (Chapter 7) is excellent. She focuses on explaining the emergence of indigenous movements in Ecuador and Bolivia, comparing them with Peru, highlighting three factors: changing citizenship regimes, transcommunity networks and political associational space. She additionally delves into the protagonism of these movements in recent political events in both countries, and ends with arguing that these movements have proposed ‘alternative methods of implementing democratic accountability’ (191) – instead of being co-constitutive of the current democratic crisis. In the first section of the chapter her analysis is superb, so it is a pity that there are a few slips in her text. Her claim that indigenous movements decisively contributed to the toppling of several presidents (pp. 190, 209) is debatable where she includes the fall of Lucio Gutiérrez of Ecuador in 2005; most observers agree that it was, in the main, the Quito middle classes that pulled this off. Her account of Bolivian developments, especially where she discusses the networking and associational space, should have highlighted much more the crucial impact of the Ley de Participación Popular, launched in 1994, conspicuously by a neoliberal administration, resulting in an extensive decentralization of the country’s political-administrative structure due to which the municipality became a significant political arena. This law also allowed indigenous communities to be represented by their traditional authorities, thus opening up local government to indigenous participation.

Additional chapters cover a range of subjects. Jeremy Adelman, in Chapter 2, talks about the Andean states as ‘unfinished’, meaning that important swaths of society still fail to accept ‘underlying rules’ of nationhood (p. 41). Chapter 4, by John Sheenan, addresses poverty and economic dilemmas of the Andean countries, and Chapter 6, by Donna Lee Van Cott, argues that indigenous movements have
turned the current crisis into an opportunity to gain prominence in the countries’ political and public debates. In Chapter 8, by Jo-Marie Burt, a meticulous analysis of how changing state-society/citizenship patterns have influenced the ways societal mobilization came about in Peru is presented. Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín, in Chapter 9, offers an analysis of why in particular national congresses in Ecuador and Colombia are also critically evaluated in both countries. Finally, in Chapter 10, Miriam Kornblith reconstructs the quest for ‘genuine’ democracy in Venezuela, both explaining the rise of Chávez, and offering a critical assessment of his contribution to this goal.

All contributions make worthwhile reading, are written by scholars who know their trade, and do not hesitate to take a stand. As a whole however, this compilation is not balanced: not in the application of the conceptual point of departure, not in the scope, and not in the varying intentions of the different author’s contributions.

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Latinoamérica ha avanzado en la inclusión de las mujeres en la arena política. Sin embargo, vale la pena detenerse a mirar la forma y los contenidos que los distintos contextos políticos permiten a las mujeres en su ejercicio de la política, para entender así en qué consiste dicha inclusión. En Women and Politics in Chile, Franceschet analiza desde la ciencia política diferentes dimensiones socio-históricas que ponen en contexto la participación política de las mujeres en el Chile de hoy, donde aun falta mucho por avanzar.

Este libro se centra en la evolución la participación en política de la mujer en Chile durante gran parte del siglo XX. La historia de participación femenina que revisa aquí Franceschet va desde 1932 hasta nuestros días, dividiendo el periodo en tres grandes etapas: la primera, revisa desde 1932 hasta el golpe de estado en 1973; la segunda, aborda el periodo de la dictadura entre 1973 y 1990; y la tercera, analiza el periodo democrático entre 1990 en adelante. La autora analiza y reconstruye el periodo básicamente desde entrevistas a mujeres que han tenido algún tipo de participación en la historia social o política en Chile. También incluye en el análisis datos de información secundaria y una importante revisión bibliográfica sobre política y género en Chile.

El libro destaca que si bien los cambios en la participación femenina en Chile evidencian un cambio sustantivo en la extensión democrática hacia las mujeres, este mismo cambio muestra que los avances en tal redefinición han sido lentos, y no necesariamente incluyen, en la práctica, un reconocimiento de las mujeres como actores políticos iguales. Las mujeres pueden entrar más fácilmente a la baja política, pero no así a la alta política. Y cuando ingresan como representantes de poder ejecutivo o legislativo es más probable que sean de clase media-alta y portadoras de un discurso de modernización y cambio a nivel socio-institucional. En consecuencia, resulta pertinente preguntarse por el rol que juegan las mujeres cuando ingresan en la política formal. ¿Las mujeres están ahí como un medio o como un
fin? ¿Son símbolos de cambio o signos portadores de un discurso político estratégico que seduce con la posibilidad de cambio?

La respuesta evidente es que la entrada de la mujer a la política formal corre el riesgo de constituirse en medio cuyo fin es más la perpetuación de viejas estructuras tradicionalmente masculinas de poder que el cambio radical de dichas estructuras. La inclusión de mujeres ha privilegiado su participación en espacios informales más que en los formales. La participación de las mujeres encuentra menos barreras de entrada a la participación de movimientos sociales de base comunitaria y muchas más en los partidos políticos. El espacio comunitario, sin embargo, no es reconocido como un espacio político donde levantar reivindicaciones públicas, es más bien entendido como un espacio más social, más íntimo y privado, más doméstico y más ‘familiar’ a las mujeres. Es un espacio definido por su condición más apolítica que política.

Con todo, Franceschet señala que existen límites democráticos que no permiten entrar a las mujeres en cualquier espacio, y por sobre todo, en aquellos espacios que son tradicionalmente masculinos. Así es como Franceschet subraya la necesidad estratégica que han venido enfrentando los movimiento de mujeres, donde o bien sacrifican la participación en sus roles más domésticos y comunitarios y se trasforman en mujeres públicas o bien se quedan en espacios de participación más flexibles y piovados. O son ‘institucionales’ o son ‘autónomas’. O colaboran con el Estado y sus instituciones o se mantienen haciendo política - al margen.

Este libro es indispensable para quienes buscan estudiar la participación de género en Chile pero también un gran aporte al estudio crítico de lo que significa participar en Latinoamérica, donde los contextos de transiciones democráticas intervienen en el horizonte de posibilidades para dicha participación. En el caso de Chile, aquí se reflexiona en torno a los vestigios dejados al movimiento femenino un régimen militar donde las mujeres, cuando fueron llamadas a participar fue para ayudar a sanar a una sociedad que cayó ‘enferma’ de tanta política (Franceschet, 2005:60; traducción AC), es decir, fue para despolitizar la sociedad.

Aquí el lector recorrerá históricamente las estrategias y reivindicaciones políticas que involucra la historia de la participación de las mujeres en política y sus dilemas, pero también logrará encontrar claves para entender cómo el feminismo de estado y el neoliberalismo han redefinido la historia reciente al movimiento de mujeres y le plantea nuevos desafíos a futuro.

Si bien este estudio se centra en el caso chileno, también realiza aportes sustantivos al debate sobre la democratización en Latinoamérica. Franceschet no sólo ofrece un acercamiento a la reflexión sobre redefinición de ciudadanía post transición y los desafíos aun pendientes en la profundización de la democracia desde una perspectiva de género, sino que también presenta un desafío teórico para la reflexión del límite que distingue lo formal de lo informal en la política, donde este último se entiende también como un espacio eminentemente político, donde se ‘hace política’ pese a que no siempre se le otorga el merecido reconocimiento. Resulta particularmente interesante que tal lente de análisis sea puesto precisamente por una mujer.

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Latin America’s move away from authoritarian rule and into electoral politics during the 1980s and 1990s has provided ample material for political scientists to analyse various aspects of the region’s politics and there has been, as a result, an impressive output on areas which previously attracted little attention, such as electoral behaviour and judicial politics. Yet, despite the increasingly important role the media plays in contemporary democratic politics in Latin America and elsewhere, there has been surprisingly little academic work done on it. This has especially been the case of Mexico, a country that provides an almost ideal setting for the study between the relation between media and politics given its protracted process of democratization and the astonishing proliferation of new media sources over the last two decades. Sallie Hughes’ *Newsrooms in Conflict* makes an attempt at reversing this shortcoming with her fascinating book, which, along with the work of Chappell Lawson (*The Building the Fourth State: The Rise of the Free Press in Mexico*), makes a very important contribution to the study of media, politics and society in Latin America.

Hughes begins her work by outlying three basic models of journalism in contemporary polities: a civic one (which emanates from civil society and which has three main characteristics: autonomy, assertiveness and diversity of opinions); an authoritarian one (characterized by the absence of newsroom autonomy passive newsgathering and the representation of the regime’s viewpoints); and a market-driven one (characterized by a lack of autonomy, the monitoring of powerful actors when commercial ends are advanced, and the provision of diversity of viewpoints to the extent that the market provides it). The author subsequently develops what she refers to as a ‘model of civic newsroom transformation’ that helps explain ‘journalistic change’ and argues that such change is a process which is influenced by the socio-political environment as well as the ability of journalists to become successful agents of change by adopting oppositional political values and alternative oppositional ideas and their organizational power to set and enforce newsroom policy.

Having developed this model, the author then proceeds to analyse the evolution of press reporting by presenting a rather impressive analysis of the coverage of political figures and societal actors by the most important newspapers (*La Jornada*, *Reforma*, *El Universal* and *Excélsior*) over twenty years up until the election of Vicente Fox in the general elections of 2000. Hughes’s analysis convincingly demonstrates that, during Mexico’s process of democratization, the country experienced the rise of civic journalism, a process led by the reporting of both *La Jornada* and *Reforma*, and subsequently joined by *El Universal*. The analysis shows that, in these three cases, autonomy, diversity and assertiveness emerged in the reporting of political events, to admittedly varying degrees. However, it also points to limitations that did not allow for the emergence of a completely civic form of journalism, such as the limited assertive reporting of the Catholic Church leadership, drug traffickers, the country’s business elite and, to a lesser extent, the military. Hughes relies on her detail analysis to advance the argument that journalism in Mexico moved from an authoritarian type into a ‘hybrid one’ made up of the three models she identifies at the beginning of her work. According to her, while
her analysis of news reporting shows the emergence of civic and market-driven forms of journalism, it continued to exhibit characteristics of the authoritarian model in some sectors.

Hughes subsequently goes into an analysis primarily based on personal interviews of the reasons why Mexican newspapers and television networks underwent changes in their political reporting at the time when they did so. For this purpose, she employs the model of journalism change that she had previously developed. Her analysis somewhat surprisingly shows that, despite the country’s transition to a market-based economy, the emergence of civic journalism was primarily the result of the adoption of values of newspapers owners’ intent in bringing about a new kind of journalism in Mexico through their desire to become more critical and assertive in the coverage of political and societal actors within a context of political change, rather than their desire to maximize profits. However, the incentives and pressures of broader economic and social conditions limited the reach of civic change to the increasingly competitive spheres of electoral politics and government.

In a last, and perhaps weakest, section of her work, Hughes uses the model she developed through her study of the Mexican case to apply it to three other Latin American cases in an attempt to test its generalizability. By looking at *La Época* of Chile, *Página 12* of Argentina, and *Siglo Veintiuno* of Guatemala, Hughes finds similar processes of journalism change toward the civic model found in Mexico, thereby validating the model. However, her analysis also suggests that that this kind of journalism declined when media owners began sharing the same ideological priorities with the new governments. For her, the only way through which civic journalism can survive through these realities is when journalists establish separate news organizations. Although this section of the book is interesting, its weakness lies in the fact that her generalizations from these case studies, contrary to the Mexican case, are based entirely on secondary material and limited to the evolution of one newspaper per country.

Despite the high calibre of this work, two main observations are worth highlighting. First, the author could have engaged the very vast literature on Latin American democratization more seriously, since the result is now a rather superficial treatment of the nature of Mexican democracy. As if adjectives to qualify Latin American democracies were in short supply, Hughes refers to Mexican democracy as ‘shallow,’ and provides a very superficial definition without framing it within larger debates. We know by now that analyses of Latin American democracy are very complex and require more than the use of flashy adjectives. Second, the work could have been enriched by some elaboration of the role the media have played in the larger context of Mexican democratization. For example, as the author briefly notes, intense lobbying from the country’s two biggest television networks (which control 95 per cent of the market) resulted in the passage of a television law in 2006 (colloquially known as the *Ley Televisa*), which gave them protected access to their market for forty years. Given the very powerful position these two corporations have taken in Mexican politics, none of the three main parties or the government were able to oppose it during the election year, thereby demonstrating the weakness of the Mexican state. Engaging such paradigmatic cases would have enriched this book.

Nevertheless, *Newsrooms in Conflict* is a fascinating, excellent and overdue study
of the relationship between the media and politics in Mexico. It makes a significant contribution to a notoriously understudied area and helps us to understand Mexico’s complex process of democratization much better. It is a must-read for students interested in the media, democratization processes and the politics of Latin America.

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This book explores the relationship between foreign direct investment and sustainable industrial development in Mexico, focusing in particular on Mexico’s ‘Silicon Valley’, an information technology (IT) cluster in Guadalajara and the state of Jalisco. With this well-documented case study, the authors aim to contribute to the larger theoretical and policy debate about the role of foreign investment in national development strategy. Under the economic orthodoxy of the Washington Consensus, foreign direct investment is considered a ‘miracle drug’ for triggering higher levels of productivity and economic growth in developing countries. Besides generating jobs and income, foreign direct investment can – theoretically – generate positive spillover effects to domestic firms by transferring technology and upgrading skills. However, The Enclave Economy confirms the findings of other (recent) studies – for example on Mexico’s automotive and garment industries, which are equally dominated by foreign direct investment – that the empirical evidence for these positive spillover effects is thin.

In the 1990s, Mexico was considered a ‘poster child’ for globalization: dramatically reducing the role of the government in the domestic economy and throwing open its borders to trade and foreign direct investment, especially after NAFTA went into effect in 1994. In terms of attracting investment and increasing exports, this laissez-faire strategy appeared to be working – at least initially – as the case of the IT industry in Guadalajara demonstrates. Attracted by its strong industrial tradition in the electronics sector and a number of other location-specific incentives, several ‘global flagships’ of the IT industry flocked to Guadalajara and established manufacturing operations in the 1990s. Although this generated an important impulse for the local economy in terms of employment and income, Gallagher and Zarsky go beyond these often narrowly defined economic objectives predominant among policymakers. Instead, they adopt the much broader concept of sustainable development that also focuses on the social and environmental effects of market-driven globalization.

From a sustainable development perspective, the economic benefits of Guadalajara’s boom in foreign investment are simply disappointing. The IT industry maintains high entry barriers in terms of investment and technology, and only a handful of companies account for the bulk of sales and profits. Initial hopes that local firms would evolve into suppliers to the multinational corporations were short-lived: rather than contract with local Mexican firms, these corporations mostly invited foreign contract manufacturing firms to co-locate in Guadalajara.
Even the lowest tiers of the production chain involving standardized, low-value generating manufacturing and operating on razor-thin profit margins offered little perspectives, since this segment was often outsourced to East Asia. As a result, many domestic firms were simply driven out of business instead of becoming part of the global IT industry. By the year 2000, the IT industry around Guadalajara had been transformed into an ‘enclave economy’ of foreign firms, largely disarticulated from the local economy.

Important reservations are also made with respect to the social outcomes of this development strategy. Though attracted as a knowledge-intensive and high-tech industry, the vast majority of jobs was low-skilled and provided little or no opportunity for training and upgrading skills. In addition, most IT companies primarily offered short-term contracts, with the result that many jobs proved to be very volatile. When the high-tech financial bubble burst in 2001, the economic dynamism of the 1990s was abruptly reversed. Demand for final products fell dramatically and manufacturing operations in Guadalajara were severely cut back, generating massive layoffs. Between 2000 and 2004, many IT companies even relocated production functions overseas. In particular after joining the WTO in 2001, China proved to be a very attractive alternative to the global IT industry.

The findings with regard to environmental spillover are more mixed. In comparison to Mexico’s traditional heavy industry, the IT sector is generally considered a ‘clean and green’ alternative. A thorough environmental regulatory framework for the IT sector is therefore not considered a priority. Nevertheless, there are significant environmental and occupational health challenges associated with IT production, especially the production of microchips is a water and energy-intensive process that involves the use of lead, solvents and other toxic chemicals and generates toxic waste. Even though most foreign IT plants established in the 1990s are ISO-certified for environmental management and are thus more efficient in water and energy use and less hazardous to workers in exposure to toxic materials, both foreign and domestic companies have a wide scope to self-regulate. Some corporate headquarters have also set environmental standards for their suppliers, but there is little evidence that these often costly ‘best practices’ are actually implemented.

The Enclave Economy provides a very informative account on the unfulfilled promise of foreign direct investment for sustainable industrial development in Guadalajara. Based on thorough empirical research using both quantitative and qualitative methods, its lessons for theory and practice contribute to the growing body of studies that support an institutionalist approach. The examples of several East Asian countries that successfully managed to obtain a central position in the global IT industry indeed convincingly stress the importance of proactive government policies in capturing positive spillovers from foreign direct investment. Rather than a proactive policy, Mexico adopted a ‘maquila mindset’ – an outgrowth of the Border Industrialization Programme that started in the 1960s – that (inadvertently) favoured foreign firms over domestic firms. Although the conclusions drawn from the Guadalajara experience do not come as a complete surprise, this book provides new convincing evidence that supportive public policies are needed to promote endogenous productive capacities.

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Living in a digital environment, we can electronically go to virtual banks, stores, libraries, and even more ‘places’. In contrast, however, poverty is never found in a virtual environment. Its numbing wants are a continual reality. Of the many deficiencies that characterize poverty, one that is emerging as increasingly apparent is digital poverty, a lack of adequate information and communication technologies (ICT).

Hernan Galperin and Judith Mariscal, respectively Mexican and Argentine scholars, have compiled this collection of articles by a group of social scientists joined in the Regional Dialogue on the Information Society (REDIS). This collaboration is an initiative of the Institute for Connectivity in the Americas of the Canadian International Research Development Centre. Their work studies the digital divide (brecha digital) between the electronically deprived and endowed in Latin America and the Caribbean. It presents several theses. The most axiomatic is that electronic and information resources comprise as necessary an element as capital in order for individuals to participate in modern society. What adequacy of resources means and how to achieve this shapes the topic of the book.

An assessment of digital resources for e-governance in the region has appeared in Latin America Online: Cases, Successes and Pitfalls (2007), which elaborated on an earlier global assessment, Digital Divide: Civic Engagement, Information Poverty, and the Internet Worldwide (2001). While these two books profile deficits and assets, Digital Poverty: Latin American and Caribbean Perspectives analyses meaning and causes. It begins its analysis by addressing in the first two chapters how one defines and quantifies digital or information poverty. The next set of chapters deals with issues related to relieving imbalances in teledensity due to differences between commercial market and government regulatory interests. The following chapters review successful, small-scale resolutions of these differences in rural and underserved areas. The final chapter summarizes issues of ICT adequacy and regulatory effectiveness within a policy perspective of pro-poor support.

The analytical chapters on definition and quantification, by Gover Barja with Björn-Sören Gibler and Roxana Barrantes, reflect another axiom of this work. Pro-growth policies require market competitiveness, but such forces are insufficient to satisfy the ICT needs so that regulatory intervention with pro-poor policies is required. The analyses are more suggestive than conclusive and would be more relevant if more tested and detailed through case histories. Nonetheless, the multidimensional nature of ICT poverty, in terms of the internet and wired or mobile telephony, is clearly layered: 1) lack of supply or connectivity access, 2) lack of demand based on inadequate income, and 3) lack of need or capacity due to inadequate literacy. Understanding these differences is crucial to establishing appropriate public policy.

The next chapters deal with markets, by Judith Mariscal, Carla Bonina, and Julio Luna, and regulation, by Jorge Dussán Hitscherich, and Juan Manuel Roldán Perea. These articles are at the heart of the dilemma of support for competitive profit incentives that marshal efficient, economical ICT penetration and for guaran-
tee of service to those outside these parameters, to all in society, as an essential national utility. The lessons here are twofold. On the one hand, the two major telephony companies in the region, Telefónica and Telmex, may have achieved economies of scale through consolidation that put them beyond regulatory reach. Moreover, the institutional organization of regulatory agencies without public interest group representation makes regulation more vulnerable to industry intervention.

The next chapters, by Hernan Galperin with Bruce Girard and Kim I. Mallalieu with Sean Rocke, delineate imaginative local solutions to ICT needs. Among these are microtelcos, ‘small-scale telecom operators that combine local entrepreneurship, municipal efforts, and community action.’ They have become cost effective due to the economical technical enabling of wireless local area networking that relies on Wi-Fi with backbone solutions or Wi-Max. Examples appear of local networks in Argentina, Brazil, and Peru. A ‘percolator’ theory is offered that formulates a model for creating local solutions to ICT needs. The model partitions the generic attributes and technical parameters of ICT into manageable domains, emphasizing contextualization within the framework of Sustainable Livelihood Approach practices developed by the UN International Fund for Agricultural Development.

The final chapter, by Army Mahan, comprises the mission statement of both the work and the cause to which the authors are dedicated: 1) the production of pro-poor strategies for achieving ICT adequacy, and 2) the conduct of research to achieve that end. It summarizes Digital Poverty as a whole and re-emphasizes the continuing role of REDIS in reducing that poverty.

This book is a modest publication in size and format. Nonetheless, it reflects a landmark in the development of the Information Age. In an earlier period, modernization extended into the economic periphery through rural postal services and electrification programmes. ICT is now advancing to incorporate the most remote interstices of the earth into the grid of globalization. The book’s cover shows a boy on horseback, one arm holding a computer monitor strapped behind him as he rides into a dusty rural village. The boy is riding a white horse.

Edward A. Riedinger
Ohio State University


Anil Hira es doctor en ciencias oolíticas y profesor asociado en la Universidad Simón Frasier, Canadá. Es experto en economía política, particularmente en estudios comparativos entre las regiones de Asia Oriental y América Latina. En la actualidad investiga temas de tecnología industrial que afectan a ambas regiones. Con el libro An East Asian Model for Latin American Success, The New Path, Anil Hira participa del debate académico y político sobre el futuro de Latinoamérica, principalmente del camino a seguir en su estrategia de desarrollo, más aún cuando se observa el agotamiento del modelo neoliberal, caracterizado por bajos índices de crecimiento económico y deterioro de la equidad social. Según Hira, el neoliberismo en Latinoamérica sufre una profunda crisis de legitimidad, por lo que se requiere un ‘cambio de paradigma en la región’, además crear nuevos consensos so-
ciopolíticos con participación y movilización ciudadanas. La región vive la más importante coyuntura en la historia de su desarrollo, lo que permite pensar en un cambio del modelo neoliberal.

En la lectura del texto de Anil Hira destacan ciertos argumentos. Por una parte, la historia de América Latina se ha caracterizado porque las concepciones e ideas económicas, sociales y políticas han impactado fuertemente en las estrategias para el desarrollo. Sin embargo, hoy día hay que mejorar la calidad técnica y la profundidad de los estudios, lo que permitirá enfrentar con mejores argumentos el neoliberalismo de analistas, tecnócratas, planificadores y tomadores de decisión/políticos. Por otra parte, América Latina debe renovar sus ideas sobre el desarrollo y el crecimiento económico y para ello debe observar experiencias exitosas que ocurren en otras partes del mundo, particularmente las economías asiáticas que, pese a su diversidad cultural y escasos recursos, se han desarrollado sobre la base de una potente política industrial, que les ha permitido conquistar mercados externos importantes. Sin embargo, Latinoamérica, que tiene mayor cantidad de recursos naturales, no ha podido avanzar hacia un mayor nivel de desarrollo.

De la misma manera, Hira sostiene la necesidad de valorar las diversas historias económicas y contextos políticos. Por ejemplo, las experiencias de China y Japón son distintas, pero a pesar de sus enormes diferencias tienen un enfoque común que les ha permitido obtener resultados superiores en términos de desarrollo. En el caso latinoamericano dicha experiencia es factible de ser replicada. Un nuevo enfoque o camino hacia el desarrollo debe aprender a utilizar el método comparativo y dejar de argumentar que las diferencias culturales y políticas son un gran obstáculo; también debe romperse el viejo parámetro cultural de abundar en estudios macroeconómicos y la práctica del paternalismo y el asistencialismo, en cuyo reemplazo debe enfatizarse el concepto de ‘política industrial’. Complementariamente, la construcción de un nuevo modelo y de un camino diferente para alcanzar el desarrollo será una verdadera ‘batalla de ideas’ y el esfuerzo debe ir más allá de las elites tecnocráticas especializadas, para involucrar a distintos actores sociales y a las coaliciones políticas que abogan por transformar muchos aspectos de la vida social y política. La idea de legitimidad, tanto en el plano de las ideas como de los intereses y la movilización sociopolítica debe estar presente en la construcción de un nuevo modelo. La experiencia asiática sólo debe ser considerada ‘una guía general para el desarrollo de una estrategia’. Finalmente, para Hira un tema recurrente en el desarrollo es el Estado, señalando que históricamente, tanto izquierdas como derechas, lo han considerado como fuente de innumerables problemas y obstáculos; sin embargo, en la construcción de un nuevo modelo de desarrollo debe cumplir una función clave.

En el balance final hay que reconocer dos aspectos que condicionan la propuesta de Anil Hira. Por una parte, el análisis del autor no enfrenta la crítica del enfoque histórico-estructural que se refiere a que, desde la Revolución Industrial y hasta hoy, el desarrollo latinoamericano se ha construido desde afuera hacia adentro, es decir, mirando las experiencias externas, lo que históricamente ha obstaculizado la construcción de un camino propio. El propio autor lo reconoce cuando señala que América Latina ha construido su desarrollo mirando a Estados Unidos como modelo paradigmático. Por otra parte, el libro de Hira debe leerse a la luz de las transformaciones de la arremetida neoliberal: Estados débiles, alejados de la parti-
cipación política, desvinculados de los intereses de los actores sociales y ausentes en el rol de cuidar el bien común.

Sin duda, el libro de Anil Hira es una contribución importante en dos sentidos. Primero, porque contribuirá al análisis y conocimiento de las relaciones económicas entre Latinoamérica y Asia. Segundo, porque será insumo importante a la hora de evaluar las políticas neoliberales del continente.

Juan Podestá
Universidad Arturo Prat, Chile


With the rapidly rising global demand and prices of energy and metals since the turn of the century, extractive industries are again a motor of economic growth in resource-rich Latin American countries. Simultaneously, the extraction of oil and metals has caused a range of troublesome social, political, environmental and economic effects. Resistance by local communities against transnational mining and oil companies has become widespread in the region, and so have instances of intense conflict. It is this ‘other side’ of metal and oil extraction that the authors of Community Rights and Corporate Responsibility aim to discuss through a general introductory and concluding chapter, and case studies on Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Colombia and Nicaragua. This Canadian initiative (based on a conference at York University, Toronto) focuses on the major role that companies from Canada play in Latin America, which represent a quarter of all large-scale mining investments in the region. Nevertheless, the volume’s findings are relevant for the more general debate about the effects of large-scale extractive activities on local communities. In addition, it poses urgent questions about the responsibilities of transnational companies and the rights of civil society in the neoliberal era.

The book documents several problematic practices of Canadian mining and oil companies in Latin America and discusses how these are linked to a wide variety of processes such as economic liberalization, political and armed conflicts, and new mining technologies. The neoliberal law reforms of the 1980s and ’90s were very positive for transnational oil and mining companies as they involved lowered taxes, freeing capital flows and more flexible labour. Interestingly, the accounts of the Canadian government playing an active role in liberalizing the mining sector in several Latin American countries remind us that imperialism and the Washington Consensus is not only a US affair. Political economy is also important in understanding civil war, especially in Colombia where guerrillas, the military and paramilitaries have fought for, among other things, control over oil. In addition, technological advancements in the mining sector imply that less local workers are required while enabling extraction at places that were previously not cost-effective. Taken together, the gains of mining have been further concentrated into the hands of a few ‘winners’ whereas the various stakeholders in local communities (workers, landowners, farmers, indigenous groups, small-scale miners, and citizens affected by environmental damage) find that the benefits of mining have diminished.
and the negative effects have increased.

While studying various cases from different angles, the contributing authors coincide in their overall view of the issue and ‘argue again and again for bringing the state back into development’ (p. 12). They convincingly demonstrate that without a modern legal framework that goes far beyond current royalties and taxation, mining activities produce the opposite of sustainable development in Latin America. When communicating with Canadian shareholders and critical citizens, corporate (social) responsibility is the dominant discourse. Conversely, local communities in Latin America see the transnational mining companies from their hard capitalist side, with actions to influence the non-governmental sector, public opinion and political decisions that are far from responsible. In many cases Canadian companies have discredited critical organizations while using the clientelist mechanisms of giving donations to NGOs in return for support, and funding ‘scientific’ research that serves their agenda. ‘The control over information and public perception […] has emerged as a key battleground for mining companies in their battle against those opposed to the spread of unregulated mineral extraction’ (p. 210). Without idealizing (strong state) policies of the past, the editors state that ‘a revised agenda for the future should include not only state regulation, taxation, and management of the region’s extractive export industries but also policies and practices that empower rural peoples to determine the terms of local development and to participate in the broader national and international processes […]’ (p. 15).

Apart from its relevant topic, this book deserves attention because of its attempt to be more than a product from and for academia. The editors have selected contributions not only by university professors, but also by persons who have worked as campaigners or coordinators in NGOs. This activist participation has produced critical assessments of the national and local ‘Canada effect’ in Latin America. Overall the advantage of well-informed and readable chapters outweighs the disadvantage of them being rather light on theory and methodology, at least to this scholarly reader. Only Chapter 2 is a completely failure according to academic standards as it extensively presents the results of a survey on local experiences with mining in three Peruvian communities without giving any information about the these communities, the number or percentage of respondents, nor the year and way in which the survey was done. However, the book seems to succeed in its aim of addressing an important issue in such a way that it is accessible to a wider audience and contributes to the political debate on improving policies as to increase corporate responsibility and community rights.

In addition to the chapters, the volume includes four testimonials by activists from Peru (Tambogrande), Bolivia, Ecuador (Cuyabeno), and Colombia. Although rather short, they give representatives of local communities and organizations room to speak for themselves, instead of the usual practice of only including them via more or less extensive citations in a scholarly publication. This practice makes the book more attractive to a wider audience (I have noticed that students really appreciate these testimonials). Moreover, it is an interesting contribution to activist social science scholarship, since beyond doing research about and with activists, their ‘voice’ is part of the publication, too.

Barbara Hogenboom
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Never before has the issue of forest resource conservation and management figured as prominently on the world stage as it does today. Not only do forests harbour much of the world’s biodiversity and support the livelihoods of millions; they also play a major role in global climate regulation. Forests act as carbon sinks, while their destruction together with other forms of land-use change produce one-fifth of global greenhouse gases, the second largest cause after fossil fuels. Efforts are underway to include reduced emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD), or ‘avoided deforestation’, as a valid criterion for carbon offset trading when the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) expires in 2012.1 If eventually incorporated, complementing the already permitted categories of reforestation and afforestation, it could have a major positive impact in curbing the rampant environmental destruction which has fuelled the frontier expansion and so-called economic ‘development’ of many tropical countries.

However, actually realizing this potential for preserving and restoring the vital environmental services provided by tropical forests remains a major challenge. Over the past two decades, approaches to conservation have moved on from the still dominant and necessary, but on their own inadequate, policies of centralized command-and-control. It is now widely accepted that saving natural resources will in large measure depend on the inclusion of local populations and other institutions as equal stakeholders in decentralized and participatory initiatives which reconcile diverse interests and create appropriate incentive structures.

Yet lack of implementation capacity remains one of the key barriers to promoting sustainable development, especially given its inevitably multi-sector nature and inter-dependent ecological, economic, social and political dimensions, each of which must be satisfactorily addressed to provide long-term, durable solutions. This timely collection by Mirjam Ros-Tonen and her colleagues is therefore particularly relevant since it focuses on multi-institutional ‘partnerships’ as one of the key mechanisms for facilitating the implementation of such policies of conservation and sustainable development. In principle, each participating institution may bring its distinctive contribution to the resource management exercise; the state at local, regional and national levels; non-governmental and other civil society organizations; communities of traditional and indigenous forest-dwellers; the private business sector and international donors. With such partnerships, the whole should be greater than the sum of its parts.

The book’s 14 chapters contain a truly fascinating range of highly informative case studies, revealing the sheer variety of potential partnerships. Its five sections are arranged according to the type(s) of collaboration involved. In part one, the excellent overview chapter by the editors is followed by two on Ecuador dealing with a range of partnerships. Laura Rival discusses community forest management and Herwig Cleuren considers sustainable bamboo production in the Chocó region. Part two focuses on public-private partnerships; Heleen van den Hombergh examines industrial forestry in Costa Rica, while James Fairhead and Melissa Leach
look at sustainable timber production in Trinidad. Part three considers the perhaps more sensitive area of company-community agreements which attempt to reconcile private sector concerns over corporate social responsibility and ‘green labelling’ with the interests of local communities. Sonja Vermeulen and James Mayers look at this in the context of the global wood fibre industry. Carla Morsello and W. Neil Adger assess arrangements between a group of Kayapó from the Brazilian Amazon and The Body Shop, while Tinde van Andel considers the feasibility of açai fruit and palm heart production in the same region. Part five concentrates on more complex, multi-sector partnerships; Pitou van Dijck writes on sustainable forest management in the Guyana Shield, Mary Finley-Brook on Miskitu forest governance in Nicaragua, Sergio Rosendo on the lessons from Brazil’s pioneering extractive reserves set up since the 1990s in the wake of the rubber tappers’ struggle, and Key Otsuki on ecological paper production in Pará state. Part five considers wider political alliances and networks. Imme Scholtz evaluates social movements around two highly controversial projects in the Brazilian Amazon; namely, the Belo Monte hydropower scheme and the paving of the BR-163 ‘soybean export highway’. Finally, Marcus Colchester examines the effectiveness of forestry networks and advocacy movements in Latin America and the preconditions for their success.

Although the volume under review amasses a large amount of evidence testifying to the effectiveness of partnerships as a vehicle for promoting sustainable forest resource management, it also points to the many possible pitfalls in these arrangements, which are well illustrated in the case studies. These include conflicting interests amongst supposedly ‘partner’ stakeholders, the emergence of power asymmetries or imbalances and new dependencies, the exclusion of poorer and weaker social actors, high transaction costs and a hostile policy environment, amongst others. Indeed, it has been suggested elsewhere that, due to these problems, especially the persistence of community marginalization by more powerful external groups, such partnerships might even be considered ‘passé’. In the light of progress witnessed to date, however, such a sweeping conclusion, while not without some justification, would be highly premature. This fine collection bears witness to such advances. It should be required reading for all those interested in mobilizing institutions to promote forest conservation, sustainable development and climatic stabilization.

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Notes


This book is an important contribution to an ongoing scholarly and artistic effort to excavate, document and communicate the multifarious diasporic experience of Jews in Latin America during the twentieth century. The volume is stretched on a
particularly wide canvas. Contributors come from an unusual array of disciplinary background; from sociology, anthropology and political science to history, literature and art; and their contributions traverse a vast geographic space, from Argentina, Chile and Brazil in South America to Cuba and Martinique in the Caribbean, and Mexico in North America.

Thematically, the contributions concentrate on the collective and individual struggles of Jews to deal with their experiences of discrimination and violence under anti-Semitic and dictatorial regimes. The goal that is set for the book by the editor Kristin Ruggiero is mostly a descriptive one: ‘to uncover and recover another story and history of the fragments of the Jewish experience’. Yet the book does more than the piecemeal collection of ‘fragments’. Essays here depict and probe the very processes of fragmentation which characterize the experiences of Jews in the Diaspora, as well as their attempts to retain and narrate these experiences.

We are thus confronted throughout the different chapters with the inaccuracy of speaking about The Jewish Community, as a singular, unified and unifying entity. Instead, our attention is drawn to the multiple cleavages that historically fragmented Jewish communities. In Cuba, Robert Levine shows how such cleavages were formed along ethnic lines (Ashkenazi vs. Sephardic), and after the revolution in 1959, also according to political and economic views (Anti-Castro vs. Pro-Castro). In Argentina, Beatriz Gurevich documents how in the aftermath of the terrorist bombing of Israeli and Jewish targets in 1990s, an earnest divide came forth between the official Jewish representative body, which largely accepted the inconclusive investigation of the Argentinean government into these atrocities, and a Jewish grass-roots movement, which faced up and blamed the government for stonewalling the investigation.

Jewish collective identity is also shown to be dynamic and differently negotiated under different circumstances. Raanan Rein observes that Argentinean Jews, who were accused by the government for having ‘dual loyalty’, often played down their allegiance to Israel. In contrast, as William Miles reports in the case of Martinique, when welcomed by the local government to take part in the creation of an inclusive hybrid identity, Jews chose to guard their exclusive identity and to largely root its invariability in their belonging to Israel.

Some of the most original contributions in this book offer insights into the intimate manners in which Jews cope as individuals with their fragmented identities and deal with the remembering (and the forgetting) of anti-Semitic violence. Tellingly, these contributions come mainly from artists and poets, who seem to be better equipped for charting this emotionally charged terrain. One only needs to read the poems of Marjorie Agosin, or observe some of the paintings from the series ‘Surviving Genocide’ by Rachel Partnoy, in order to feel overwhelmed by the intense and tragic experiences they capture.

In a poetic essay, Ilán Stavans vividly illustrates how Yiddish became for many Jewish refugees in Mexico, including his own beloved grandmother, ‘the umbilical cord with Europe, one never fully cut’. The important role of language in the reconstruction of fragmented identities is also highlighted in an essay about the German Jewish writer Anna Seghers, who returned after the Second World War from her exile in Mexico to her homeland Germany, confessedly saying it was the place where ‘I can do most for the language which I speak best’. Ruth Behar’s reflec-
tions on the motivations that drove her to make the movie *Adio Kerida* reveal her attempts to reconnect with Cuba in order to deal with a set of unresolved issues: from recounting the untold story of the Sephardic Jews of Cuba to finding the personal meaning of her own Jewishness as a *Jubana* (Cuban Jew) who grew up in the US to a father who fled Castro’s regime.

Overall *Fragments of Memory* provides a powerful reading and constitutes an invaluable addition to the studies of the Jewish Diaspora in Latin America, and more particularly to the creation of a shared memory of experiences, which are often being reduced to silence by the undying pain of those who survived them. The variety and richness of the essays here inhibits the generation of a robust analytical framework that coalesces all the contributions. Indeed, with a very brief introduction and no concluding chapter, the editor Kristin Ruggiero paints the slightest of frames around this collection, as if not to disturb its somewhat eclectic quality. Nevertheless, since Ruggiero mentions that ‘the Latin American Jewish Diaspora has been recognized as a unique phenomenon in diasporic studies’, it would have been a worthy effort to work out more explicitly this ‘uniqueness’ in historical and theoretical senses. It makes one wonder to what extent does the Latin American Jewish Diaspora represent a particular phenomenon, and to what extent does it contain universal features which are comparable to Jewish and non-Jewish Diaspora elsewhere in the world? Such an analytical effort is all the more due, in light of the last essay in the book, where Claudia Partnoy, herself a *desaparecida* who was jailed by the Argentinean military dictatorship in the late 1970s, argues for ‘the similarities between Holocaust literature and the testimonial texts produced by victims of the Southern Cone dictatorships’.

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The urbanization process and characteristics of Caribbean cities, their population and their problems are interesting and challenging topics for research. The specific geographical nature of the region (mostly smaller islands), for example, brings about important consequences for the spatial organization and development of its societies and, therefore, of its cities. Research on these issues can add to our knowledge of urban development in the South. Moreover, the study of the relation between the socio-economic history of the islands (such as their dependent position in the colonial empires and in the subsequent process of globalization, or the almost permanent migration processes) and urbanization can shed more light on the historical development of cities and its explanatory factors. Additionally, information on these topics could serve as inputs for policy initiatives on urban poverty alleviation, environmental degradation and urban renewal in historical centres.

Despite the relative importance of cities in the Caribbean (countries like Cuba, Martinique, Puerto Rico and Trinidad and Tobago have about 80 per cent of their population living in urban areas, while the Caribbean average is 68 per cent), urban research in the region has largely remained a blind spot. There have been some
very valuable general studies by the British geographers Potter and Clarke, and studies on specific issues like historic centres and urban renewal (Havana, Curaçao) or urban violence (Kingston), but all in all, especially in comparison with Latin America, the bibliography remains surprisingly meagre.

In December 2004, the Leiden University in the Netherlands organized an international workshop titled *The Caribbean City*, which aimed to ‘[…] transcend disciplinary and linguistic/colonial barriers to enhance a pan-Caribbean, interdisciplinary discourse on the region’s urbanism’ (on the Acknowledgements page). Edited by anthropologist Rivke Jaffe, *The Caribbean City* is based on papers presented during this meeting by authors from the region itself, and others from Europe and the United States. The first chapter introduces the central themes of the book: dependent urban development, urban-rural relationships, socio-spatial fragmentation, formal/informal economy and the cities as nodes in the processes of globalization. This is followed by three contributions on historical processes: colonial influences on urban form, the evolution of housing policy in the British West Indies and federal housing in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Next, a contribution focuses on the political economy of violence in Kingston’s inner city. Three other articles discuss different aspects of housing and related issues such as segregation in Kingston, Paramaribo, Suriname, and Puerto Rico. One contribution highlights the concept of urban fragmentation through case studies of Kingston and Willemstad, Curaçao. Two articles draw on the concept of urban livelihood: one again concerns Kingston in a study of small-scale metal smelting in low income neighbourhoods, while the other examines habitat as a productive asset for poor urban households. Finally, three contributions take a different approach and make use of cultural and literary criticism to analyse various features, such as crime in Fort-de-France (Martinique) and Pointe-à-Pitre (Guadeloupe).

Unfortunately, it is not a very balanced book. First of all, the large majority of the papers focus on the Anglophone and Francophone Caribbean (four of the thirteen contributions deal with Kingston), whereas the Hispanic islands are represented only by two contributions on Puerto Rico. Given the fact that Cuba and the Dominican Republic are the largest and most populous islands of the region and have a long urban history, as do the ‘Caribbean coasts’ of South and Central America, this is a disappointing omission. Secondly, the book is not as interdisciplinary as it aims to be. The large majority of the contributions offer a spatial/territorial view on urban themes, including those by the anthropologist Jaffe on urban fragmentation in Kingston and Willemstad, and the literary critic De Bleeker on Francophone Caribbean crime novels. Given this concentration on geographical perspectives, it is a missed opportunity that no more attention has been given to geographical theories and concepts on urbanization and habitat. Dinzey Flores’ contribution on segregation in Puerto Rico, for instance, refers to Foucault’s and Levide’s more abstract studies on ‘space’, but completely ignores important and relevant studies on urbanization and habitat in Latin America by human geographers like Gilbert, Ward, Mertins or Van Lindert, and formulates self-evident conclusions on spatial behaviour by poor people. Thirdly, the quality of the articles is somewhat uneven and some editing could have enhanced their readability.

Nevertheless, this volume offers a wide range of topics and, as such, is a useful introduction to the urban Caribbean. Two contributions stand out in particular:
Dodman’s chapter on small-scale metal smelting as a livelihood strategy in Kingston, and Verrest’s chapter on urban livelihoods in low-income neighbourhoods in Suriname and Trinidad. Both demonstrate a sound balance between theory and empirical research and are excellent examples of the application of a still predominantly ‘rural’ concept like livelihood to urban studies.

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Libros Recibidos/Books Received*


* From March 2008 to September 2008. Inclusion in this list does not preclude a review in any of the issues of the European Review.

De marzo de 2008 a septiembre de 2008. La inclusión en esta lista no descarta que sea reseñado en alguno de los números de la Revista Europea.
Publicaciones/Publications

CEDLA LATIN AMERICA STUDIES (CLAS)

Roddy Brett, *Social Movements, Indigenous Politics and Democratisation in Guatemala, 1985-1996*
CLAS 95, March 2008, pp. xvi, 232, hardback  € 59.00 / US$ 86.00
ISBN-13: 978 90 04 16552 6; ISSN 1572-6401 BRILL, LEIDEN

Mirjam A.F. Ros-Tonen (editor) in collaboration with Heleen van den Hombergh and Annelies Zoomers, *Partnerships in Sustainable Forest Resource Management: Learning from Latin America*
CLAS 94, Dec 2006, ISSN 1572-6401  € 49.00
ISBN 90-04-15339-X / 978-90-04-15339-4 BRILL, LEIDEN

Arij Ouweneel, *The Flight of the Shepherd: Microhistory and the Psychology of Cultural Resilience in Bourbon Central Mexico*
CLAS 93, Mar 2005, pp. 256  € 28.50
ISBN 90 5260 053 8 AKSANT ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS, AMSTERDAM

Flavia Fiorucci and Marcus Klein (editors) *The Argentine Crisis at the Turn of the Millennium: Causes, Consequences and Explanations*
CLAS no. 92, Nov 2004, pp. 208  € 25.00
ISBN 90 5260 166 6 AKSANT ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS, AMSTERDAM

Ton Salman and Annelies Zoomers (eds) *Imaging the Andes: Shifting Margins of a Marginal World*
CLAS 91, May 2003, pp.260  € 28.50
ISBN 90 5260 054 6 AKSANT ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS, AMSTERDAM

A. C. Van Oss, *Church and Society in Spanish America*
CLAS 90, Feb 2003, pp.250  € 29.50 / US$ 29.95
ISBN 90 5260 053 8 AKSANT ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS, AMSTERDAM

David Cahill, *From Rebellion to Independence in the Andes: Soundings from Southern Peru, 1750-1830*
CLAS 89, June 2002, pp. 232  € 25.00 / US$ 27.50
ISBN 90 5260 054 6 AKSANT ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS, AMSTERDAM

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CLAS 88, Dec 2002, pp. 296  € 25.00 / US$ 27.50
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CEDLA, *Fronteras: Towards a Borderless Latin America*
CLAS 87, Oct. 2000, pp. 400  € 21,55 / US$ 23.75
ISBN 90 70280 87 6
Magdalena Barros, *From Maize to Melons: Struggles and Strategies of Small Mexican Farmers*
CLAS 86, Aug. 2000, pp. 176 € 15.90 / US$17.50
ISBN 90 70280 57 4

Raymond Buve y Marianne Wiesebron (comp.) *Procesos de integración en América Latina: Perspectivas y experiencias latinoamericanas y europeas*
CLAS 85, Oct. 1999, pp. 220 € 17.00 / US$ 18.75
ISBN 90 70280 47 7

Pitou van Dijck (ed.) *The Bolivian Experiment: Structural Adjustment and Poverty Alleviation*
ISBN 90 70280 27 2

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Hans Siebers, *We Are Children of the Mountain, Creolization and Modernization among the Q’eqchi’es*
CLAS 82, Feb. 1999, pp. 212 € 17.00 / US$ 18.75
ISBN 90 70280 7 5

Daniel Míguez, *Spiritual Bonfire in Argentina: Contrasting Current Theories with an Ethnographic Account of Pentecostal Growth in a Buenos Aires Suburb*
CLAS 81, Oct. 1998, pp. 216 € 17.00 / US$ 18.75
ISBN 90 70280 96 5

Veronica Montecinos, *Economists, Politics and the State: Chile 1958-1994*
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Testing Democracy’s Promise: Indigenous Mobilization and the Chilean State
(Poniendo a prueba la promesa de la democracia: movilizaciones indígenas y el estado chileno)

Patricia Rodríguez and David Carruthers

Keywords: Mapuche, CONADI, indigenous rights, Chile, democratization
Palabras claves: Mapuche, CONADI, derechos indígenas, Chile, democratización

In the early 1990s, Chile’s restored democratic government created a new legal architecture and a new institution, the CONADI (National Corporation for Indigenous Development), in order to improve the historically distant relationship between the state and indigenous groups. To the Mapuche Indians, newly institutionalized principles of constitutional rights, self-determination, and participatory co-governance promised not just more meaningful citizenship, but resolution to longstanding claims of injustice over ancestral land and natural resource claims. This project chronicles the dilution and betrayal of this commitment. In a series of tense conflicts over land, forestry, and hydroelectric power, state officials suppressed indigenous initiatives and implanted their own policy priorities within the new institutions. This experience has deepened the divisions among state actors, private actors, and indigenous communities. Still, important reform currents persist, and Mapuche activists continue to pressure and challenge the state in creative ways. This evolving relationship between the Mapuche and the state presents a vital test of the quality of Chilean democracy.

Ethnic self-regulation and democratic instability on Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast: The case of Ratisuna
(Auto-regulación étnica e inestabilidad democrática en la costa atlántica de Nicaragua: El caso de Ratisuma)

Ken Henriksen

Keywords: Nicaragua, neo-liberalismo, auto-regulación, resistencia, identidad, exclusión
Palabras Clave: Nicaragua, neo-liberalism, self-regulation, resistance identity, exclusion

This article examines some of the negative impacts of ethnic self-regulation on the processes of

En este artículo se estudian algunos de los efectos negativos de la auto-regulación étnica sobre los
democratization in Nicaragua. Based on a case study of a small Miskitu community on the Atlantic Coast the article argues that self-regulatory practices do not automatically forge the integration of civil society. On the contrary, these practices lead to an exclusionary development process that reinforces existing divisions and deepens ongoing conflicts. This argument is based on a distinction between three different, yet interrelated, expressions of neo-liberal change on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua: First, in the absence of state institutions the political influence of the ethnic minorities lies not in the ability to mobilize against the state, but in the fact that they fill the vacuum created by a state in retreat. Community members thus execute political authority and create social and political space. Second, the execution of political authority may contribute to the formation of community and the creation of space and social rights. But in this process other vulnerable groups are excluded, marginalized and denied access to basic rights. Thirdly, self-help practices lead to an exaggerated fragmentation of society into secluded and autonomous spatial and social units based on inward-looking principles.

The Rise and Fall of Mexico’s Green Movement (Auge y caída del movimiento verde de México)

Jordi Díez

Keywords: Mexico, social movements, green movement, democratization, movement decline

An important component of the process of political change Mexico has undergone over the last two decades has been mass mobilization of society, as numerous sectors have pulled out of corporatist structures and placed demands directly upon the state. It is within this ‘thickening’ of civil society that Mexico’s environmental movement emerged, strengthened and was ultimately able to achieve numerous policy triumphs during the 1990s. Puzzlingly, however, since the end of PRI rule in the 2000 elections and the advent of democratic politics, Mexico’s environmental movement has suffered a severe weakening, a weakening which has resulted in very limited impact on national environmental policy. This article examines the reasons behind the weakening of Mexican processes of democratización en Nicaragua. Basándome en un caso estudio de una pequeña comunidad miskito en la costa atlántica, en el artículo sostengo que las prácticas auto-regulatorias no forjan automáticamente la integración de la sociedad civil. Al contrario, estas prácticas conducen a un proceso de desarrollo excluyente que refuerza las divisiones existentes y acentúa los conflictos en curso. Esta interpretación se basa en la distinción entre tres expresiones diferentes, aunque interrelacionadas, del cambio neo-liberal en la costa atlántica de Nicaragua: Primero, en la ausencia de instituciones estatales, la influencia política de las minorías étnicas no reposa en la capacidad de movilización contra el estado, sino en el hecho de que estas minorías llenan el vacío dejado por un estado en retirada. De este modo los miembros de la comunidad ejercen autoridad política y crean espacio y derechos sociales. Segundo, el ejercicio de autoridad política puede contribuir a la formación de la comunidad y a la creación de espacio y derechos sociales. Pero en este proceso se excluye a otros grupos vulnerables, marginándolos y negándoles el acceso a derechos básicos. Tercero, las prácticas de auto-ayuda conducen a una exagerada fragmentación de la sociedad en unidades espaciales y sociales recluidas y autónomas, centradas en sí mismas.
environmentalism since 2000. Based on data obtained through field research and in-depth personal interviews with key state and non-state actors, this article presents the argument that the weakening of the Mexican environmentalism is primarily due to a ‘leadership vacuum’ produced by the inclusion of the movement’s key actors into positions within the Environment Ministry during the first half of Fox’s administration (2000-06).

Retos y perspectivas de la gobernanza del agua y gestión integral de recursos hídricos en Bolivia (Challenges and perspectives of water governance and integrated water resource management in Bolivia)

Sergio Antonio Ruiz e Ingo Georg Gentes

Key words: Water governance, integrated water resource management, democracy, Bolivia

Bolivia is not only highly affected by social and political instability, but also by erosion and climate change and an indiscriminate and vast exploitation of its natural resources. The new policy structure seeks to establish a broad consensus on better water governance relying on a participatory democracy approach and the commitment to indicators for sustainable development. The creation of a Water Ministry in 2006, which emerged from the water riots against privatization of water rights and sanitation services in 2000, can be interpreted as a clear sign for more integration of social movements and civil organizations. But at the present these organizations seemed to be marginalized from the decision-making process, and government and public institutions are confronting a complex situation of weakened legitimacy. The present paper offers an insight on the ongoing process, including the challenges and obstacles for the implementation of a new water policy and local integrated water management systems. The reflections consider the official legal framework and a policy analysis in order to illustrate the conflictive schemes in different regions and localities. The final aim is to indicate the gaps between the official discourse and local realities for water governance and to indicate some recommendations for a more coherent public-civic action in water governance, control and transparency.
Farmers, Markets and Contracts: Chain Integration of Smallholder Producers in Costa Rica
(Campesinos, mercados y contratos: La integración al mercado de los pequeños productores de Costa Rica)

Ruerd Ruben and Fernando Sáenz-Segura

Keywords: Contract farming; supply chain, market integration; smallholders; Costa Rica
Palabras clave: Agricultura de Contrato; cadena de intermediación; inserción de mercado, pequeños productores; Costa Rica

Contract farming is frequently considered as an appropriate mechanism for integrating smallholders into dynamic markets. We discuss the rationale for the variety in contractual arrangements between small-scale producers and agro-processing firms in the Northern and Central region of Costa Rica. Different market configurations give rise to delivery conditions, ranging from spot market negotiations to verbal or written contracts. We analyse which types of farmers are typically engaged in each of these contractual arrangements, and what are the implications for their production and investment decisions. Main attention is given to the effects of institutional organization for equity, efficiency and sustainability. The analysis is based on detailed case studies for two non-traditional commodities (pepper and chayote). Results suggest that contracts provide an important insurance device for farmers meeting investment and information constraints, and offer incentive for more intensive input use. This suggests that contract farming may be a critical requirement enabling smallholders to enter into specialized markets.

Troublesome Construction: The Rationale and Risks of IIRSA
(Una construcción problemática: Razones y riesgos de IIRSA)

Pitou van Dijck

Keywords: IIRSA, road infrastructure, integration, land use conversion, strategic environmental assessment (SEA)
Palabras clave: IIRSA, infraestructura vial, integración, conversión en el uso de la tierra, evaluación medioambiental estratégica,

Latin American countries are involved in implementing a continental-wide infrastructure programme to deepen regional integration and facilitate their insertion in international markets. The IIRSA [Iniciativa para la Integración de la Infraestructura Regional Suramericana] program-

Los países latinoamericanos están implementando un programa continental de infraestructura para profundizar la integración regional y facilitar su inserción en los mercados internacionales. El programa de IIRSA [Iniciativa para la Integración de la Infraestructura Regional Surameri-
me includes ten so called development hubs that may contribute to significant change in the location of economic activities in the continent as well. They may as well have a substantial impact on the environment in regions adjacent to the corridors. This study deals with the rationale and organization of the IIRSA infrastructure programme. Subsequently the study focuses on the spatial impact such corridors may have and the environmental, social and economic implication of these roads. Finally the paper deals with some critical methodological problems involved in the making of strategic environmental assessment studies of IIRSA-related road infrastructure projects.

cana] incluye diez centros de desarrollo que pueden contribuir a cambios importantes en la ubicación de las actividades económicas en el continente. Estos centros podrían tener un impacto substancial en el medioambiente de las regiones adyacentes a los corredores. Este estudio se ocupa de las razones y organización del programa de infraestructura de IIRSA. Luego nos concentrarnos en el impacto espacial que pueden tener esos corredores y las implicaciones sociales, económicas y para el medioambiente de esos caminos. Finalmente tratamos en el artículo algunos críticos problemas metodológicos en la elaboración de evaluaciones medioambientales estratégicas de proyectos de infraestructura vial de IIRSA.
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Orvar Löfgren & Billy Ehn

Life After Dark in Kwahu Tafo
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El disparo de los índices delictivos en las ciudades y el surgimiento de industrias criminales transnacionales, en particular el narcotráfico, van a la mano del proceso de democratización de las instituciones políticas en México a partir de la década de 1980. La seguridad se ha convertido en el tema angular del debate social, y está al centro de las preocupaciones ciudadanas; en respuesta, los gobiernos democráticos formulan políticas para la reducción de la criminalidad y violencia. La seguridad en México es un indicador del funcionamiento del estado de derecho, de las instituciones públicas y también un revelador de los miedos públicos y confianza de los ciudadanos en su gobierno.

Mientras el sistema político del país transita de un partido de Estado a un modelo multipartidista, es primordial estudiar las respuestas de estos gobiernos sobre la cuestión de la seguridad. ¿Cuál ha sido el impacto de la transición política sobre la reducción del crimen y la agenda de seguridad en México? ¿Cómo funcionan y son utilizadas las instituciones policiales y judiciales en este contexto?

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Ciudad/Estado/Código Postal __________________________ Páis
City/State/Postal Code __________________________ Country

CEDLA: Keizersgracht 395-397; 1016 EK Amsterdam; Países Bajos/The Netherlands